REESE  LIBRARY 


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UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 

%ecei  / /  L^t  ^«  '      / 


•  Accessions  A'.j.^y  /  /  7  .      Class  No. 


~\j _ U— B— Lf— 


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I 


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HEGEL'S 


z.  ¥■ 


Educational  Ideas 


BY 


WILLIAM  M.  BRYANT,  M.  A.,  LL.D. 

w 

Instructor  in  Psychology  and  Ethics,  St.  Louis  Normal  and  High 
School.     Author  of  "The  World-Energy  and  Its  Self-Conserva- 
tion;1' "The  Philosophy  of  Landscape  Painting  ;  "  "Syl- 
labus of  Psychology  ;  "  Syllabus  of  Ethics,"  Etc.,  Etc. 


WERNER  SCHOOL  BOOK  COMPANY 

NEW  YORK  CHICAGO  BOSTON 


>\AB8 


Cv97f 

Copyright,  1896, 
By  William  M.  Bryant. 


Educational  Ideas. 


■hIh  Oft 


CONTENTS 


I.     Preliminary  View 15 

II.     Hegel's  Personality  and  Envi- 
ronment        25 

III.  General  Educational  View  Im- 

plied in  the  Hegelian  System  32 

IV.  "From  the  Simple  to  the  Com- 

plex " 44 

V.     "  The  Ages  of  Man  " 52 

VI.     General  Notion  of  Education  .  77 

VII.     Instruction — Its  Character      .  89 

VIII.     Instruction — Its  Process  ...  93 
IX.     Instruction — Its  Means — A. 

Language  .  x no 

X.     Instruction — Its  Means— B. 

Form 157 

XI.     Instruction — Its  Means — C. 

The  Study  of  Process     .    .    .  171 

XII.     Instruction — Its  Method       .     .  183 

XIII.  Discipline 187 

XIV.  Refinement 200 


/ 


PREFACE. 


The  concept  at  the  heart  of  the  science 
current  at  the  present  day  is  expressed  in 
the  word  "  Evolution."  So  far  as  it  refers 
directly  to  the  inorganic  world,  this  con- 
cept takes  shape  in  the  expressions  :  "  Con- 
servation of  Energy  "  and  "  Correlation  of 
Forces."  As  applied  to  the  organic  king- 
dom, the  same  concept  assumes  the  aspect 
indicated  by  the  phrase  "  Natural  Selec- 
tion." 

Thus  far  the  science  of  the  day  has  to 
do  chiefly  with  those  processes — i.  e.}  con- 
crete relations — which  are  unfolded  in  and 
through  forms  occupying  space.  These 
forms,  acting  directly  upon  the  sense-or- 
gans, appeal  immediately  to  the  sensuous 
consciousness.  In  the  main,  therefore, 
scientific  works  within  this  sphere  consist 
of  vivid  and  presumably  precise  descrip- 
tions of  phenomena.  Not  infrequently 
apology  is  offered    for   adding   to  the  de- 

5 


6  Preface. 

scription  serious  discussion  of  the  "  ab- 
stract '  principles  involved  in  the  phe- 
nomena. 

Nevertheless,  though  the  idea  of  evolu- 
tion has  so  generally  appeared  in  merely 
implicit  rather  than  explicit  or  actually 
reasoned-out  form,  in  treatises  that  have 
passed  as  "  scientific,"  this  very  fact  has 
not  been  without  its  compensation.  There 
has  indeed  been  positive  advantage  in  the 
pictorial  and  dogmatic  form  in  which  this 
central  feature  in  the  thought  of  the  time 
has  been  so  generally  presented.  As  pic 
torial  it  has  appealed  directly  to  the  im- 
agination. As  dogmatically  expressed,  it 
has  appealed  to  the  element  of  faith  inhe- 
rent in  the  human  mind.  Thus  it  has 
rapidly  made  its  way  into  general  recogni- 
tion and  acceptance. 

The  pedagogical  intimations  contained 
in  all  this  are  of  the  greatest  value  ;  and 
we  are  now  in  full  swing  of  the  attempt  to 
possess  ourselves  of  that  value.  So  eager 
have  we  been  in  this  attempt,  besides, 
that  many  of  us  are  even  now  but  just  be- 


Preface.  7 

ginning  to  suspect  the  gravity  of  the  dan- 
gers it  involves.  The  aspects  of  the  world 
appealing  to  the  sensuous  consciousness 
have  exercised  such  fascination  upon  us 
that  for  the  time  being  the  reflective  con- 
sciousness has  been  held  in  abeyance — 
maintained  in  a  state  of  comparative  "  in- 
hibition." We  have  thus  unawares  actu- 
ally been  delivering  ourselves  over  to  the 
relatively  rudimentary  phase  of  conscious- 
ness as  to  an  infallible  guide,  and  neglect- 
ing the  cultivation  of  the  more  adequate 
phase  consisting  of  the  reflective  conscious- 
ness. This,  too,  on  the  assumption  that 
somehow  the  latter  must  inevitably  land 
us  in  the  limbo  of  hopeless  contradictions. 
Yet  the  divine  instinct  of  Reason  in  us 
is  not  wholly  to  be  suppressed  ;  and  its 
protest  against  the  attempt  to  impale 
thought  upon  the  microscropist's  needle, 
and  by  the  magic  of  some  new  X-ray 
power  compel  the  non-extended  to  as- 
sume sensuously  visible  form,  has  at 
length  taken  the  special  direction  of  seri- 
ous   psychological    research.       From  our 


8  Preface. 

exuberant  contemplation  of  material  forms 
we  are  turning  with  increasing  evidence 
of  anxiety  to  the  consideration  of  mental 
modes. 

But  even  this  instinctive  struggle  illus- 
trates in  most  impressive  fashion  the  speil 
under  which  the  mind  of  the  time  is  still 
more  or  less  completely  bound.  Ignoring 
the  fact  that  mind  can  be  known  by  mind 
alone,  and  be  known  alone  to  mind,  we 
have  been  assured  that  a  "new  '  psychol- 
ogy has  taken  the  place  of  the  "  old  ;" 
that  the  true  psychology  consists  in  a 
mass  of  "  truths  "  attained  through  a  study 
of  the  nervous  system  ;  in  short,  we  have 
been  asked,  with  much  show  of  serious- 
ness, to  accept  a  "  psychology  without 
the  psyche." 

By  degrees,  however,  we  are  beginning 
to  recognize  that  only  the  workings  of  an 
actual  psyche  could  give  rise  even  to  such 
"  psychology  ;"  and  so,  grateful  for  the  nu- 
merous, and  often  helpful,  clews  the  "  new 
psychology  "  affords  us,  we  are  beginning 
to  brace   ourselves   to    the   really  serious 


/ 


Preface.  9 

task  of  studying  mind  as  Mind — mind  in 
its  essential,  universal,  typical  nature. 

Most  helpful  of  all  the  clews  of  which 
modern  science  has  emphasized  the  value, 
indeed,  is  this  :  that  spiritual  as  well  as  phy- 
sical *  Reality  can  be  known  only  through 
its  appearance — which  in  truth  is  not  so 
far  from  saying  with  Spinoza,  that  "  at- 
tributes are  what  constitute  the  essence 
of  Substance."  So  that  if  we  are  really  to 
know  mind,  we  must  observe  mind  itself. 

But  this  throws  us  back  upon  the  pro- 
cesses of  mind  as  involved  in  the  ac- 
tual normal  development  of  mind.  In 
other  words,  it  refers  us  to  the  whole  pro- 
cess of  education  in  its  widest  sense,  as 
involving  the  essential  facts  to  be  co-ordi- 
nated and  given  accXirate  valuation  in  any 
really  vital  psychology.  And  the  recipro- 
cal of  this  is  that  if  we  would  really  com- 
prehend the  true  significance  of  education, 
whether  in  respect  of  its  aim  or  of  its 
means  or  of  its  method,  we  must  be  guided 

*  And  it  may  turn  out  that  the  latter  is  only  an 
aspect  of  the  former. 


\^ 


I  o  Preface. 

in  our  study  by  the  principles  of  a  sound 
psychology. 

Clearly  then  the  study  of  Natural  Sci- 
ence forces  us  forward  to  the  study  of 
psychology;  while  the  study  of  psychol- 
ogy necessarily  leads  us  on  to  thoroughly 
re-examine  education  as  constituting  in  its 
total  range  the  positive  process  in  which 
the  phenomena  of  mind  may  be  traced, 
not  only  in  their  essential,  vital  relation  to 
each  other,  but  also  in  their  actual  con- 
crete  evolution.  In  other  words,  we  are 
driven  to  consider  the  total,  universal  na- 
ture of  mind,  both  in  its  inner  and  in  its 
outer  phases.  And  this  again  necessarily 
involves  the  study  of  all  the  essential  as- 
pects of  relation  into  which  the  individual 
mind  can  enter  with  other  things. 

Finally,  when  this  survey  has  been  com- 
pleted, it  is  discovered  tWat  Education  is 
the  process  of  developing  the  individual 
mind  through  bringing  it  into  ever  increas- 
ingly complex  actual  —  and  that  means 
conscious — relation  with  the  total  World 
or  Universe,  as  the  expression  of  the  one 


Preface.  1 1 

ultimate  Reason   or  primal  Cause   of  all, 
including  the  individual  mind  itself.  » 

Throughout  this  whole  research,  as  we 
may  now  observe,  there  is  at  every  step 
increasingly  imperative  need  of  safe  guid- 
ance. Such  safe  guidance,  again,  is  to  be 
found  only  in  the  organically  unfolded 
thought  of  the  world  (universe),  as  ex- 
pressed in  the  teachings  of  the  great  sys- 
tematizes who  have  marked  the  great 
epochs  in  the  evolution  of  human  intelli- 
gence. Among  these,  Aristotlejn  ancient_ 
times,  and  Hegel  in  molJeTntimes,  have 
presented  the  most  comprehensive  and 
consistent  systematizations  of  human 
thought. 

Like  Aristotle,  Hegel  has  been  rejected 
by  the  impatient,  and  despised  by  the 
thoughtless.  Nevertheless  the  truth  re- 
mains, that  whoever  would  set  Aristotle 
or  Hegel  or  any  other  great  thinker  aside 
as  "  antiquated,"  must  first  master  such 
thinker's  total  thought,  and  show  its  im- 
perfections. Otherwise  he  but  exposes 
his  own  emptiness  and  conceit. 


1 2  Preface. 

Thus  the  great  and  growing  interest  of 
the  present  day  in  mind,  and  in  education 
as  the  process  of  the  normal  unfolding  of 
mind,  is  inevitably  referring  us  to  the  great 
thinkers  for  stimulus  and  guidance  in  our 
task  of  deepening  and  revising  our  knowl- 
edge of  what  mind  essentially  is,  as  well 
as  of  the  true  mode  of  its  development. 
In  this  deeply  significant  and  promising 
movement  thoughtful  minds  are  gravitat- 
ing more  and  more  definitely  toward  He- 
gel as  the  one  who  thus  far  has  presented 
in  clearest  and  most  adequate  form  the 
true  philosophic  ground  of  all  science  and 
of  all  educational  work,  rightly  so  called. 
And  if  we  are,  as  it  were,  predestined  to 
go  to  school  to  him,  it  is  because  he  obe- 
diently went  to  school  to  all  the  world, 
and  learned  from  them  the  central  clew  to 
the  actual  evolution  of  the  thought  of  the 
race  as  progressively  reflecting  the  thought 
of  the  eternal  Mind,  which  again  consti- 
tutes the  absolute  law  of  the  development 
of  the  individual  human  mind. 

The  following  essay  is  an  attempt  to  in- 


Preface.  1 3 

terpret  Hegel's  theory  with  direct  refer- 
ence to  the  educational  needs  of  our  own 
time.  It  is  believed  that  this  theory  will 
be  found  to  justify  whatever  is  really  good 
in  the  "  New  Education,"  and  also  to  fur- 
nish adequate  ground  for  the  rejection  of 
whatever  it  presents  of  the  spurious  and 
merely  novel. 

We  may  add,  finally,  that  Hegel  is  not 
properly  to  be  looked  upon  as  a  competi- 
tor with  Pestalozzi  and  Froebel  and  Her- 
bart  for  the  honors  of  educational  leader- 
ship. Rather  he  presents  in  his  system  of 
philosophy  as  a  whole  a  universal  scheme 
of  education  in  which  each  of  these  great 
reformers  finds  his  proper  place  and  due 
relation.  If  this  scheme  is  not  found  in 
the  present  essay,  the  fault  must  be  cred- 
ited to  the  present  writer. 

I  am  indebted  to  my  son,  Max  Midler 
Bryant,  for  valuable  assistance  in  reading 
the  proof. 


HEGEL'S 
EDUCATIONAL  IDEAS 


i. 

PRELIMINARY   VIEW. 


It  is  a  matter  of  frequent  remark  that 
Hegel  was  one  of  those  fortunate  indi- 
viduals who  come  to  be  born  "  in  the  full- 
ness of  time."  He  lived  at  the  culmi- 
nation of  a  great  epoch  in  the  spiritual 
history  of  mankind. 

In  the  sixteenth  century  Luther  had 
given  articulate  expression  to  the  univer- 
sal sense  of  protest  against  the  demand 
for  unreasoning  submission  to  mere  au- 
thority in  morals  and  religion.  In  the 
seventeenth  century  Descartes  gave  utter- 
ance to  the  same  spirit  of  protest,  though 
by  him  the  protest  was  directed  against 
unreasoning  submission  to  mere  authority 

15 


1 6  Hegefs  Educational  Ideas. 

within  the  realm  of  speculative  science. 
In  the  eighteenth  century  the  rising  spirit 
of  Individualism  gradually  assumed  politi- 
cal form,  and  at  length  burst  forth  in  the 
French  Revolution. 

In  the  mind  of  Locke  this  principle  had 
developed,  not  so  much  in  the  form  of  a 
universal  principle  applicable  to  all  men 
alike,  as  in  the  form  of  a  staid,  respectable 
self-assertion  appropriate  to  a  member  of 
a  cultivated  English  household.*  Rous- 
seau, while  borrowing  from  Locke,  yet 
wrenched  the  idea  of  individualistic  right 
and  individual  destiny  completely  free 
from  the  limitations  of  the  mild  form  in 
which  Locke  had  rendered  it  familiar  to 
the  English-speaking  people,  and  with 
fierce  energy  proclaimed  it  as  the  central 
characteristic  native  in  every  man. 

It  was  thus  that  Rousseau  came  at  once 
to  be  recognized  as  the  apostle  of  the  rev- 
olutionary spirit,  and  that  he  proved  to 
be  the    actual    and    specially  appropriate 

*  Cf.  Erdmann,  History  of  Philosophy  (Trans.  Wil- 
liston  S.  Hough),  II.,  no. 


Preliminary  View.  17 

prophet  of  the  Revolution.  If,  as  he 
taught,  individual  man  is  already  good 
when  he  comes  from  the  hand  of  nature, 
and  is  only  ruined  by  Society,  then,  as  an 
individual,  man  has  the  right  to  turn  upon 
and  destroy  Society. 

Such  reckless  intellectualism  has  its  off- 
set in  the  devoutly  ethical,  but  still  essen- 
tially individualistic,  spirit  of  Kant,  who 
summed  up  the  whole  of  philosophy  in  its 
practical  import  in  the  declaration  that, 
in  all  the  world  there  is  nothing  good 
"except  a  good  will."*  But  also,  it  is  im- 
portant to  remember  that,  by  a  "  good 
will,"  he  meant  not  the  mere  individual 
will,  as  it  comes  directly  from  the  hand  of 
nature  (Rousseau's  view),  but  rather  the 
individual  will,  enlightened  and  discip- 
lined through  the  practical  unfolding  of 
its  normal  social  relations  in  the  full  range 
of  all  their  normal  aspects. 

Let  us  note  now  that  all  these  elements, 
revolutionary  and  restraining,were  already 

*  Kant's  Theory  of   Ethics    (Trans.    Abbott),  4th 
ed.,  p.  9. 

2 


r 


1 8  HegeVs  Educational  Ideas. 

in  full  swing  of  seething  ferment  when,  in 
1770,  Georg  Wilhelm  Friedrich  Hegel 
was  ushered  into  individual  existence  in 
this  world  of  ours.  Such  storm-brewing 
atmosphere  he  breathed  from  his  infancy. 
As  a  youth  he  witnessed  the  bursting  of 
the  storm,  and  felt  through  his  whole  be- 
ing the  awakening  force  of  the  shock.  In 
his  maturer  years  he  saw  the  full  measure 
of  destructiveness  involved  in  the  unre- 
strained fury  of  the  mere  crude  natural 
individualism  of  Rousseau.  It  was  thus 
that  he  was  led  to  penetrate  to  the  deep- 
est secret  of  that  transfigured  individual- 
ism which  never  emerges  into  fullness  of 
definition  save  in  the  character  of  a  sec- 
ond birth.  And  this  spiritual  regenera- 
tion in  turn  is  possible  in  no  other  way 
than  through  conscious  and  deliberate 
self-restraint  within  the  limits  of  a  rational 
social  organization. 

Naturally  enough,  the  youthful  Hegel, 
like  the  youthful  Goethe,  was  dazzled  by 
the  splendor  of  the  Titan,  Napoleon. 
Even  as  late  as    1806  he  refers  to  him  as 


Preliminary   View.  1 9 

"  this  World-Soul."*  On  the  other  hand 
the  mature  Hegel,  like  the  mature  Goethe, 
turned  resolutely  away  from  the  Titan, 
and  paid  his  deeper  homage  to  the  actual 
Divinity,  which  he  more  and  more  clearly 
saw  to  be  struggling  into  ever  richer  de- 
grees of  self-realization  in  humanity  as  a 
whole,  and  also  in  each  individual  member 
of  the  race. 

Such  may  serve  as  a  hint  in  explanation 
of  the  fact  that  the  writings  of  Hegel 
are  everywhere  so  strikingly  pervaded  with 
the  calmly  reasoned  assurance  of  the  di- 
vine nature  of  man  as  genuine  individual 
Person.  Equally,  too,  does  the  inevita- 
ble inference,  that  because  of  this  divine 
nature  man  as  individual  is  immortal  and 
weighted  with  an  infinite  destiny,  appear 
as  the  fundamental  tone  in  every  line. 

Thus  Hegel  may  rightly  be  regarded  as 
the  representative  of  absolute  Individual- 
ism, in  which  the  individual  human  soul 
is  seen  as  at  once  the  vibrant  focus  of  all 
divine  influences,  and  as  the  infinitely  pro- 

*Thaulo\v,  Hegets  Ansichten,  III.,  165. 


V 


20  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

phetic  germ  of  all  divine  qualities,  and 
hence,  as  the  central  object  of  interest  in 
all  the  universe,  so  far  as  the  universe  is 
viewed  as  a  process  of  evolution  from 
lower  to  higher  forms. 

Hence,  also,  the  whole  of  the  Hegelian 
system  is  the  absolute  denial  of  exclusive 
right  on  the  part  of  any  "  royal  "  person- 
age to  declare  of  himself,  "  I  am  the  state,/ 
because  the  whole  of  that  system  is  the 
absolute  declaration  of  right  on  the  part 
of  ££idi  and  every  member  of  the  human 
race  to  make  and  verify  that  declaration 
of  and  for  himself. 

And  because  Right  and  Duty  are  but 
obverse  aspects  of  one  and  the  same  rela- 
tion, it  is  equally  the  duty  of  each  and 
every  member  of  the  race  to  practically 
assert  the  organic  oneness  of  the  State 
with  himself.  For  true  Royalty  inheres 
in  every  human  being  ;  a  Royalty  bearing 
within  it  the  inalienable,  because  divine, 
Right  to  all  the  conditions,  negative  and 
positive,  needful  for  his  own  complete 
self-unfolding. 


Preliminary  View.  21 

Such,  in  brief,  may  be  taken  as  a  pre- 
liminary intimation  of  the  central  practi- 
cal characteristic  of  the  Hegelian  philoso- 
phy. And  because  this  in  turn  is  but  the 
summarizing  and  fusing  into  organic  unity 
of  all  the  vital  results  of  the  entire  ferment 
of  the  spirit  of  Individualism  in  its  deep- 
est import,  Hegel  may  be^aiteaMn"fe"specT 
of  this,  as  long  ago  he  was  called  in  respect 
of  the  whole  field  of  speculative  thought : 
11  the  Harvester  " — the  one  who  had  only  to 
gather,  and  arrange  in  bundles,  and  store, 
the  ripened  fruit  of  other  men's  labors. 

"  Only ! "  His  wisdom  was  nothing 
more  than  that  of  selection,  and  arrange- 
ment, and  discovery  of  vital  relations,  and 
bringing  to  view  of  essential  values,  and 
showing,  as  had  nevqr  been  shown  before, 
that  the  world  is  one  infinite  organic 
Whole,  whose  inner  creative  principle  is 
absolute,  eternal  Mind,  and  whose  outer 
form  is  but  the  manifestation  of  that  Mind 
— such  manifestation  culminating  in  con- 
scious units  identical  in  nature  with  that 


22  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

In  fact,  it  is  just  this  view  that  the  world 
—pro-duct  of  Mind  and  culminates 
in  mind  that  constitutes  the  real  clew  to 
Hegel's  educational  principles;  and  equal- 
ly it  is  this  that  explains  how  it  happens 
that  throughout  Hegel's  writings  are  found 
everywhere  references  to  educational  needs 
and  conditions  and  appliances  ;  so  much  so 
that  one  nTay~^ery~- well  conclude  that 
every  word  Hegel  deemed  worth  the 
trouble  of  recording  was  set  down  because 
to  him  it  pointed  the  way  to  the  education 
of  man  in  the  sense  of  the  unfolding  of 
the  divine  nature  in  each  individual  man. 

It  would  even  lead  us  to  suspect  that 
Hegel  intended  his  whole  system  to  find 
its  practical  culmination  in  the  systematic 
exposition  of  the  fundamental  principles 
underlying  the  aims,  the  means  and  the 
methods  of  Education.  And  in  fact,  a 
letter  from  Hegel  to  Niethammer  indicates 
his  intention  of  writing  out  what  he  sig- 
nificantly calls  a  Staatspddogogik;  that  is, 
a  science  of  Education  in  which  education 
is  viewed  as,  on  the  one  side,  a  function  of 


Preliminary   View.  23 

the  social  organism,  and  on  the  other,  as 
the  individual's  own  development  through 
his  reactions  upon  the  whole  round  of  the 
institutional  life  in  which  he  is  involved.* 

Nor  can  we  doubt  that,  as  Thaulow 
confidently  believes,f  Hegel  would  have 
carried  out  this  design  but  for  the  sudden 
termination  of  his  life,  while  yet  in  the 
full  vigor  of  his  mental  power. 

In  the  following  essay,  I  shall  attempt 
to  present,  in  as  clear,  connected  and  con- 
cise a  form  as  possible,  what  I  conceive  to 
have  been  Hegel's  educational  ideas,  as 
these  appear  by  way  of  seemingly  inci- 
dental remark  and  illustration  scattered 
throughout  his  various  works  ;  and  I  shall 
also  endeavor  to  show  how,  when  brought 
together,  these  occasional  notes  of  his  on 
/  the  subject  of  education  simply  expand 
into  detailed  form  the  central  idea  of  the 
V  human  mind  in  the  normal  process  of  its 
awn  development — the  idea  which,  as  al- 
ready  indicated,  constitutes  the  practical, 

*  Cf.      Rosenkranz  :    HegeP s  Leben,   p.  254. 
f  HegeVs  Ansichten,  III.,  5. 


24  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 


living  core  of  Hegel's  whole  system  of 
philosophy.  It  need  hardly  be  added  that 
what  I  shall  have  to  say  must  of  course 
assume,  in  large  measure,  the  character  of 
interpretation.  How  far  the  interpreta- 
tion is  faithful  to  the  original  the  critical 
reader  will  judge  for  himself. 

Before  entering  upon  this,  however,  it 
will  be  well  to  bring  before  our  minds, 
though  it  be  ever  so  briefly,  Hegel's  own 
personality. 


Hegel 's  Personality  and  Environment .       25 

II. 

HEGEL'S    PERSONALITY    AND     ENVIRON- 
MENT. 

ALREADY  in  the  sixteenth  century  the 
Protestant  ferment  forced  upon  the  ances- 
tors of  Hegel  the  choice  between  convic- 
tion and  comfort — between  inward  peace 
coupled  with  outward  struggle  on  the  one 
hand,  and  outward  calm,  with  inward  un- 
rest, on  the  other.  The  choice  was  in 
favor  of  the  deeper  conviction  of  Right  ; 
and  this  involved  the  breaking  up  of  es- 
tablished associations  and  the  entering 
into  new  relations,  the  emigration  from 
Catholic  Austria  into  Protestant  Schwabia. 

Lying  in  a  valley,^  but  commanding  an 
extended  view,  is  the  capital  city,  Stutt- 
gart. Here,  on  the  27th  of  August,  1770, 
was  born  the  child  who  was  to  become  the 
philosopher  in  whose  educational  ideas  we 
are  now  centering  our  interest. 

Everywhere  man  is  more  or  less  dis- 
tinctly  the  child   of   Mother   Earth;    and 


26  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

the  Schwabian  character  has  a  peculiarity 
of  texture  due  to  the  Schwabian  land.  So 
that  Rosenkranz'  reference  to  Hegel's 
" tie f €7i  tic  Jit  Sckwdbischen,  Innigkeit"*  to 
his  deep,  genuine  Schwabian  Internality, 
or  tendency  to  serious  reflection,  is  by  no 
means  merely  a  figure  of  speech. 

Similarly,  on  the  other  hand,  there  can 
be  no  doubt  that  the  passing  of  his  early 
life  in  the  city  which  constituted,  not  only 
the  focus  of  all  the  interests  of  Schwabia, 
but  also  one  of  the  foci  of  the  more  gen- 
eral interests  of  Protestant  Germany, 
served  as  an  offset  to  the  revery-inviting 
quiet  of  the  beautiful  mountain-bordered 
valley,  and  stimulated  the  mind  of  the 
gifted  boy  to  inquire  into  the  secrets  of 
the  currents  of  human  interest  that  were 
ceaselessly  mingling  in  the  life  of  the 
town.  And  this  the  more  as  the  employ- 
ment of  his  father  in  the  public  service 
brought  the  family  into  direct  and  varied 
relation  with  many  persons  of  high  official 
rank — persons  constituting  the  immediate 

*  HegeVs  Lcbcn,  p.  5. 


HegeVs  Persojiality  and  Enviro7iment.       27 

embodiment  of  actual    current  public   in- 
terests. 

Under  these  circumstances  it  was  but 
natural  that  there  should  develop  in  such 
a  mind  as  that  of  the  youthful  Hegel  an 
"  all-sided  attentiveness,"  amounting  to  a 
special  alertness  as  toward  every  sort  of 
aim  and  activity.  Nor  was  it  less  natural 
that  through  his  native  "  Schwabian  inter- 
nality  "  this  all-sided  attentiveness  should 
deepen  into  a  lively  desire  for  systema- 
tized knowledge  along  every  line  of  in- 
quiry open  to  the  human_mindL____ 

Neither  can  we  doubt  that  the  clerical 
precision  and  formal  finish  of  the  official 
life  with  which  he  was  surrounded  during 
his  early  years  impressed  him  deeply  ;  and 
so  much  so  as  to  account  in  part  for  the 
pains-taking,  methodical  way  in  which 
throughout  his  whole  life  he  pursued  his 
studies.  Especially  would  this  seem  to  be 
the  case  in  respect  of  his  voluminous  note- 
books. Nor  does  it  seem  unreasonable  to 
suppose  also  that  this  entered  as  a  subor- 
dinate but  appreciable  factor  into  his  high 


28  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

estimate  of  formal  finish  and  methodical 
completeness  and  consistency  in  the  work- 
ing out  of  the  details  of  his  System  of 
Philosophy.  However  this  may  be,  the 
fact  is  beyond  dispute  that  Hegel  is,  above 
everything  else,  just  the  systematize?,  of 
human  knowledge. 

In  /his  respect  he  is  the  man  whose 
work;  more  than  that  of  any  other  in  the 
history  of  human  thought,  is  rich  in  its 
suggestiveness  for  the  teacher.  For  it  is 
the  teacher  above  all  others,  to  whom,  as 
such,  Method  is  the  very  breath  of  life. 
And  this  because  it  is  of  the  very  essence 
of  the  daily  life  of  the  teacher  to  bring 
other  minds  to  a  consciousness  of  the  true 
method  of  Thinking  as  the  process  of  the 
inner  definition  of  life,  and  of  Doing,  as 
the  process  of  its  outer  definition. 

Eager,  yet  methodical,  enthusiastic,  yet 
self-contained  and  logical,  Hegel  very 
early  proved  himself  to  be  a  representa- 
tive at  once  of  the  spirit  of  the  highly 
sophisticated  eighteenth  century  "  En- 
lightenment "  and  of  the  buoyant  spirit  of 


HegeVs  Personality  and  Environment.       29 

classical  antiquity.  Awake  in  the  Present 
he  was  also  awake  to  the  Past.  So  that 
from  the  outset  his  instinct  of  methodical 
completeness,  stimulated  as  we  have  seen, 
forced  him  forward  to  read  the  Past  in  the 
light  of  the  Present,  and  to  interpret  the 
Present  as  the  normal  fruit  of  the  Past. 
The  very  conditions  of  his  own  mental 
evolution  led  him  on  by  a  logical  necessity 
to  the  unfolding  of  his  own  famous  "  his- 
torical method,"  and  hence  to  the  speedy 
transcending  of  the  over-confident  spirit 
of  the  Aufklarung. 

Thus  his  school-days  were  occupied,  not 
with  mere  mechanical  conning  and  recit- 
ing of  prescribed  lessons.  Rather  the 
most  significant  picture  presented  to  us  in 
those  days  is  that  of  Hegel,  alone  in  his 
private  room,  working  with  quiet,  unre- 
mitting intensity  over  books  not  assigned 
as  text.  These  were  by  no  means  books 
of  "  light  literature."  They  were  such 
books  as  the  Psalms,  the  Iliad,  Cicero's 
Letters,  Euripides,  Aristotle's  Ethics,  the 
CEdipus   of  Sophocles,   Epictetus,  Thucy- 


30  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

dides ;  besides  modern  works  in  history, 
mathematics,  science,  art,  criticism,  phil- 
osophy and  theology.  From  all  of  which 
he  made  careful  and  extended  extracts. 

Throughout  all  this,  too,  there  was  the 
gathering  force  of  the  prophetic  instinct 
that  was  at  length  to  unfold  into  such 
marvelously  symmetrical  and  richly  varied 
realization  in  the  form  of  explicit  and  sus- 
tained thought. 

For  our  present  purpose,  too,  it  is  of  es- 
pecial moment  to  notice  that  even  so  early 
as  his  fourteenth  year  the   central   signifi- 

(cance  of  education  was  already  dawning 
upon  him  ;  so  that  from  that  time  forward 
he  collected  in  his  note-books  significant 
sayings  of  various  authors  upon  this  theme, 
and  more  and  more  recorded  his  own 
ever-deepening  reflections. 

Thus,  though  we  have  no  separate  work 
upon  education  from  the  hand  of  Hegel, 
yet  reflections  upon  the  subject  as  gath- 
ered out  of  his  works  by  Thaulow  and  pub- 
lished in  1853-54  cover  some  thousand 
closely  printed  pages! 


Hegel's  Personality  and  Environment.       31 

To  all  which  we  must  add  the  further 
remark  that  the  divided  and  helpless  state 
of  Germany,  during  the  earlier  part  of 
Hegel's  active  life,  could  not  but  have  the 
effect  of  throwing  him  back  upon  and  in- 
tensifying his  native  reflectiveness  or 
"  Schwabian  internality,"  and  in  this  indi- 
rect way  could  not  but  prove  a  really  strong 
factor  in  his  wonderfully  thorough-going 
analysis  of  the  possibilities  and  ultimate 
significance  of  the  individual  life  in  its 
subtler  spiritual  aspects.  Such  analysis, 
besides,  could  not  fail  to  deepen  and  clar- 
ify his  conviction  as  to  the  supreme  signifi- 
cance of  education.  And  as  a  matter  of 
fact  we  do  find  him  expressing  himself  upon 
this  subject  in  that  troublous  period  in  the 
following  positive  terms:  "  The  importance V 
of  a  good  education  was  never  more  mani-  \ 
fest  than  under  the  conditions  of  our  time. 
The  inner  treasure  which  parents  give 
their  children  through  a  good  education 
and  through  the  use  of  institutions  of  / 
learning  are  indestructible  and  retain  their  i 
worth  under  all  conditions."* 

*  From  an  Address  of  Hegel's. 


32  HegeVs  Educational  Ideas. 

III. 

GENERAL     EDUCATIONAL     VIEW    IMPLIED 
IN    THE    HEGELIAN    SYSTEM. 

Of  course  no  pretense  can  here  be  made 
to  outline  the  system  of  philosophy  devel- 
oped by  Hegel.  At  best  we  can  do  no 
more  than  indicate  its  central  aim.  The 
system  itself  is  an  organic  whole,  no  part 
of  which  can  really  be  comprehended  save 
with  reference  to  the  whole. 

The  first  draught  of  the  system  was 
struck  out  at  a  white  heat  .n  the  "  Phen- 
omenology of  Mind"  a  volume  of  about 
six  hundred  pages.  After  more  fully  elab- 
orating the  system,  at  a  later  period,  Hegel 
undertook  its  condensation  (while  still  pre- 
serving its  now  explicitly  differentiated  as- 
pects) into  a  compass  manageable  by  stu- 
dents. The  result  was  the  "  Encyclopedia  ' 
in  three  volumes — {a)  the  Logic,  (b)  the 
Philosophy  of  Nature,  (c)  the  Philosophy 
of  Mind — amounting  in  all  to  fifteen  hun- 
dred pages. 


General  Educational   View.  33 

{a)  The  Logic  presents  the  system  of 
thought  as  such.  That  is,  it  presents  in 
systematic  arrangement  the  fundamental 
categories  of  Reason,  beginning  with  the 
simplest,  and  showing  by  the  famous 
"  dialectical  method '  how,  from  its  very 
nature,  mind  cannot  rest  in  such  simple, 
vacuous  forms  ;  but  by  its  own  inherent 
energy  necessarily  unfolds  into  ever  richer 


phases  of  consciousness  until  it  reaches  the 
idea  of  an  eternally  self-contained,  self- 
conscious,  self-active  Energy,  which,  by 
that  fact,  is  an  eternally  self-realizing,  and 
therefore  infinitely  creative,  Mind. 

(b)  The  Philosophy  of  Nature  is  the  in- 
terpretation of  the  phenomena  of  the  outer 
ivorld  of  nature,  on  the  one  hand,  as  con- 
stituting nothing  else  than  the  infinitely 
manifold  forms  in  which  that  creative  En- 
ergy forever  manifests  itself ;  and  on  the 
Mother,  as  leading  up  to  and  culminating  in 
that  subtle  complex  of  physical  energy  in 
which  consists  the  human  body  —  the 
medium  in  and  through  which  the  human 
soul  emerges  into  conscious  being. 
3 


34  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

(c)  The  PhilosopJiy  of  Mind  is  the  inter- 
pretation of  the  phenomena  of  the  inner 
world  of  mind.  It  traces  the  evolution  of 
the  human  mind  through  its  merely  natural 
qualities — that  is,  the  qualities  determined 
through  external,  natural  influences — finds 
it  emerging  into  individualized  form  as 
"  feeling  soul,"  and  again  unfolding  into 
theJ^jLCtual  soul,"  which  already  begins  to 
distinguish  itself  from  its  embodiment, 
and  to  command  the  latter,  and  thus  al- 
ready to  give  to  it  a  significance  properly 
described  as  ideal.  Thus  man  stands  erect, 
not  because  it  is  physiologically  "  natural ' 
for  him  to  do  so,  but  only  because  he  wills 
the  upright  attitude. 

But  this  is  only  initial.  The  Philosophy 
of  Mind  traces  further  the  fundamental 
forms  of  consciousness,  emphasizing  espec- 
ially the  contrast  between  the  merely  sen- 
suous consciousness,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
on  the  other,  ^'//"-consciousness,  which,  in 
its  highest  term,  is  the  thinking  conscious- 
ness^ q  r  -Reason . 

Following  this  a  summary  of  Psychology 


General  Educational   View.  35 

closes  the  treatment  of  the  "  Subjective 
Mind;'  i.  e.,  Mind  as  self-related  indi- 
vidual. 

But  this  necessarily  implies  an  objective 
aspect  of  mind  ;  that  is,  it  implies  the  out- 
ward manifestation  of  mind  whose  inner 
or  subjective  characteristics  have  thus  far 
been  considered.  It  is  the  consideration 
of  mind  in  this  phase  which  gives  rise  to 
the  estimation  of  the  practical  relations 
into  which  the  individual  mind  enters,  and 
to  the  very  brief  summarizing  of  what 
Hegel  presents  more  fully  in  his  PJiilo- 
fiyof  Right — that  is,  ethics  from  the 
objective  or  "  prrrtfrnl  "  point  ofjjnv 

The  last  thirty  pages  indicate  the  vari- 
ousjispects  of  "  Absolute  Mind/'  or  Spirit. 
By  which  Hegel  means  the  universal,  ideal 
forms  or  degrees  in  whicliTKe  human  mind- 
realizes  its  highest  characteristics  and  finds 
its  purest  satisfaction.  These  forms  are 
(1)  Art,  to  which  Hegel  elsewhere  devotes 
~Threti-^rrjtumes  ;  (2)  Religion,  to  which  he 
gives  two  volumes,  and  (3)  Philosophy,  to  ^3 

which   he  devoted  his  life,  and  to  which 


36  HegeVs    Educational   Ideas. 

the  whole  of  his  works,  in  eighteen  vol- 
umes, are  his  amazingly  rich  contribution. 
Hegel's  Logic  is  a  search  for  the  eternal 
forms  of  Reason.     His  Philosophy  of  Na- 
ture is  an  attempt  to  trace  these  abiding 
forms  as  in  eternal  process  of  manifesta- 
tion in  the  eternally  vanishing  forms  and 
J  phases    of    the    outer    world.      His   Philo- 
/    sophy  of  Mind  indicates  the  way  by  which 
the  human  soul  "  struggles  upward  out  of 
V    nature  into  spirituality."  * 
\    In  the  Hegelian  system  of  Philosophy, 
then,  there  is  presented  a  reasoned,  articu- 
lated account  of  the  total  organic  round 
I   of  Evolution,  f     The  Logic  culminates  in 
/a  glimpse  of  the  Eternal  Mind,  whose  ab- 
(  solute  Internality  is  focused  in  God.     In 
the    Philosophy   of  Nature  this   same   ab- 
solute, divine  Internality  is  seen  unfolding 
its  creative  energy  into  the   form   of  that 
infinite  Externality  which  we  call  Nature. 

*   Werke,  X2.,  120. 

f  It  is  Hegel,  and  not  Darwin,  nor  yet  Herbert 
Spencer  who  is  the  real  author  of  the  modern  doc- 
trine of  evolution. 


General  Educational  View.  37 


In  the  Philosophy  of  Mind  we  see  the  same 
infinite  creative  Energy  again  gathering 
itself  into  foci,  constituting  human  souls — 
units  characterized  by  the  same  absolute 
Internality  as  that  which  constitutes  the 
central,  vital  element  of  the  Eternal  crea- 
tive Energy  or  Mind  itself. 

Nature  is  the  outer  form  of  the  divine 
Thought,  and  apart  from  that  Thought  it 
is  nothing.  The  return  of  this  Thought  to 
its  own  native  Internality  in  the  form  of 
a  self-conscious  unit  is  the  process  of  the 
creation  of  a  human  soul.  Man  is  made 
in  the  image  and  likeness  of  Divinity,  for 
he  is  Divinity  awaking  out  of  the  sleep  of 
^infinitely  self-expanded  being.  And  as  the 
expansion  is  infinite,  so  the  concentration 
of  Return  is  infinite,  assuring  to  the  indi- 
vidual soul  an  infinite  destiny,  consisting 
of  endless  progress  in  self-realization,  one 
essential  phase  of  which  must  be  an  ever- 
deepening  consciousness  of  its  own  God- 
likeness.  If  nature  is  God's  omnipresence, 
in  the  sense  of  his  infinitely  diffused  being, 
the  human  soul  is  God's  omnipresence,  in 


38  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

the    sense     of    his    infinitely    concentered 
being. 

To  aid  the  individual  soul  in  fulfilling 
this  destiny — to  aid  it  in  freeing  itself  from 
its  own  capricious  tendencies,  and  in  con- 
forming to  the  divine  Type  or  Ideal  Na- 
ture common  to  all  spiritual  beings — such 
\  is  the  central  aim  of  all  true  educational 
effort.  Indeed,  Hegel  expressly  says  :* 
"  With  the  school  begins  the  life  of  uni- 
versal regulation,  according  to  a  rule  ap- 
plicable to  all  alike.  For  the  individual 
spirit  or  mind  must  be  brought  to  the  put- 
ting away  of  its  own  peculiarities,  must  be 
brought  to  the  knowing  and  willing  of 
what  is  universal,  must  be  brought  to  the 
acceptance  of  that  general  culture  which 
is  immediately  at  hand  " — at  hand,  that  is, 
in  the  organized  .^orial  life  around  hirn^ 

Evidently,  then,  in   the   Hegelian  view, 
roan  is  in  truth  the  microcosm;\  and  it  is  in 

*lVerke,  VI 1 2.,  82. 

fit  is  to  be  wished,  in  this  connection,  that  every 
thoughtful  teacher  might  be  induced  to  read  Lotze's 
great  work,  the  Microcosmus.  It  has  been  translated 
by  Elizabeth  Hamilton  and  E.  E.  Constance  Jones. 


Gefieral  Educational   View.  39 

this  manner  that  we  are  henceforth  to  re- 
gard him.  He  is  the  Cosmos  in  miniature. 
As  such  he  is  in  vital  relation  alike  to  Na- 
ture, to  Society,  and  to  God.  And  because 
of  these  phases  of  relationship  involved  in 
the  life  of  each  individual  human  being,  it 
is  evident  that  his  education  can  rightly  be 
developed  only  on  condition  that  in  the 
^  process  of  his  education  all  these  conditions 
determining  his  life  shall  betaken  into  con- 
sideration, and  freely  allowed  full  measure 
of  efficiency,  each  in  its  own  specific  way. 
But  it  is  also  important  to  keep  clearly 
in  view  the  fact  that  Nature  is  only  the 
infinitely  extended  outer  form  of  the  in- 
finitely concentered  inner  mind  of  the  Cre- 
ator. As  such,  Nature  is  not  merely 
something  opposed^  Mind,  it  is  also  and 
especially  only  one  aspect  of  Mind.  It  is 
Mind  reduced  to  its  lowest  terms.  And 
the  condensation  of  Nebulae  into  stars  and 
suns,  and  their  attendant  spheres,  and  the 
further  gathering  of  Energy  into  crystal- 
line forms,  and  again  into  microscopic 
spheres,   palpitating    with    the    first    pre- 


40  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas, 

monitions  of  individualized  life — all  this 
constitutes  the  way  of  return  from  infi- 
nitely expanded  unconscious  being  to  con- 
centered conscious  existence,  the  highest 
term  of  which  is  that  self-directed  activity 
which  specially  characterizes  Man,  and 
proves  him  to  be  the  actual,  endlessly  as- 
cending descendant  of  the  primal,  eternal 
Mind.  It  is  on  this  ground  that  each  in- 
dividual human  being  has  infinite  and  in- 
alienable Rights.  "  Man  is  by  natu.re_ra- 
tional ;  therein  lies  the  possibility  of 
equality  of  the  rights  of  all  men."* 

But  thus  all  men  are  identical  in  nature 
— are  of  the  one  self-same  divine  Type. 
And  because  the  type  is  divine,  and  there- 
fore infinite,  and  because  the  type  can  be 
completely  fulfilled  only  in  the  individual, 
then  each  individual  has  an  infinite  des- 
tiny, and  hence  a  destiny  which  ultimately 
is  one  and  the  same  with  that  of  every 
other.  The  Brotherhood  of  Man  has  its 
absolute  assurance  of  unquestionable  truth 
in  the  Fatherhood  of  God. 

*  Werke,  VIl2.,65. 


General  Educational   View.  41 

Hence,  each  can  aid  every  other,  and  be 
aided  by  every  other.  Humanity  consti- 
tutes a  divine  Family,  the  ideal  of  which] 
is  that  each  shall  work  for  the  good  of  alL/ 
and  precisely  in  so  doing  shall  secure  to 
jiimselfthe  greatesT  good. "  And  as  the 
greatestgoooTTscontinuous  and  normal 
inner  growth,  or  growth  of  mind,  and  as 
it  is  just  this  growth  which  constitutes  the' 
essence  of  all  true  education,  it  is  evident 
that  the  education  of  the  individual  in- 
cludes in  the  full  round  of  its  indispensa- 
ble appliances  the  whole  range  of  those 
human  relations  whirh  constitute  the  or- 
ganic determining  substance  of  the  social 
or  institutional  world. 

Association',  thpnj  is  a  primal  law  of  the 
very  nature  of  Man.  As  Aristotle  insisted, 
"  Man  is  by  nature  a  social  being."  And 
to  Hegel  this  truth  is  of  still  deeper  im- 
port  than  appears  in  the  form  in  which  it 
presented  itself  to  the  great  Greek. 

But  thus  the  social  factor  in  the  educa- 
tion of  Man  is  of  still  more  vital  import- 
ance than  is   the  factor  consisting  of   his 


42  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

relation  to  Nature.  In  fact,  the  realiza- 
tion of  man's  destiny — the  actual  develop- 
ment of  his  education — is  impossible,  save 
through  mutual  helpfulness.  Hence,  all 
the  forms  of  social  life,  all  human  insti- 
tutions, have  each  its  specific  educational 
value.  And  when  we  remind  ourselves 
that  education  is  but  the  process  of  un- 
folding the  divine  Type  into  realized  form 
in  the  individual  human  being,  and  that 
that  Type  has  for  its  central  characteristic 
self-activity  or  Freedom,  we  can  see  how 
til-comprehending  is  the  statement  of  He- 
gel, that  "  History  is  nothing  else  than 
progress  in  the  consciousness  of  Free- 
dom,"* and  why  Rosenkranz  should  say 
explicitly  that  "  Hegel  represents  History 
as  the  education  of  Man  through  Godjjj^— ^ 

And  further,  since  Freedom  or  Self-ac- 
tivity is  the  supreme  quality  in  and  through 
which  we  recognize  the  oneness  in  nature 
of   Man    with    Divinity,  it    would    appear 

*  Werke,  IX.,  24  {Philosophy  of  History,  Bohn  lib. 
Trans.  Sibree,  p.  19.) 
\  Hegel 's  Leben,  p.  9. 


General  Educational  View.  43 

that  the  consciousness  of  Freedom  cannot 
be  rightly  unfolded  save  in  so  far  as  the 
educational  processes  intended  to  secure 
this  result  include  explicit  and  systematic 
reference  to  the  fundamental  relation  sus- 
tained by  man  to  God.  _ 

Thus  The  education  of  the  individual 
human  being  can  be  really  complete  in 
any  given  degree  only  by  being  at  once 
physical,  social  and  religious. 


44  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

IV. 

"  FROM   THE    SIMPLE   TO   THE   COMPLEX." 

THE  first  word  in  the  most  thoroughly 
orthodox  articles  of  modern  educational 
faith  is  this  of  the  necessary  law  of  ad- 
vance "  from  the  simple  to  the  complex." 
It  will  be  worth  our  while  to  see  what  in- 
terpretation Hegel's  philosophic  theory 
suggests  for  this  assumed  law. 

Even  so  meagre  an  intimation  as  that 
already  given  will  serve  to  show  how  abso- 
lutely the  three-fold  idea  of  Unity  in  Sub- 
stance, Completeness  of  Energy,  and  Con- 
sistency of  Process  dominates  in  Hegel's 
view  of  the  world.  And  this  again  is  only 
a  deepening  of  Aristotle's  conception  of 
Cause  as  (a)  Material  Cause  (Substance), 
(fr)  Formal  Cause  (Self-defining  Energy) 
and  (c)  Efficient  Cause  (actual  concrete 
Process).  And  further;  Cause  cannot  be 
real,  save  as  the  completly  fused  unity  of 
these  three  aspects.     And  being  this  it  is 


"From  the  Simple  to  the  Complex."        45 

also  Final  Cause — that  is,  the  perfect  and 
perpetual  fulfilment  of  the  absolute  de- 
mands of  Reason. 

Herein,  too,  is  the  one  thoroughly  ad- 
equate  ground  of  the  doctrine  of  Evolu- 
tion. Self-active  Energy  or  Mind  appears 
as  the  primal,  self-differentiating  Sub- 
stance. Such  p^ina^-Mind  cannot  be  con- 
ceived save  (a)  asynergy  or  Will ;  (b)  as 
self  -  directin^JEjie*gy  or  Intelligence  ; 
(c)  as  self-sufficing  Intelligence  or  Sub- 
stance ;  (J)  as  self-satisfying  Energy,  or 
absolute  repose  in  absolute  activity.  To 
which  we  must  add  that  absolute  activity 
cannot  have  less  than  absolute  result.  A 
perfect  Creator  necessarily  implies  a  per- 
fect Creation — and  vice  versa. 

The  infinite  exercise  or  forth-putting  of 

*  IT  O 

this  Energy  is  in  the  first  place  the  crea- 
tion of  the  extended  or  material  world. 
But  this  infinite  forth-putting  or  self-ex- 
pansion of  the  primal  Energy  is  at  the 
same  time  its  infinite  self-concentration  or 
coming  together  with  itself.  As  infinite 
Energy   its   act    is    infinite.     Looked    at 


46  HegeVs  Educational  Ideas. 

from  one  side  the  result  of  this  act  must 
be  infinite  self-differentiation,  or  infinite 
self-analysis.  But  this  is  only  one  aspect 
of  the  process,  the  complementary  aspect 
of  which  can  be  nothing  less  than  infinite 
self-integration  or  self-synthesis. 

In  fact  we  cannot  guard  ourselves  too 
carefully  against  supposing  that  differenti- 
ation and  integration  are  ever  found  or 
findable  in  actual  separation.  In  the  heart- 
beat of  the  Universe  systole  and  diastole 
are  coincident.  Both  the  outflow  into  the 
form  of  the  extended  world  of  Matter  and 
the  inflow  into  the  non-extended  world  of 
Mind  are  incessant,  and  the  "heart- 
period  "  is  the  eternal  Now  of  divine  Per- 
fection. 

But  also  either  aspect  of  the  process 
looked  at  separately — i.  <?.,  abstractly — pre- 
sents a  definite  order  of  succession  ;  and 
thus  gives  rise  to  time,  which  is  but  the 
form  of  succession.  As  we  come  to  com- 
prehend the  process  and  recognize  it  as 
working  toward  a  definite  end  we  call  it 
^history"  or  "evolution,"  and  proceed  to 


"From  the  Simple  to  tJie  Complex."        47 

record  our  observations  of  and  reflections 
upon  the  process. 

The   records   thus   far  made  constitute 


what  is  called  "  Science  " — the  cumula- 
tive results  of  the  knowing  process  of  hu- 
manity. Geometry,  Astronomy,  Physics, 
Chemistry — these  are  the  divisions  of  the 
one  total  "  Universal  History  "  within  that 
elementary  stage  which  has  to  do  with  the 
forms  and  processes  of  the  outer  material 
world  as  such.  At  the  same  time  Chemis- 
try involves  "  organic  compounds,"  and 
thus  introduces  us  to  the  secondary  stage 
of  our  "  Universal  History  "  which  leads 
through  Biology  to  Human  Physiology; 
and  this  in  turn  proves  to  be  the  transition 
form  in  which  we  are  already  introduced 
to  the  final  or  Human  stage. 

And  all  this  is  not  merely  important,  it 
is  altogether  essential  to  the  right  under- 
standing of  tlig__enxi^__the  means  and  the 
method  of  education.  If  man  would  com- 
prehend his  actual  destiny,  and  the  true 
mode  of  fulfilling  that  destiny,  he  must 
know  what  he  is   in  his  own   essential  na- 


48  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

ture.  And  this  he  can  rightly  know  only 
through  discovering  the  way  in  which  he 
has  come  to  be  what  he  is.  Man  studies 
Nature  only  because  he  sees  himself  re- 
flected in  Nature.  He  seeks  to  know  the 
World  only  because  from  the  dawn  of  his 
existence  he  has  been  prompted  by  the  in- 
extinguishable premonition  that  the  world 
is  only  his  own  larger  self.  The  "  Know 
Thyself "  of  the  Delphic  Apollo  is  no  out- 
wardly given  command.  "  It  is  nothing^ 
else  than  the  inborn,  absolute  Law  of 
Mind.  All  activity  of  Mind  is^  therefore, 
only  a  seizure  of  one's  own  self ;  and  the 
end  of  all  true  science  is  only  this  :  that  the 
spirit  of  man  shall  recognize  itself  in  all 
things,  whether  in  the  Heavens  or  upon 
the  Earth."* 

First  of  all,  indeed,  education  consists  in  a 
theoretical  process — viz:  the  process  of  dis- 
covery that  the  World  is  a  world  of  Reason. 
But  it  is  also,  and  equally,  the  practical  pro- 
cess of  progressive  self-adjustment  to  that 
World.  And  this  self-adjustment,  let  us 
*  Hegel's  Werke,  VII2.,  4. 


"From  the  Simple  to  the  Complex."        49 

/  repeat,  has  a  three-fold  significance.  It  is 
the  process  of  self-adaptation  (a)  to  Nature 
as  the  necessary  condition  of  man's  phys- 
ical life  ;  (p)  to  human  Institutions  as  the 
necessary  condition  of  realizing  ma.ns  eth- 
ical life  ;  and  (c)  to  the  Eternal  Mind  as 
the  primal  condition  of  the  whole  life  of 
man,  and  especially  of  his  religious  life. 

Evidently,  then,  in  Hegel's  view,  the 
process  from  the  simple  to  the  complex  is 
meaningless,  save  as  the  complement  of 
the  process  from  the  complex  to  the  sim- 
ple. Accepting  which  it  is  easy  to  see 
that  in  educational  discussions  the  phrase, 
"  from  the  simple  to  the  complex  "  is  only 
too  often  used  in  merely  one-sided  fash- 
ion, and  thus,  at  best,  with  only  superficial 


meaning. 


Meanwhile  the  educator,  as  such,  is  un- 
der absolute  obligation  to  know  the  ulti- 
mate, infinitely  complex  typical  nature  to 
the  realization  of  which,  by  virtue  of  his 
office,  he  pledges  himself  to  guide  the 
child.  It  is,  in  fact,  only  in  comparison 
with  this  ultimate,  infinitely  complex  typi- 
4 


50  HegeVs  Educational  Ideas. 

cal  nature  that  he  can  hope  to  judge  cor- 
rectly of  "simplicity"  in  all,  or  even  in 
any,  of  its  endlessly  varying  degrees, 
whether  in  ends,  or  in  means,  or  in  methods, 
in  his  work. 

In  this  connection  we  may  quote  He- 
gel's express  declaration  that  "  The  con- 
sideration of  mind  is  only  then,  in  truth, 
philosophical  or  rational,  when  it  recog- 
nizes the  idea  or  notion  (Begriff)  of  the 
(same  in  its  living  development  and  actual- 
ization ;  in  other  words,  when  it  compre- 
hends the  [human]  mind  as  an  image  of 
the  eternal  Idea  [or  divine  Mind]."*  And 
it  is  further  worth  our  while  to  remind 
ourselves  that  Hesfel  elsewhere  defines 
philosophy  as  "the  thinking  consideration 
of  things,"-)*  in  which   sense  every  teacher 

*  Werke,  VII2.,  3. 

f  Werke,  VI.,  4.  Of  course  Hegel  uses  the  word 
thinking  (denkende)  in  its  really  serious  sense  of  the 
most  careful  tracing  out  of  relations,  and  this  per- 
sisted in  until  a  reasoned  whole  is  reached.  The  mere 
idle  reflection,  so  often  called  thinking,  Hegel  would 
rather  regard  as  a  sort  of  traiimerei,  or  aimless,  va- 
pory dreaming. 


"  F?'0?n  the  Simple  to  tJie  Complex"        51 

ought  assuredly  to  be  an  ever-growing 
"  philosopher."  And  the  more  thought- 
fully the  interests  of  education  are  consid- 
ered, the  more  unquestionable  it  appears 
that  the  formula,  "  from  the  simple  to  the 
complex,"  only  suggests  an  infinite  pro- 
gressive series,  each  term  of  which,  from 
one  point  of  view,  may  and  must  be  re- 
garded as  "  simple,"  and  from  the  oppo- 
site point  of  view,  must  equally  be  looked 
upon  as  "  complex."  And  this  complexity 
of  simplicity  and  simplicity  of  complexity 
must  be  kept  constantly  in  view  by  every 
teacher  who  would  prove  himself  worthy 
of  his  high  calling.  For  only  on  this  con- 
dition can  he  judge  rightly  of  the  adapta- 
tion of  means  to  ends,  and  of  the  relative 
values  of  ends  in  his  Work. 

And  now  let  us  note  the  significance  of 
this  evolutional  clew  with  reference  to  the 
development  of  each  individual  mind. 


52  HegeVs  Educational  Ideas. 


V. 

"THE   AGES   OF   MAN." 

With  Hegel  the  existence  of  the  race 
is  presupposed  in  the  existence  of  the  in\ 
dividual  Man,  just  as  the  existence  of  Na-\ 
ture  is  presupposed  in  the  existence  of  the 
race,  as  again  the  existence  of  God  is  pre-, 
supposed  in  all,  as  the  primal  cause  of  all/ 
Not  only  is  it  true  that  man  inherits  his 
spiritual  nature  from  Divinity ;  he  also 
derives  his  physical  nature,  his  organism, 
not  from  the  material  world,  but  through 
the  material  world,  from  God  ;  always  re- 
membering that  the  material  world  itself 
is  nothing  else  than  a  mode  of  the  divine 
Energy.  In  the  fact  that  man  possesses 
an  outward  form  as  the  expression  of  his 
inward  being,  he  is  rightly  said  to  be  made 
in  the  image  of  God,  whose  outer  being 
fills  infinite  space.  And  in  the  fact  that, 
as  man,  his  inner  being  is  mind,  he  is  made 


"  The  Ages  of  Man."  53 

in  the  likeness  of  God,  whose  inner  being 
is  also  Mind.  God  is  perfect  Mind.  Man 
is  Mind  struggling  toward  perfection. 

Nature  isjjins  the  nntwarri  f^rm  ^f  the 
Revelation  of  Divinity  to  Man,  as  Man 
hiinself  is  the  inner  form  of  that  revela- 
tion. So  that  Nature  proves  to  be  of 
two-fold  significance  in  education.  /  On 
the  one  hand  it  is  of  significance  for  the 
reason  that  it  constitutes  the  immediate 
determining  condition  of  the  outer  physi- 
cal life  of  Man.  It  is  this  that  constitutes 
the  so-called  practical  import  of  Nature. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  manifold  aspects 
of  Reason  involved  in  Nature,  and  con- 
stituting the  simpler  modes  of  the  eternal 
Mind,  have  always  appealed  to  the  deeper 
reason  of  Man  ;  and,_accordingly,  the  in- 
terpretation of  Nature  in  tennsoT  Mind 
has  from  the  beginning  been  one  of  the 
most  significant  of  all  the  factors  in  the 
gradual  education  of  the  race.  The  be- 
ginnings of  this  interpretation  were  made 
through  the  phantasy  in  the  form  of  myth  ; 
the  revised    and    matured    forms   are  un- 


54  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

folded  through  reflection  and  speculative 
reason,  and  constitute  what  is  called  sci- 
ence. 

In  respect  of  this  two-fold  significance 
of  Nature,  few  treatises  can  be  found 
equal  to  Hegel's  Anthropology*  in  direct, 
and  in  the  deeper  sense,  practical  sugges- 
tiveness,  for  the  teacher.  Not  only  does 
he  show  there  in  terse  form  and  with  fairly 
unerring  precision  the  great,  fundamental 
determining  influences  due  to  distribution 
of  land  and  water,  and  to  the  conforma- 
tion of  the  land,  and  how  these  have  pre- 
determined the  destinies  of  primitive  races 
and  nations  ;  but  with  a  marvelous  keen- 
ness of  vision  which  nothing  seemed  to  es- 
cape, he  indicates  the  progress  made  by 
men  of  different  races  in  the  power  to  read 
aright  the  Sybiline  books  of  nature. t 

"Here,  as  elsewhere,  it  will  be  impossible 
to  enter  much  into  details.  We  can  only 
note  that  the  clew  to  the  explanation,  nnH 

*   Werke,  VI I2.,  46-249. 

f  This  latter  phase  is  developed  more  extendedly 
in  the  Philosophic  der  Religion. 


"  The  Ages  of  Man"  55 

r^rr^pfir^n    nf    Q^pprQfitinn    in    all    its  forms 

is  indicated,  following  which  clew  one  can 
trace  the  stages  through  which  mankind 
have  advanced  from  the  various  forms  of 
superstitious  interpretation  of  Nature  to  a 
right  understanding  and  more  or  less  ade- 
quate comprehension  of  its  various  aspects 
— i.  e.,  from  the  mythical  to  the  scientific 
view. 

So  long  and  so  far  as  the  things  of  the 
outer  world  were  impenetrable  to  his  vis- 
ion, man  bowed  in  fear  before  them.  As 
nature  became  transparent  to  his  view,  he 
beheld  God  the  Spirit  as  its  substance  and 
soul ;  and  his  worship  became  a  worship 
of  joy  and  love.  The  breath  of  God's 
spirit  is  the  creation  of  Worlds  ;  the  breath 
of  the  spirit  of  mavn  is  the  creation  of 
words  ;  as  man  saw  and  understood  the 
coming  and  going  of  worlds,  his  own 
breath  came  and  went  with  quickened  in- 
tensity and  firmer  coherence,  and  his  soul 
breathed  thoughts  and  his  thoughts  con- 
densed into  words  and  the  words  blended 
into  song.    It  is  such  rythmic  outbreathing 


^ 

^ 


56  HegeVs  Educational  Ideas. 

of  the  soul  that  constitutes  Literature  and 
Art  of  every  form  and  every  degree. 

The  lower  animals  have  voices  also ; 
but  the  symbolism  of  the  voice,  as  also  that 
of  color,  all  this  belongs  to  mind  articu- 
late, and  this  exists  for  man  alone.  And 
the  spontaneous  symbolizing  process  in- 
volved in  sensuous  perception  on  the  part 
of  man,  constitutes  the  intellectual  root  of 
that  wonder,  with  which,  as  already  no- 
ticed, all  human  knowing  begins,  and 
which,  therefore,  all  real  success  in  educa- 
tion necessarily  implies. 

idently,  then,  it  is  the  business  of  the 
teacher,  not  to  suppress  curiosity  or  won- 
der— that  is,  interest — nor  yet  merely  to 
indulge  it,  but  rather  to  guide  it  and  di- 
rect it  upon  worthy_x>b_jects.  And  in  or- 
der to  do  this,  the  teacher  must  know  the 
limitations  of  the  child.  And  to  really 
knoiv  these  limitations,  he  must  know  them 
first  of  all  with  reference  to  the  universal 
Type  of  Mind,  and  also  as  being  absolute- 
ly protean  in  character.  So  far  from  be- 
ing fixed  once  for  all,  they  are  infinitely 


"  The  Ages  of  Man."  57 

variable,  to-day  vanishing  and  to-morrow 
reappearing  in  other  and  subtler  forms. 
The  task  which  yesterday  taxed  his  strength 
to  the  utmost,  so  that  the  sense  of  contra- 
diction between  what  was  demanded  and 
what  could  be  accomplished  amounted  to 
nothing  less  than  poignant  suffering,  is  to- 
day performed  with  exuberance  and  even 
with  scorn  that  any  one  should  count  it 
difficult.  The  problem  with  which  he 
struggles  desparingly  to-day  he  will  play 
with  to-morrow,  and  smile  a  rainbow  of 
triumph  through  the  vapor  of  vanishing 
tears.  The  "  impossible  "  means  only  the 
"  deferred." 

Endlessly  elusive  as  all  this  must  ever 
be  for  the  teacher,  there  must  nevertheless 
be  no  illusion  in  his  mind  concerning  the 
nature  of  what,  in  any  given  instance,  con- 
stitutes the  actual  difficulty  in  which  the 
individual  child-mind  is  involved.  Rather 
it  is  for  the  teacher  to  know  the  whole 
process  through  which  the  child  must 
pass — to  know  that  process  in  its  general 
character,  and   to   know   it  also  in  its  de- 


58  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

tails  and  so  be  able  to  render  real  service 
to  the  child  at  every  crisis  in  his  progress. 
Thus  education,  as  Hegel  explicitly  de- 
scribes it,  is  essentially  a  process  of  "  me- 
diation,"* of  the  reconciliation  of  what  at 
3  first  appear  as  opposing  or  even  contradic- 
tory elements  in  the  child's  mind  ;  and 
thus,  at  every  step,  it  is  the  process  of 
raising  the  consciousness  of  the  child  to  a 
higher  power,  to  a  richer,  more  positive 
unity.  Whence  we  may  note  the  neces- 
sary inference  that  the  office  of  the  teach- 
er is  essentially  mediatorial.  If  the  priest 
is  ex  officio  a  teacher,  so  also  the  teacher 
is  ex  officio  a  priest.  And  it  is  high  time 
that  this  fundamental  character  of  the 
function  of  the  teacher  were  better  under- 
stood and  appreciated. 

But  this  brings  us  to  notice,  in  the  next 
place,  that  the  first  (and  least  concrete) 
specific  formula  of  the  evolutional  process 
through  which  the  child  must  pass — mainly 
under  the  guidance  of  the  teacher — in  its 
attainment  of  maturity,  is  that  of  the  so- 

*    IVer/ce, VI.,  135. 


"  The  Ages  of  Man."  59 

called  "  ages  of  man  ;  "  that  is,  the  several 
periods  of  childhood,  youth,  maturity  and 
old  age  in  the  life  of  the  individual.  In 
which  connection  it  is  extremely  interest- 
ing to  see  how  Hegel  traces  the  forms  and 
relations  of  the  inorganic  world  over  into 
the  realm  of  the  organic  ;  and  how  again 
he  shows  the  relation  between  the  individ- 
ual and  the  species  within  the  limits  of  the 
simple  sphere  of  the  organic — -the  individ- 
ual organism  completing  serially  the  round 
of  characteristics  pertaining  to  the  species 
only  to  die  at  length  and  thus  to  leave  the 
species  as  a  mere  abstraction.  But  also, 
in  its  failure  ever  to  express  at  one  and 
the  same  moment  within  itself  more  than 
a  single  phase  of  the  significance  of  the 
species  of  which  it  is'the  "  realization,"  the 
individual  is  itself  also  fated  never  to  es- 
cape wholly  from  the  ghostly  realm  of  abr 
straction.  The  individual  never  wholly 
includes  the  species,  nor  does  the  species 
ever  wholly  include  the  individual.  Each 
excludes  even  while  it  includes  the  other., 
Such  the  contradictory  character  of  the 


60  Ilcgcl  's  Educational  Ideas. 

merely  organic  world.  On  the  other  hand 
it  is  in  the  realm  of  mind,  properly  speak- 
ing, that  the  species  finds  itself  fully  real- 
ized. For  in  this  realm  the  individual, 
through  self-consciousness,  comes  to  in- 
clude the  species  in  itself ;  and  thus  death 
is  subordinated  to  life  in  the  individual 
and  hence  proves  to  be  only  the  form  of 
transition  to  a  more  adequate  degree  of 
individual  existence. 

But  here,  also,  the  initial  point  of  view  is 
simply  "  anthropological ;  "  that  is,  it  takes 
account  of  man  chiefly  as  a  "  natural  "  be- 
ing, or  as  a  mere  product  of  nature.  Thus 
regarded,  he  is  subject  to  natural  changes, 
and  therefore  still  falls  within  the  limits  of 
Time  as  the  form  of  change.  Hence  arises 
a  series  of  distinct  states  through  which 
the  individual  as  such  passes — states  which, 
so  far  from  being  fixed,  prove  their  fluid 
nature  by  merging  the  one  into  the  other  ; 
a  fact  which  shows  the  life  of  the  individ- 
ual to  have  a  wider  and  subtler  signifi- 
cance than  pertains  to  the  life  of  a  race  or 
of  a  nation   as  such.      It   is  this  series  of 


"  The  Ages  of  Man"  61 

clearly  marked  states  or  conditions  that 
constitutes  what  has  already  been  indicated 
as  the  course  of  the  "  ages  of  man." 

Even  from  the  merely  anthropological 
point  of  view,  this  succession  of  periods  is 
of  deep  practical  interest  to  the  teacher; 
for  on  the  one  hand  the  child  is  not  merely 
a  soul,  but  an  embodied  soul ;  and  on  the 
other  hand  the  body  of  the  child  is  not 
merely  an  animal,  but  also  the  organ  of  a 
developing  mind.  So  that  the  study  of 
man  as  animal  can  never  be  adequately 
pursued,  save  in  so  far  as  it  is  pursued 
with  reference  to  the  mental  functions 
which  the  body,  as  organ,  is  fitted  to  serve. 

In  fact,  the  complete  separation  of  the 
anthropological  from  the  psychological 
and  the  ethical  point  of  view  is  quite  im- 
possible, and  the  consideration  of  the  char- 
acteristics of  the  later  are  inevitably  more 
or  less  anticipated  in  the  analysis  of  the 
earlier.  For  what,  in  the  living  or  organic 
being  as  such,  constitutes  nothing  more 
than  the  simple  quality  of  the  species, 
shows  itself  in  the  spiritual  being  as  noth- 


62  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

ing  less  than  the  characteristic  of  rational- 
ity. 

It  is  this  rationality  that  constitutes  the 
central  point  of  interest  even  in  the  initial 
anthropological  stage.  "  The  age  of  in- 
fancy is  the  period  of  natural  harmony,  of 
simple  contentedness  on  the  part  of  the 
'subject'  [or  individual  mind]  with  itself 
and  with  the  world.  It  is  thus  the  begin- 
ning in  which  contradiction  has  not  yet 
arisen  ;  as  the  period  of  old  age  is  the  end 
from  which  opposition  has  ceased."  What- 
ever oppositions  appear  in  infantile  life 
are  without  interest,  since  they  are  super- 
ficial and  fail  to  penetrate  to  the  inner  be- 
ing of  the  individual.  "  The  child  lives  in 
innocence,  without  lasting  grief,  in  love 
for  his  parents  and  in  the  feeling  of  being 
loved  by  them."  And  yet  the  germ  is 
here  of  all  that  is  to  follow. 

For  this  reason  "  this  immediate,  and 
hence  non-spiritual,  merely  natural  unity 
of  the  individual  with  his  species  and  with 
the  world  in  general  must  be  broken  up" 
The  individual  must  progress  to  the  point 


"  The  Ages  of  Man."  63 

of  putting  himself  in  direct  opposition  to 
the  actually  existing  world  about  him. 
For  thus  alone  can  he  take  the  first  step  in 
the  attainment  of  his  own  independence. 
It  is  this  that  specially  characterizes  youth.  J 

True,  this  opposition  is  altogether  one- 
sided, and  in  turn  must  also  be  overcome. 
The  individual  must  recognize  that  the 
actually  existing  order  of  the  world  is  it- 
self the  immediate,  practically  unfolded 
form  of  Reason,  to  which  he  must  con-  ^ 
form,  if  he  would  realize  his  own  indi- 
vidual existence. 

Arrived  at  this  point  the  youth  has 
become  a  man. 

Old  age,  finally,  is  the  simple  return  to  a 
state  of  indifference  to  affairs,  and  presents 
no  point  of  positive  .interest  in  an  educa- 
tional sense. 

(a)  But  upon  this  important  aspect  of  the 
subject  we  must  enter  a  little  more  into 
detail. 

And  here  the  first  thing  we  have  to 
notice  is  that  the  age  of  infancy  is  charac- 
terized especially  as  the  period  of  bodily 


64  HegeVs  Educational  Ideas. 

growtli ;  and  above  all,  as  we  may  add,  of 
the  growth  of  the  brain  as  the  more  imme- 
diate organ  of  individualized  life.  Such 
individualized  life  begins  with  breathing — 
that  special  rhythmic  practical  relation, 
positive  and  negative,  to  the  outer  world, 
consisting  in  inspiration  and  expiration  of 
the  enveloping  medium.  Immediately  con- 
nected with  this  is  vocalization — a  cry, 
which,  regulated  and  articulated,  at  length 
becomes  speech. 

It  is  worth  noting,  too,  that  talking  and 
walking  begin  simultaneously,  which  serves 
to  remind  us  that  the  brain  is  the  organ 
of  mind  as  will,  no  less  than  of  mind  as 
intelligence.  For,  as  already  noticed,  manl 
stands  erect,  not  because  it  is  "  natural ' 
for  him  to  do  so,  but  because  he  wills  tq 
stand.  To  which  we  may  add  that  though 
a  cry  may  be  "involuntary,"  the  utterance 
of  a  word  is  no  less  a  deliberate  expression 
of  will  than  is  standing  or  taking  a  step;  just 
as  standing  and  walking  are  definite  forms 
of  activity,  and  hence  are  expressions  of 
intelligence  no  less  than  expressions  of  will. 


"  The  Ages  of  Ma/i."  6$ 

But  with  the  beginning  of  definite,  de- 
liberate act  and  speech  the  definite  formal 
education  of  the  child  has  begun.  The 
child  feels  his  independence  ;  is  ceaselessly 
surprised  and  delighted  with  the  discovery 
and  exercise  of  his  own  powers.  Through 
language  he  learns  to  apprehend  things  in 
their  universal  character,  and  also  attains 
to  the  consciousness  of  his  own  universal- 
ity in  the  use  of  the  pronoun  "  I." 

At  the  same  time  the  feeling  of  inde- 
pendence on  the  part  of  the  child  is  shown 
in  liandling  things  in  play.  To  which 
Hegel  adds  that  the  most  rational  use 
to  which  children  can  put  playthings  is 
to  break  them  to  pieces.  And  he  would 
certainly  have  emphasized  this  judgment 
still  further  had  he  lived  to  see  the  greed 
of  the  manufacturer  invading  the  sacred 
world  of  childhood,  and,  by  anticipating 
all  the  wants  of  children  in  respect  of  the 
means  of  play,  rob  them  of  the  inalienable 
right  to  growth  in  intelligence  and  in  will 
and  in  healthful  pleasure  through  the  in- 
vention and  practical  creation  of  their  own 
5 


66  HegeVs  Educational  Ideas. 

toys.  Happily  Froebel  and  an  army  of 
Froebelians  have  come  to  the  rescue,  and 
children  are  being  trained  in  the  spirit  of 
play  joyfully  to  exercise  their  intelligence 
in  invention  and  their  will  in  creation. 
Happily,  too,  the  normal  child  can  never 
be  altogether  satisfied  with  the  toy  that 
has  been  given  him  ready  made  until  he 
has  analyzed  it,  that  so  at  least  he  may  see 
how  its  synthesis  has  taken  place. 

Thus  even  infancy  reveals  a  seriousness 
of  purpose,  and  the  play  of  childhood  is 
already  the  premonitional  form  of  the  crea- 
tive activity  of  work — of  the  self-regulated 
exercise  of  power  through  which  the  indi- 
vidual attains  maturity.  The  theoretical 
phase  of  this  is  inquisitiveness,  which  is  the 
mainspring  of  intellectual  acquisitiveness. 
The  awaking,  prophetic  sense  of  what  he 
ought  to  be — the  stirring  of  the  deepest 
instinct  of  his  being  consisting  of  the 
divine  element  of  Reason  in  his  heredity 
— this  involves  the  disquieting  recognition 
that  what  he  is  does  not  conform  to  what 
he  ought  to  be.     And  of  this  the  inevit- 


"  The  Ages  of  Many  67 

able  outcome  is  the  lively  desire  to  become 
as  mature  people  are,  and  to  this  end  to 
live  in  association  with  them. 

Herein,  too,  is  the  secret  of  the  deeply 
significant  disposition  towards  Imitation, 
which  is  so  like  a  frenzy  in  children. 
Hence,  too,  that  eager  questioning  spirit 
which  heeds  no  bounds,  and  which  so  often 
appears  as  impertinence  in  the  child; 
'This  characteristic  striving  of  children 
after  self-definition  [Erziehung)  is  the  in 
ner  moving  element  in  all  educatio 
{Erziehung)." 

But  the  ideal  of  which  the  child  is  con- 
scious and  to  which  he  would  elevate  him- 
self does  not  appear  to  him  in  abstract 
general  form.  Rather  it  appears  to  him, 
as  Hegel  specificallyMiotes,  in  the  form  of 
a  given  individual  person  who  is  to  him  an 
authority.  Only  in  this  concrete  fashion 
as  embodied  in  another  and  relatively  ma- 
ture human  being  does  the  child  recog- 
nize that  essential  being  which  he  still  re- 
gards as  his  own  and  to  realize  which  in  his 
own  person  constitutes  his  chief  aspiration. 


68  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

This  feeling  of  reverence  for  author- 
ity— for  an  example  in  the  concrete  of 
what  the  child  himself  desires  to  become — 
ought,  Hegel  insists,  to  be  preserved  and 
\       fostered  with  special  care. 

According  to  Hegel,  then,  it  is  evident 
that  in  the  theoretical  aspect  of  the  child's 
education  the  teacher  is  an  authority 
whom  he  must  follow,  and  that  in  the  eth- 
ical aspect  of  his  education  the  teacher  is 
a  model  whom  the  child  must  imitate. 
And,  indeed,  in  the  nature  of  the  case 
this  can  scarcely  be  otherwise,  let  the  ca- 
pability and  the  character  of  the  teacher 
be  what  they  may — a  point  upon  which 
boards  of  education  may  very  well  reflect 
with  even  more  than  ordinary  seriousness. 

We  may  note  in  the  next  place  that 
with  such  penetrating  view  of  the  signifi- 
cance of  child-life  Hegel  could  hardly  be 
expected  to  treat  with  any  great  degree  of 
consideration  the  trifling  pedagogics 
(Spielende  Pddagogik)  which  would  strip  ed- 
ucational work  of  all  earnestness  of  pur- 
pose and  definiteness  of  means  and   con- 

J 


"  The  Ages  of  Man"  69 


tinuity  of  method  and  reduce  it  to  the 
mere  aimless  form  of  childish  play — which 
would  demand  of  the  educator  that  he  let 
himself  down  to  the  level  of  the  pupil  in- 
stead of  elevating  the  latter  to  the  serious- 
ness of  a  purpose  in  itself  essential.  Such 
mere  pass-time  "  education  "  may  easily 
result,  and  in  fact  could  not  fail  to  result, 
in  the  child  coming  to  regard  everything 
in  a  merely  superficial  manner  and  to  act 
from  mere  caprice. 

In  this  connection  we  may  easily  gather 
that  much  of  the  so-called  child-study  of 
the  present  day  could  hardly  have  failed 
to  awake  the  scorn  of  Hegel,  who  would 
indeed  have  the  child  thoroughly  studied 
by  the  educator  ;  but  studied  with  explicit 
reference  to  its  essential  nature  on  the  one 
hand  and  to  its  inevitable  limitations  on 
the  other;  not  with  reference  to  its  ca- 
prices and  mere  trifling  fancies  and  observa- 
tions— these,  too,  set  down  at  random  and 
altogether  indiscriminately  by  wholly  un- 
trained and  even  immature  minds.  No 
doubt    the    peculiarities  of  the  individual 


/o  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 


child  ought  to  be  noted  by  the  teacher  ; 
but  only  in  order  that  they  may  be  cor- 
rected— not  with  a  view  to  recording  them 
as  if  they  were  of  profound  and  universal 
significance!  We  ought  still  to  go  to 
school  to  Aristotle  if  we  have  not  yet 
learned  that,  as  he  says,  "  there  can  be  no 
science  of  the  accidental." 

On  the  other  hand  not  less  seriously  det- 
rimental results  may  easily  follow  from  a 
different  method  sometimes  followed  by 
injudicious  teachers.  That  method  con- 
sists in  never-ending  commendatory  incit- 
ing of  children  to  "  reasoning ;  "  whence 
mere  glibness  and  flippancy  is  likely  to  be 
the  only  result.  No  doubt  the  thought  of 
the  child  must  be  awakened,  but  the 
teacher  ought  to  remember  the  limitations 
of  the  child's  mind  in  this  respect,  and  not 
attempt  to  present  the  ultimate  values  of 
things  to  the  unripe,  empty  understanding 
of  children. 

(b)  We  have  next  to  observe  that  just 
as  the  most  conspicuous  transition  occur- 
ring within  the  period  of  childhood  is  that 


"  The  Ages  of  Man:'  71 

out  of  infancy  into  the  articulately  speak- 
ing stage  ;  so  the  transition  from  childhood 
to  youth  occurs  in  and  through  puberty 
which,  in  Hegel's  phrase,  is  the  life  of  the.  , 
species  rising  to  consciousness  in  the  indi- 
vidual and  beginning  to  seek  satisfaction. 
And  of  course  by  the  "  species  '  coming 
into  explicit  form  in  the  individual  con- 
sciousness Hegel  here  means,  not  so  much 
the  animal  species  as  manifested  in  the 
form  of  mere  physiological  tension,  as 
species  in  the  sense  of  what  he  calls  the 
7r5ur5sranfiaf  Universal ; '  that  is,  species 
in  the  sense  of  an  internal  vital  principle 
constituting  the  essential  ideal  or  type 
struggling,  in  the  form  of  vague  premoni- 
tion, to  be  realized  in  and  for  and  by  the 
individual  himself.     v 

Thus  instead  of  seeing  his  ideal  already 
realized  in  the  person  of  a  given  human 
being  of  relatively  mature  age  and  serving 
as  an  authority  and  a  model,  as  happens 
with  the  child,  the  youth  conceives  his 
ideal  as  something  too  exalted  to  have  yet 
attained    realization,    and    in    comparison 


72  HegeVs  Educational  Ideas. 

with  which  the  things  and  persons  and  in- 
stitutions of  the  actually  existing  world 
are  insignificant  and  worthy  only  of  com- 
miseration or  contempt.  Hence,  that  the 
world  of  present  reality  should  be  regarded 
as  itself  the  form  in  which  the  actual  evo- 
lution of  that  Ideal  has  already  taken 
place  and  is  now  taking  place  can  only  ex- 
cite the  scorn  of  the  clear-sighted  and  im- 
patient youth.  On  the  contrary  the  pres- 
ent world  of  fact  in  its  whole  range  is  for 
him  a  mere  perversion  and  caricature  of 
the  genuine  Ideal.  Hence  the  youth  feels 
himself  called  to  revolutionize  the  world 
and  bring  it  into  conformity  with  the 
Ideal —  i.  c,  his  ideal. 

It  is  thus^-as  Hegel  puts  it,  that  the 
peace  in  which  the  child  lives  with  the 
world  is  broken  by  the  youth.  And  pre- 
cisely on  account  of  this  persistent  appeal 
^to  the  Ideal  the  youth  bears  the  appear- 
ance  of  having  a  more  exalted  aim  and  a 
greater  generosity  of  soul  than  has  the 
man  engrossed  in  mere  transitory  inter- 
ests.    On    the    other   hand    it    is    for  the 


"  The  Ages  of  Man. 


youth  to  discover  that  it  is  precisely  the! 
man  of  affairs  who  in  freeing  himself  from 
his  own  subjective  or  merely  individual 
fancies  and  visions  of  far-off  unattainable 
"  Ideals,"  has  merged  himself  in  the  con- 
crete Reason  of  the  actual  world  and  has 
come  to.  put  forth  his  energies  for  that 
world. 

To  this  self-same  end,  indeed,  the  youth 
himself  must  come  at  last.  Meanwhile  his 
immediate  aim,  in  his  own  estimation,  is 
precisely  this — to  formulate  himself,  to 
prepare  himself  for  the  carrying  out  of 
the  ultimate  aim  of  bringing  his  splendid 
Ideal  into  perfect  realization.  And  it  is 
precisely  in  the  carrying  out  of  this,  his 
immediate  aim,  that  the  youth  becomes  a 
man,  and  discovers  vat  last  the  futility  of 
his  projects  for,  revolutioni-zir4g-the-.woxldT--   * 

But  also  this  discovery  constitutes  a  se- 
rious crisis  in  the  experience  of  youth,  and 
is  likely  to  assume  a  more  or  less  tragic 
form.  The  descent  from  his  ideal  life  into 
the  monotonies  of  actual  communal  life  is 
apt  to  appear  to  him  as  a  hopeless  descent 


74  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

into  the  inferno  of  Philistinism.  In  which 
case  the  utter  irreconcilability  of  the  pres- 
ent Reality  with  the  fondly  cherished 
Ideal  plunges  the  youth  into  a  sort  of 
hypochondriac  state — a  state  from  which 
one  of  weak  nature  may  prove  unable  ever 
to  recover. 

At  this  critical  period  there  devolves 
upon  parent  and  teacher  the  difficult  and 
delicate  task  of  bringing  the  youth  to  re- 
cognize that  the  necessity  in  which  he  finds 
himself  involved — the  necessity  of  enter- 
ing into  a  world  that  seems  to  him  an  al- 
together alien  world — is,  after  all,  by  no 
means  a  necessity  of  violence,  but  rather 
that  it  is  nothing  else  than  the  necessity  of 
.eason  ;  that,  therefore,  considered  as  ex- 
ternahtd  the  life  of  the  individual,  it  is 
just  the  Rational  and  Divine  which  as  such 
possesses  the  absolute  Might  to  bring 
about  its  own  perfect  realization ;  and 
that,  also,  considered  as  pertaining  to  the 
individual,  it  is  nothing  else  than  the  very 
law  of  his  own  inner  being  demanding 
that  precisely  for  the   purpose  of  hisowj 


i 


4-  \)sr<y  •  '^wka/ 


"  77/*  4^  <?/  Afa;/."  75 

self-realization — which  is  but  the  realiza- 
tion o\^nr^Trice  Ideal — he  shall  willingly 
and  unreservedly  take  his  part  in  the  total 
round  of  activity  of  this  seemingly  foreign 
world  ;  but  which,  nevertheless,  is  a  world 
to  which  he  is  actually  altogether  native, 
and  in  which  it  is  his  destiny  to  be  alto- 
gether  at  home. 

In  short,  we  may  say  that  youth  is  the  i 

period  of  the  home-sickness  of  the  soul. 
And  the  gravity  of  the  disease  is  in  the 
delirium  by  which  the  youth  fancies  that 
his  true  home  is  in  a  far-off  cloudland,  and 
that  he  is  at  present  an  exile  in  a  world 
which  can  neither  understand  him  nor 
sympathize  with  him. 

In  this  critical  period,  we  repeat,  parent 
and  teacher  are  joint  physicians.  Happy 
the  youth  whose  case  his  physicians  rightly 
understand  !  The  true  remedy  is  nothing 
else  than  right  education. 

From  the  study  of  the  child,  and  of  the 
youth,  as  thus  indicated,  we  may  securely 
infer  the  general  character  of  education, 
and  the  course  it  must  take,  to  be  wor- 


y6  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

thy  the  name  of  education.*  And  first 
we  will  attempt  to  show  in  what  educa- 
tion essentially  consists. 

*I  omit  any  reference  to  the  age  of  maturity, 
though  this,  too,  is  of  importance,  as  the  period  of 
prolonged  self-culture,  and  of  mutual  helpfulness  to 
this  end  in  the  form  of  culture-clubs,  university  ex- 
tension, etc.,  etc. 


Geiieral  Notion  of  Education.  77 

VI. 

GENERAL   NOTION   OF   EDUCATION. 

We  have  now  to  remind  ourselves  of 
what  is  in  itself  a  self-evident  proposition  : 
that  the  very  idea  of  education  presup- 
poses a  state  of  imperfection  from  which 
the  individual  is  to  be  raised  to  a  state 
of  relative  perfection.  At  the  same  time 
this  self-evident  fact  has  only  too  gen- 
erally been  interpreted  as  if  it  were  of 
significance  solely  or  mainly  in  respect  of 
the  intellectual  aspect  of  human  life. 
Whereas,  on  the  other  hand,  education 
can  really — i.  e.  rationally — mean  nothing 
else  than  the  regulated  process  of  matur- 
ing the  whole  being  of  the  individual. 
And  while  Hegel  steadily  and  rightly  kepi 
I  his  eye  upon  the  central  idea  of  education 
as  consisting  essentially  in  the  process  of 
developing  into  realized  form  the  spiritual 
and  abiding  nature  of  the  individual  ;  yet 
the  careful    consideration  he   gives,  espe- 


78  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

daily  in  his  Philosophy  of  History,  to  the 
influence  of  climatic  conditions,  to  the  con- 
figuration of  the  land-masses,  and  to  the 
proximity  to  the  sea,  as  influencing  the 
development  of  races,  of  nations,  and  of 
individuals,  shows  how  well  aware  he  was 
of  the  significance  of  the  physiological  life 
of  man — not  in  itself,  but  as  organic  to  his 
spiritual  life  —  and  also  how  consistent 
with  his  whole  view  of  education  is  the 
central  idea  of  the  so-called  "  New  Edu- 
cation "  to  the  effect  that  the  child's  own 
activity  is  the  all-important  factor  involved 
in  determining  his  own  development, 
whether  considered  as  physical,  as  intel- 
lectual, as  moral,  or  as  religious. 

How  to  direct  that  self-activity  is  the 
reajj3rpbl^ffl--QLjill  education,  and  Hegel 
could  not,  without  self-contradiction,  have 
done  otherwise  than  heartily  approve,  not 
only  of  the  kindergarten,  as  putting  in 
consistent  and  effective  practical  form  for 
children  his  own  educational  ideas,  but  he 
must  also  have  recognized  in  "  manual 
training"    means    admirably    adapted    to 


General  Notion  of  Education.  79 

disciplining    the  will    in    the    critical  and 
puzzling  period  of  youth. 

Were  there  any  doubt  upon  this  point 
it  must  be  dissipated  by  reference  to  his 
explicit  statements  as  to  the  deep-reach- 
ing significance  of  imitation  as  leading  to 
Jiabit,  and  of  habit  as  the  established  form 
of  character.  Indeed,  Hegel  leaves  no 
ground  for  question  that  with  him  the  true 
aim  of  all  education  is  just  character  ration- 
ally formulated  and  practically  fulfilled — 
the  development  of  rational  habit  as  a 
transfigured  second  nature.  He  does  not 
hesitate  to  expressly  declare*  that  "  Ped- 
agogics is  the  art  of  making  men  moral." 
And  to  this  he  adds  that,  theoretically, 
"  it  regards  man  as  natural,  and  shows  the 
way  of  bringing  about  his  regeneration, 
the  way  of  transforming  his  first  nature 
into  a  second  spiritual  nature,  so  that  the 
latter  shall  attain  the  form  of  habit  within 
him." 

In  accordance  with  the  view  thus  inti- 
mated, Hegel  points  out  that  at  the  begin- 

*  IVerke,  VIII.,  212. 


8o  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

ning  of  his  existence  each  individual  is 
merely  rudimentary,  merely  germinal ;  that 
is,  wanting  in  the  practical  development  of 
all  the  characteristics  that  go  to  constitute 
manhood,  properly  speaking.  It  is  this 
that  Hegel  expresses  when  he  says  that 
man  is  at  first  a  merely  "  natural  '  being ; 
which  amounts  to  saying  that,  initially, 
man  simply  appears  as  a  product  of  Na- 
ture— as  a  being  whose  explicit  character- 
istics are  essentially  animal. 

But  this  contradicts  the  ultimate  ideal 
or  typical  nature  of  man  as  man,  which  is 
that  of  a  being  characterized  by  spiritual 
life  ;  that  is,  by  a  life  of  self-consciousness 
and  self-activity.  Whence  it  is  evident 
that  in  each  individual  there  inheres  at 
the  outset  a  radical  contradiction,  which 
contradiction  is  that  between  his  elemental 
or  animal  nature  on  the  one  hand,  and 
his  ultimate  or  spiritual  nature  on  the 
other.  In  infancy  the  consciousness  of 
the  individual  is  merged  in  the  former. 
Nevertheless,  he  is  predestined  to  awake 
out  of  this  into  consciousness  of   his  spir- 


General  Notion  of  Education.  81 

itual  nature.  And  this  transition,  devel- 
oped into  active,  transforming  degree, 
Hegel  regards  as  just  the  "second  birth  " 
of  the  individual. 

The  conception,  then,  that  man  is  "  by 
nature  evil,"  is  true,  but  true  only  in  re- 
spect of  his  elemental  nature.  And  even 
this  is  true  only  in  a  restricted  sense  ;  only 
in  so  far  as  this  lower  "  nature  "  is  brought 
into  conflict  with,  instead  of  being  made 
instrumental  to,  the  higher  or  spiritual 
"  nature,"  which  latter  is  the  ground  of  all 
possible  goodness  in  him,  and  to  satisfy  the 
demands  of  which  the  elemental  nature 
must  be  subordinated,  or  even  sacrificed. 

But  this,  of  course,  the  child  does  not 
know,  and,  as  a  child,  cannot  comprehend  ; 
though,  by  the  divine  instinct  of  his  higher 
nature,  he  has  premonitions  of  it,  and 
more  or  less  deep  yearnings  toward  it. 
And  further,  he  must  awake  to  this 
through  experience,  and  must  be  guided 
to  a  right  awaking  by  his  intellectual 
and  moral  elders.  In  other  words,  it  is 
only  through  a  slow  process  of  training 
6 


,J 


82  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

and  culture  that  man  first  becomes  what 
as  man  he  ought  to  be.  Which  forcibly 
reminds  us  of  Kant's  positive  declaration 
in  his  Padagogik*  that  "  Man  can  become 
jfian  only  through  education  ;"  that  in  fact 
"  he  is  nothing  else  than -what  education 
makes  him.5'  To  which  he  adds,  by  way 
of  emphasis,  that,  "  Whoever  is  not  cul- 
tivated is  crude  {roll) ;  whoever  is  not  dis- 
ciplined is  lawless  {wild)"  i.  c,  has  not 
advanced  beyond  the  stage  of  primitive  or 
"  savage "  life.  It  is  the  unenlightened 
and  undisciplined  yearning  toward  a  larger 
and  higher  life  that,  left  in  such  crude  and 
rude  state,  becomes  dwarfed,  and  also  per- 
verted into  greed  of  unworthy  things,  and 
thus  prompts  the  individual  to  violence 
and  evil  of  every  kind. 

It  is  just  these  dwarfed  and_p,exy.ertccl 
yearnings  that  constitute  what  Hegel  calls 
"^negative  or  subjective  " — i.  e.,  capricious 
and  selfish — aims.  Hence  follows  the  con- 
clusion that  the  individual,  as  a  spiritual 
being,  "  must  bring  the  two  sides  of  his 
*  lVc?-ke,  Ed.  Hartenstein,  X.,  386. 


General  Notion  of  Education.  83 

double  nature  into  unison  and  correspond- 
ence ; '  which  really  means  that  he  must 
wholly  subordinate  his  merely  animal  or 
"  natural  "  being  to  his  spiritual  or  rational 
being ;  and  this  to  such  extent  that  the 
latter  shall  have  full  mastery  over  the 
former. 

And  to  this  let  us  add  that  Hegel  never 
wearies  of  declaring  that  "education"  is 
the  descriptive  term  applicable  to  the  total 
process  by  which  this  complete  self-mas- 
tery on  the  part  of  the  individual  is  to  be 
accomplished.  And  this,  to  repeat,  al- 
ready implies  that  education  is  at  once 
both  theoretical  and  practical.  On  the 
one  hand,  there  is  the  inner  fundamental 
-Type,  the  universal,  all-comprehensive 
form  or  Ideal  of  Mind  inherent  in  each  in- 
dividual mind  as  mind,  to  unfold  which 
into  ever-increasing  reality  in  and  for  its  A 
own  positive,  individual,  and  personal  ex-  ' 
vistence  is  the  true  destiny  of  each  and 
every  mind.  On  the  other  hand,  so  re- 
garded, the  individual  mind  is  a  "  subject ' 
— 1.  c\,  a  self-conscious,  self-active  unit  of 


84  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

energy — which  finds  itself  in  the  midst  of 
endlessly  manifold  "  objects  "  with  which 
it  is  ceaselessly  and  vitally  related  by  the 
\yery  necessities  of  its  own  being.  Mind, 
and,  above  all,  a  merely  rudimental  mind, 
cannot  exist  in  mere  isolation.  But  neither 
can  things  utterly  unlike  be  related.  And 
this  already  suggests  that  the  ultimate 
basis  or  essential  ground  of  these  very 
"  objects  "  to  which  the  individual  finds  it- 
self related,  must  be  identical  with  the  Sub- 
stance whose  Form  is  the  universal,  all- 
comprehending  Ideal  of  Mind.  Whence 
it  would  seem  that  the  Type  which  is  in 
process  of  unfolding  in  the  individual  mind 
is  forever  unfolded  in  and  through  the 
universal,  self-active,  self-realizing  Energy, 

t which  is  the  Soul  of  the  Universe,  and 
which  may  thus  be  named  the  one  per- 
fectly realized  and  hence  eternal^Mind.  It 
is  in  this  sense  that  Hegel  declares  th.it 
"  even  external  Nature,  like  mind,  is  ration- 
al, is  divine,  is  a  forth-putting  of  the  Idea  "  * 
— the  word  "  Idea  "  being  here  used  by 
*    Werke,  VII2.,  15. 


General  Arotwn  of  Education.  85 

Hegel  to  indicate  the  eternal  Mind  in  its 
absolutely  concrete  character. 

Hence,  what  is  germinal  in  the  individ- 
ual mind  or  "  subject  "  is  immanent  in  the 
things  or  "  objects'  to  which  such  mind 
finds  itself  related.  From  which  it  is  evi- 
dent that  the  education  of  the  individual 
mind  must  include  the  progressive  devel- 
opment of  insight  into  that  universal,  all- 
comprehensive  Form  or  Ideal  of  Mind 
which  is  at  once  germinal  in  each  mind 
and  also  immanent  in  things. 

And  this,  which  constitutes  education  in 
its  theoretical  aspect,  manifestly  implies 
careful,  regulated,  ceaseless,  and  compre- 
hensive study  of  Mind,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  of  nature,  on  the  other.  Not  without 
such  study  can  the  germinal  mind  become 
realized  as  mind. 

But  mere  theoretical  insight,  so  far  from 
being  the  whole  of  education,  is  itself  im- 
possible in  any  adequate  sense  save  as  in- 
cluding the  practical  phase.  For  while  in 
its  immediate  form  it  consists  in  positive 
inner  conformity  on  the  part  of  the  indi- 


86  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

vidual  mind  to  the  fundamental  law  or  Type 
germinal  in  its  own  being  as  mind,  it  has  its 
outer,  complementary  form  in  progressive 
self-adjustment  on  the  part  of  the  individ- 
ual mind  to  the  actual  "  objective  "  world. 

At  the  same  time  we  must  also  keep 
clearly  in  view  that  to  Hegel  the  "  objective 
world  "  includes  ultimately  not  merely  the 
world  of  Nature,  but  also  the  world  of 
human  institutions.  Though  here  again 
it  must  be  noted  that  while  Nature  as 
such  constitutes  the  immediate  "  objec- 
tive'  form  of  the  eternal  Mind,  institu- 
tions are  rather  the  mediate  "  objective  ' 
form  of  the  human  mind  ;  and  this  not  in 
its  merely  individual,  but  also  and  above 
all  in  its  social  character. 

And  stih1  agamTTor  the  individual  mind 
the  subtlest  aspect  of  the  "  objective  ' 
world  consists  in  the  universal  forms  in 
which  man  progressively  apprehenctsTrie 
rhythm  of  the  self-unfolding  of  the  eternal 
Mind.  One  of  these  forms  is  that  of 
Beauty.  Striving  to  give  utterance  to  his 
deepest    experiences    within    this    sphere, 


i 


General  Notion  of  Education.  87 

man  creates  the  world  of  Art.  A  sec- 
ond form  is  that  of  Goodness ;  and 
man's  effort  to  illustrate  what  that  is  to 
him  in  its  highest  character  unfolds  the 
ceremonial  forms  that  breathe  the  spirit  of 
Religion.  A  third  form  of  this  highest 
phase  of  the  objective  world  is  that  of 
Truth  ;  and  of  this  man  formulates  in  lan- 
guage his  own  interpretation,  and  to  such 
interpretation  he  gives  the  name  Philoso- 
phy. 

/We  are  now  prepared  to  say  that  in  its 
/widest  range  education  begins  in  the  regu- 

/  lated  adjustment  of  the  individual's  organ- 
ism to  the  right  sensuous  apprehension  of 

\  the  world  of  Nature,  and  culminates  in 
the  regulated  adjustment  of  his  reason  to 
the  right  apprehension  of  the  eternal  Mind 
as  immanent  in  Nature  and  germinal  in 
the  individual  mind. 

But  also  the  whole  mind  is  germinal  in 
each  from  the  first,  and  hence,  in  strict 
truth,  education  can  add  nothing  to  the 
mind,  but  can  only  stimulate  the  indivi- 
dual mind  to  and  guide  it  in  its   own  self- 


88  HegeVs  Educational  Ideas. 

activity  as  the   one  possible  mode  of  its 
own  actual  unfolding. 

And  now  we  have  to  add  that  so  far  as 
this  process  consists  in  self-definition  on 
the  part  of  the  pupil,  the  outer  and  cor- 
responding process  is  properly  named  In- 
struction ;  so  far  as  it  consists  in  develop- 
ment of  regulated  self-activity  on  the  part 
of  the  pupil,  the  outer  and  corresponding 
process  is  that  of  Discipline.  So  far  as  it 
consists  in  self -harmonization  on  the  part 
of  the  pupil,  the  outer  and  corresponding 
process  is  the  unfolding  of  the  universal 
forms  of  Refinement. 

The  remaining  portion  of  the  present 
essay  will  be  given  to  indicating  what  the 
present  writer  conceives  to  be  Hegel's 
point  of  view  with  respect  to  these  several 
essential  aspects  of  education. 


Instruction — Its  CJiaracter.  89 

VII. 

INSTRUCTION — ITS  CHARACTER. 

And  here  we  must  again  remind  our- 
selves of  what  with  Hegel  is  a  fundamental 
point,  namely,  that  the  mind  of  the  child, 
as  being  mind  in  its  merely  initial  state  is 
not  yet  true  as  mind.  That  is,  it  is  only 
the  rudiment  and  abstract  prophecy  of 
mind.  To  become  "  true  "  as  mind  it  must 
unfold  this  prophecy  into  fulfilment,  must 
develop  this  rudiment  into  the  full  meas- 
ure of  its  typical  nature,  so  that  its  present 
reality  shall  coincide  with  its  rational  Ideal. 
But  also  because  this  Ideal  is  infinite  it  is 
but  inevitable  that  the  present  reality  of 
the  individual  mind  can  never  at  any 
given  moment  actually  be  brought  to  a 
degree  of  perfection  such  that,  then  and 
there,  it  will  prove  to  be  the  adequate  ful- 
filment of  the  ultimate  rational  Ideal  of 
Mind.  And  the  highest  phase — not  degree 
— of  excellence  attainable  by  the  individual 


9° 


Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 


\ 


mind  is  this  :  That  it  shall  become  fully 
conscious  of  its  own  ultimate  or  Typical 
/Nature.  To  go  on  deepening  and  enrich- 
/  ing  this  phase  of  consciousness  to  infinity 
— this  is  the  true  destiny  of  the  individual 
mind  as  a  genuinely  rational  and  hence 
immortal  soul.  And  education  cannot  be 
conceived  as  ultimately  including  less  than 
the  whole  of  this  process ;  though,  of 
course,  we  are  here  directly  concerned 
only  with  so  much  of  this  total  process  as 
takes  place  during  the  formative  period  of 
childhood  and  youth. 

In  this  sense,  then,  education  is  to  be 
looked  at  objectively  as  the  system  of  aids 
by  which  the  individual  mind  is  enabled 
to  rise  from  the  helplessness  of  infancy  to 
the  independence  characterizing  true  self- 
conscious  existence.  On  the  other  hand, 
from  the  subjective  point  of  view,  it  is  to 
be  regarded  as  just  the  process  itself 
through  which  the  individual  mind  ad- 
vances  from  infancy  to  maturity  as  mind. 

Thus  Hegel  expressly  declares  that  it  is 
only  when  we  consider  mind  in  the   actual 


Instruction — Its  Character.  91 

process  of  its  rational  development  that 
we  can  be  said  to  really  know  mind  in  its 
truth]  adding  that  by  "truth'  he  means 
precisely  the  coincidence  between  the 
present  reality  and  the  rational  Ideal. 

Keeping  this  in  view,  it  is  easy  to  un- 
derstand the  further  highly  characteristic 
and  significant  statement  that  "the  whole 
development  of  mind  is  nothing  else  than 
its  own  self-elevation  to  its  truth  ;  and  the 
so-called  powers  or  faculties  of  the  soul 
have  no  other  meaning  than  this ;  that 
they  are  merely  the  stadia  of  this  develop- 
ment. Through  this  self-differentiation, 
through  this  self-transformation,  and 
through  this  reference  of  its  specialized 
phases  to  the  unity  of  its  Bcgriff,  i.e.,  the 
unity  of  its  ultimate  typical  nature — the 
mind  is  not  merely  a  [theoretically]  true 
but  also  a  [practically  unfolded  and  hence] 
living,  organic,  systematic  unit."*  But 
again,  this  universal  typical  nature  (to  a 
consciousness  of  which  as  his  own  nature 
the  individual  attains  through  education) 
*Werke,  VI 1 2.,  11. 


92  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

is  also  just  that  which  constitutes  the  cen- 
tral characteristic  of  the  species.  Hence 
the  propriety  of  Dr.  Wm.  T.  Harris's  defi- 
nition of  Education  as  "the  process  by 
which  the  individual  man  elevates  himself 
to  the  species."* 

Let  us  consider  this  process  a  little  more 
closely.  Just  here,  too,  it  must  be  re- 
membered that  we  are  now  considering  it 
in  its  intellectual  aspect,  and  thus  as  tak- 
ing place  under  those  special  conditions 
summed  up  under  the  name  of  Instrtiction. 

We  shall  first  indicate  the  inner  process 
of  Instruction.  Following  this,  considera- 
tion will  be  given  to  the  outward  means  of 
Instruction  ;  to  which,  thirdly,  will  be 
added  a  brief  consideration  of  Methods  of 
Instruction.  As  to  the  central  aim  of  ed- 
ucation, it  will  scarcely  be  necessary  to 
remind  the  reader  that  that  has  already 
been  indicated  in  what  precedes. 

*Rosenkranz  Pedagogics,  p.   31.      (Note.) 


Instruction — Its  Process.  93 

VIII. 

INSTRUCTION — ITS  PROCESS. 

The  process  of  Instruction  in  its  most 
general  character,  may  be  described  as  a 
subtle,  progressive  interaction  between  two 
minds,  one  of  which,  as  relatively  mature, 
initiates  and  guides  the  process,  while  the 
other  as  relatively  immature,  voluntarily 
submits  itself  to  such  stimulation  and 
guidance.  The  general  psychological  pro- 
cess is  the  same  in  both  minds.  But  in' 
the  mind  of  the  teacher  the  given  exer- 
cise has  been  repeated  many  times.  And 
not  only  so,  but  what  is  presupposed  in 
the  given  exercise,  is  clearly  seen,  as  also 
is  that  to  which  it  logically  leads.  It  is 
thus  that  the  assumed  relative  intellectual 
superiority  has  been  attained  and  is  now 
manifested. 

On  the  other  hand,  in  the  mind  of  the 
pupil,  the  process  as  a  consciously  pursiicd 
process,  is  now  for  the  first   time  taking 


94  HegeVs  Educational  Ideas. 

place.  The  pupil  is  by  that  fact  unable 
to  trace  for  himself  with  clearness  and  ad- 
equacy, the  rational  necessity — i.e.,  the  es- 
sential logical  relations — of  the  matter  im- 
mediately under  consideration.  For  this 
reason  he  feels  himself  to  be  relatively 
powerless  and  dependent.  Hence  all  his 
power  assumes  the  form  of  intent  atten- 
tion. And  this  is  as  much  as  to  say  that 
for  the  time  being  he  merges  all  his  inter- 
est in  the  indications  given  him  of  what  ft 
going  on  in  the  mind  of  the  teacher. 
Without  being  aware  of  it,  he  becomes  an 
intent  psychological  observer.  And  the\ 
direct  aim  which  actuates  him  in  this  is  to 
develop  in  his  own  mind  what  he  discovers 
as  taking  place  in  the  mind  of  the  teacher. 
That  is,  he  concentrates  his  whole  energy 
in  a  determined  effort  to  bring  into  full 
development  on  his  own  part  the  same 
mode  of  intellectual  activity  as  that  which 
presents  itself  as  already  clearly  defined 
and  realized  in  the  mind  of  the  teacher. 

But  this,    clearly,  is   nothing  else   than 
Imitation — a  characteristic    which    Hegel 


Instruction — Its  Process.  95 


holds,  and  may  very  well  hold,  in  high  es- 
timation. Especially  for  the  young  child, 
as  we  have  already  seen,  the  teacher  is  re- 
garded by  Hegel  as  both  an  authority  to 
be  implicitly  obeyed  and  a  model  to  be 
constantly  imitated.  It  may  be  said,  there- 
fore, that  from  this  point  of  view  the  part 
played  by  the  child  in  the  interaction  be- 
tween himself  and  his  teacher  consists  es- 
sentially in  this:  that  in  his  character  of  a 
self-active  unit  of  energy,  he  exerts  himself 
to  the  utmost,  that  so  he  may  unfold  from 
within  himself,  the  aspects  of  intellectual 
maturity  which  he  recognizes  as  already 
realized  in  his  model. 

And  to  this  we  may  add  that  even  the 
transition  from  this  first  unquestioning  ac- 
ceptance of  the  model  to  the  critical  ques- 
tioning of  its  validity,  is  still  in  essence  an 
imitation  of  the  model.  The  pupil  is 
raised  to  the  level  of  a  critic  through  the 
criticism  he  has  himself  undergone.  From 
which  it  is  but  a  natural  corollary  that  the 
character  and  method  of  the  criticism  in- 
dulged in  by  the  pupil  will  reflect  those 


g6  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

qualities  as  exhibited  in  the  criticism  of 
the  teacher.  Here,  as  elsewhere,  Kant's 
remark — trite  perhaps  in  itself — holds 
good  ;  that  "  one  generation  educates  an- 
other." 

But  again,  from  the  fact  that  the  teacher 
has  already  many  times  traversed  the 
course  which  the  pupil  must  pursue,  it  is 
open  to  him  to  regard  that  course  either 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  result  in 
which  it  culminates,  or  from  the  point  of 
view  of  the  initial  stage  with  which  the 
course  sets  out.  In  the  former  case  the 
attitude  of  mind,  as  need  hardly  be  said, 
is  predominantly  analytical,  while  in  the 
latter  it  is  predominantly  synthetic.  And 
we  may  add  by  way  of  a  glance  forward, 
that  we  have  here  the  clew  to  all  true 
method. 

The  choice  of  method — whether  analy- 
tical or  synthetic — must  depend  upon,  a  va- 
riety of  conditions.  But  above  all,  thev 
fundamental  condition  is  that  of  the  pres- 
ent degree  of  advancement  on  the  part  of 
those  whose  education  is  in  progress. 


Instruction — Its  Process.  97 

Strictly  speaking,  indeed,  there  is  no 
such  thing  as  a  method  that  is  either  ex- 
clusively analytic  or  exclusively  synthetic. 
These  are  but  complementary  phases  of 
every  actual  method.*  Meanwhile,  ini- 
tially, the  individual  mind  seizes  or  appre- 
hends everything  first  of  all  in  its  totality. 
Not  by  any  means  that  for  such  mind  the 
given  totality  is  anything  more  at  the  out- 
set than  a  whole  of  qualities  which  as  yet 
are  undistinguished  from  one  another. 
But  just  because  of  this  inability  to  actively 
distinguish  between  the  qualities  or  char- 
acteristics of  a  given  whole,  the  undevel- 
oped mind  must  at  first  seize  objects  as 
wholes.  Whence  it  is  evident  that  the 
better  understanding  of  such  objects  is 
possible  for  such  minds,  only  through  a 
process  that  is  primarily  that  of  analysis. 

Nevertheless,  this  very  analysis  of  the 
"  object  "  is  the  process  of  unfolding  into 
richer  form  within  the  mind  of  the  pupil, 
just  the  consciousness  of  this  self-same  ob- 

*  Compare  with  this  what  has  already  been  said 
on  the  subject  of  simplicity  and  complexity. 

7 


98  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

ject.  So  that  while  in  its  objective  as- 
pect, the  process  appears  as  predominantly 
analytic,  yet  equally  in  its  subjective  phase 
it  is  no  less  unquestionably  of  a  predomi- 
nantly synthetic  or  constructive  character. 

And  indeed  it  is  precisely  this  synthetic 
or  constructive  aspect  of  the  process  which 
takes  place  in  the  mind  of  the  pupil  that 
constitutes  the  positive,  vital  factor  in  all 
education.  It  is  here  that,  if  not  the 
most  "  interesting,"  at  least  the  most  fruit- 
ful field  for  child-study  presents  itself.  And 
here  too,  let  us  repeat,  it  is  not  the  mere 
particular  limitations  constituting  the  pe- 
culiarities of  individual  children,  the  study 
and  recording  of  which  is  of  real  signifi- 
cance. On  the  contrary  what  is  required 
is  the  study  of  the  limitations  of  the  child- 
mind  as  such. 

No  doubt  such  study  can  be  actually 
carried  on  only  through  observation  of 
the  minds  of  individual  children.  But 
there  is  infinite  difference  between  the  ob- 
servations made  by  the  mere  untrained 
curiosity-seeker  and   those   made    by   the 


Instruction — Its  Process.  99 

disciplined  psychologist,  who  will  note  ab- 
normalities as  such,  and  as  something 
merely  by  the  way  ;  but  whose  attention 
will  be  unswervingly  directed  to  the  fun- 
damental Ideal  of  Mind  as  this  is  found 
in  actual  process  of  development  in  chil- 
dren ;  so  that  with  this  fundamental  Ideal 
as  his  guide  he  may  note  the  positive 
forms  under  which  that  Ideal  presents  it- 
self in  childhood,  and  also  discover  the 
degree  and  quality  of  concrete  develop- 
ment it  may  reasonably  be  expected  to 
assume  at  any  given  stage. 

Nor  can  the  teacher  too  often  remind 
himself  that  all  modes  of  mind  are  of  ne- 
cessity present  from  the  outset  in  each  in- 
dividual mind  ;  that,  as  Hegel  never 
wearies  of  repeating  in  one  or  another 
form,  the  whole  purpose  and  plan  of  edu- 
cation is  simply  this :  To  unfold  into 
ever-increasingly  explicit  degree  what  is 
already  implicit  in  the  individual  mind 
from  the  first  moment  of  its  existence  as 
an  individual  mind.  This  and  no  other  is 
the  genuine  Ariadne-thread  that  will  guide 


IOO  HegcVs  Educational  Ideas. 

the  teacher  securely  through  all  the  laby- 
rinthine perplexities  of  course  of  study, 
of  text-books  and  of  methods. 

And  indeed  the  education  of  the  race 
has  not  progressed  so  far  without  substan- 
tial investigation  of  the  limitations  of  the 
child-mind  being  actually  made.  In  truth, 
these  limitations  in  their  essential  practical 
significance  are  not  so  subtle  and  hidden 
as  to  render  their  discovery  specially  dif- 
ficult. They  have  been  known  substan- 
tially for  many  centuries  and  the  choice 
of  means  and  methods  has  been  deter- 
mined accordingly.  Mistakes  have  been 
made  ;  "  scientific  "  fads  as  well  as  caste 
interests  have  from  time  to  time  drawn 
attention  more  or  less  widely  from  the 
central  aim  of  education  ;  but  in  the  main 
the  process  of  education  has  always  been 
substantially  one  and  self-consistent,  be- 
cause on  the  one  hand  the  fundamental 
nature  of  mind  is  invariable,  and  because 
on  the  other  hand  the  limitations  of  the 
child-mind  are  so  far  beyond  the  reach  of 
individual    control    that    wherever  educa- 


Instruction — Its  Process.  ■      101 

tion  takes  place  at  all  it  must  be  along  the 
lines  already  fixed  in  the  very  nature  of 
the  case. 

On  the  intellectual  side  these  limitations 
are  substantially  as  follows  : 

(a)  Even  in  respect  of  Perception  it  is, 
or  ought  to  be,  a  matter  of  daily  observa- 
tion on  the  part  of  every  thoughtful  teacher 
that    the    average    child-mind   is   able    to 

o 

form  only  very  inadequate  and  for  the 
most  part  very  inaccurate  images  of  ob- 
jects. Upon  which  point  we  must  content 
ourselves  with  simply  calling  attention  to 
the  fact  that  children's  descriptions  of 
what  they  have  seen  prove  that  what  they 
saw  was  far  enough  from  corresponding  to 
what  was  there  to  be  seen.  And  this  is 
still  further  complicated  by  another  fact, 
as  follows  : 

(b)  The  Imagination  of  children  is  still 
so  plastic  that  the  images  formed  in  their 
minds  yield  to  the  pressure  of  feeling — 
whether  of  fear  or  of  desire,  whether  of 
disappointment  or  of  elation — so  that  the 
image    often    becomes    completely   trans- 


102  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

formed.  And  not  infrequently  this  occurs 
without  the  child  being  in  the  least  aware 
of  the  fact  that  any  such  change  has  act- 
ually taken  place  in  his  mind.  He  will 
therefore  tell,  with  perfect  assurance  and 
in  wholly  good  faith,  of  things  to  which  he 
has  been  eye-witness,  though  his  elders 
know  that  what  he  says  represents  what  is 
"  simply  impossible."  The  reader  will 
doubtless  recall  Oliver  Wendell  Holmes' 
humorous-pathetic  account  of  his  own  expe- 
rience as  a  child  in  this  respect.  And  the 
case  becomes  further  complicated  by  the 
fact  that  the  crude  images  already  existing 
in  the  child's  imagination  tend  to  fuse 
with  and  thus  more  or  less  to  confuse  the 
image  in  process  of  formation  in  any  given 
act  of  perception — this  result  being  the 
more  pronounced  in  proportion  as  excite- 
ment is  involved. 

From  which,  as  we  may  remark  by  the 
way,  it  is  evident  that  what  are  called 
"  children's  lies  "  are  often  no  more  than 
the  crude  phantasies  of  children,  and  that 
irreparable  moral  injury  is  done  the  child 


Instruction — Its  Process.  103 

by  those  who,  ignorant  of  his  psycholog- 
ical limitations  and  difficulties,  assume  all 
inaccuracies  of  statement  on  his  part  to  be 
evidences  of  moral  perversity  and  apply 
punishment  where  the  true  remedy  is  care- 
ful, kindly  explanation  leading  to  closer 
observation  by  the  child. 

(<:)  And  besides  these  limitations  there 
is  the  still  subtler  one  in  respect  of  thought 
and  language.  We  are  so  much  in  the 
habit  of  saying  that  perception  develops 
first,  imagination  later,  and  thought  last, 
that  one  is  liable  to  accept  this  formula  as 
literally  representing  the  fact,  and  thus  to 
forget  that  all  three  modes  of  intelligence 
are  present  from  the  first  and  develop,  not 
merely  simultaneously,  but  also  in  com- 
plete interfusion  ;  the  appearance  of  serial 
order  being  due  to  the  relative  complexity 
of  these  modes  ;  so  that  thought  is — not 
last  to  develop — but  last  to  attain  maturity 
of  development. 

Meanwhile,  as  a  moment's  reflection 
proves,  the  assumption  so  commonly  made 
that  the  senses  are  completely  developed 


104  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

by  the  time  the  child  enters  school  is 
clearly  in  utter  contradiction  of  the  fact. 
The  senses,  especially  those  of  sight  and 
hearing  as  the  specifically  intellectual 
senses,  ought  therefore  to  receive  careful 
education  and  training,  including,  of 
course,  the  testing  of  the  sense-organs. 

But  the  still  more  vital  point  in  respect 
of  education  is  this  :  That  sensation  and 
perception  are  to  be  definitely  and  delib- 
erately brought  into  subordination  to 
t  J  ion  gilt,  and  thus  elevated  to  the  rank  of  a 
fundamental  factor  in  all  true  observation. 
It  is  here,  indeed,  that  the  significance  of 
sense-perception  finds  its  highest  term. 
The  end  and  aim__oJ  education  is,  let  us 
repcatr^FcrBring  the  mind  to  maturity — to 
maturity,  we  may  now  add,  as  one  whole 
mind  in  each  and  all  its  modes.  It  is  pe- 
culiarly important  in  the  educational  sense, 
however,  to  bring  to  as  high  a  state  of  ma- 
turity— i.  e.,  of  clearness  and  precision  and 
adequacy — as  possible,  the  power  of  per- 
ceiving color  and  form  and  relative  size ; 
as  well  as  the  power  of  perceiving  tone  in 


Instruction — Its  Process.  105 

its    three    phases    of    pitch,  loudness    and 
quality. 

The  justification  of  this  last  statement 
is  in  brief  as  follows  : 

(1)  Judgment — in  fact  thought  in  gen- 
eral— is  involved  in  the  very  process  of 
perception  ;  (2)  Visual  perceptions  are  in- 
dispensable to  all  scientific  work,  espec- 
ially in  respect  of  measurement  and  class- 
ification ;  (3)  precise  perceptions  through 
the  sense  of  hearing  are  indispensable  to 
exactness  both  in  the  utterance  and  in  the 
understanding  of  spoken  language  ;  (4)  to 
which  we  must  add  that  exactness  in  per- 
ception of  form  through  the  sense  of  vision 
is  indispensable  to  precision  of  expression 
and  to  precision  of  understanding  in  re- 
spect of  written  language. 

Similiarly  the  imagination  must  be 
trained  into  full  subordination  to  thought. 
In  which  connection  teachers  would  do 
well  to  read  Tyndall's  very  suggestive  es- 
say on  "The  Scientific  Uses  of  the  Imag- 
ination." Though  also  every  teacher 
ought  always  to  distinguish  with  perfect 


. 


106  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

clearness,  and  as  rapidly  as  possible  to 
bring  his  pupils  as  they  advance  in  grade, 
to  distinguish  (with  greater  clearness  and 
exactness  than  was  done  by  Tyndall)  as 
between  thinking  and  imagining.  Each  is 
involved  in  the  other,  but  neither  is  the 
other.  To  imagine  is  to  develop  an  im- 
age in  the  mind.  To  think  is  to  recog- 
nize a  relation.  One  may  think  space  as 
infinite,  though  he  could  never  imagine  it. 
One  may  imagine  a  dragon  of  the  sky, 
though  he  could  never  really  think  it. 
On  the  other  hand,  as  already  indicated, 
I  Hegel   would    here  remind   us,    and  does 

/  betimes  forcibly  remind  us,  that  such  dis- 
tinctions  as  that  between   imagining  and 
thinking — to  develop  which  distinction   is 
itself  an  example  of  deliberate  and  some- 
\     what  complex  thinking — ought  not   to  be 

\  expected  of  pupils  who  are  still  "  chil- 
dren." Rather  this  has  its  explicit  begin- 
ning in  the  period  of  youth  when  the  in- 
dividual mind  is  already  more  or  less  def- 
initely awakened  to  that  stage  of  con- 
sciousness   which,  as  we   have   previously 


Instruct 'io? i — Its  Process.  107 

noticed,  Hegel  described  as  "  including  the 
life  of  the  species  " — the  period  namely, 
in  which  the  individual  begins  positively 
to  recognize  abstract  universal  forms,  i.e., 
begins  really  to  think,  and  also  to  unfold 
universal,  ideal  images,  i.e.,  to  exercise  the 
higher  degrees  of  creative  imagination. 

In  fact  the  particular  instance  just  re- 
ferred to  is  a  good  example  of  Instruction 
that  pertains  rather  to  secondary  than  to 
primary  education. 

To  which  we  may  add,  that  since  the 
progress  of  the  child  is  continuous  as  well 
as  gradual,  the  gradations  in  the  progress 
are  practically  beyond  number.  To  note 
these  gradations  and  to  be  able  with  ease 
to  modify  the  "  instruction  '  accordingly, 
this  is  the  proof  of  genuine  power  of  divin- 
ation on  the  part  of  the  teacher.  It  is  a 
secret  which  no  "  normal  "  school  can  com- 
municate. It  can  only  be  grown  into — 
more  rapidly  by  some,  less  rapidly  by 
others.  It  is  the  subtlest  element  in  the 
"  personality  "  of  the  teacher.  The  indis- 
pensable   conditions   of    its    development 


io8  Hezd's  Educational  Ideas. 

are  :  Sincerity  of  purpose,  rich  and  ever- 
increasingly  varied  culture,  sympathetic 
enthusiasm  in  school-room  work. 
.  Nor  must  we  turn  from  this  topic  with- 
out specially  noting  the  intellectual  value 
of  the  energy  of  will  as  expressed  in  con- 
scious effort  to  work  out  a  definitely  ap- 
prehended plan.  Not  only  does  knowl- 
edge lead  to  self-activity ;  knowledge  is 
gained  through  self-activity.  Ultimately, 
indeed,  no  knowledge  whatever  can  be 
gained  in  any  other  way.  For  knowing 
is  itself  a  form  of  self-activity.  But  what 
especially  is  intended  here  is  that  the  very 
hands  are  of  extremely  subtle  significance 
as  organs  of  intelligence,  which  yet  must 
be  brought  into  use  by  the  intelligent  will 
or  the  willing  intelligence  exercised  not 
merely  directly  through  the  hands  them- 
selves, but  also  indirectly  upon  the  hands 
through  the  eye. 

It  is  this,  as  need  hardly  be  remarked, 
that  constitutes  the  justification,  on  the 
intellectual  side,  of  that  aspect  of  the 
u  new  education  "  represented  by  the  kin- 


Instruction — Its  Process.  log 

dergarten,  and  the  manual  training  school, 
as  well  as  by  the  growing  demand  for  ac- 
tual performance  of  experiments  and  the 
direct  examination  of  specimens  by  the 
individual  pupils. 

But  we  must  turn  to   the  consideration 
of  the  second  phase  of  Instruction. 


no  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas 


IX. 

INSTRUCTION— ITS  MEANS— A.  LANGUAGE. 

As  to  the  means  of  Instruction  in  gen- 
eral, these  may  be  said  to  consist  of  sub- 
ject-matter properly  arranged  (course  of 
study)  and  of  the  appliances  for  rendering 
this  effective  (text-book  and  apparatus). 
It  is  the  former  alone,  that  we  shall  here 
especially  consider. 

Under  this  head  the  first  thing  to  notice 
is  that  such  subject  matter  really  consti- 
tutes just  the  immediate  objective  aspect 
of  Education.  As  such  it  presents  three 
distinct  phases.  T\\e  first  of  these  phases 
is  Language  as  expressive  of  Thought-re- 
lations. The  second  phase  is  that  of  Form 
as  expressing  Space-relations.  The  third  is 
Process  as  expressing  relations  of  Energy. 
Of  course  these  are  by  no  means  mutu- 
ally exclusive  subject-matters  of  Educa- 
tion, but  only  distinguishable  phases  of 
the  one  total  subject-matter  which  is  to  be 


Instruction — Its  Means — A.  Language,     in 

made    the    object     of    study  in    the     one 
whole  educational  process. 

These  phases  we  have  next  to  consider 
a  little  more  in  detail. 

(a).  Language  Universal.  Language  is  the 
most  universal  and  adequate  form  in  which 
the  thought-aspect  of  consciousness  finds 
expression.  We  have  already  noticed  in 
this  connection  that  Hegel  regards  the' 
beginning  of  articulate  thinking,  that  is, 
thinking  in  words,  as  marking  the  first 
great  epoch  in  the  education  of  the  indi- 
vidual. 

Indeed,  when  it  is  remembered  that  in 
the  nature  of  the  case  an  image  as  such 
can  represent  only  a  particular  and  isolated 
fact  or  object  ;  and  that,  on  the  other 
hand,  relations,  totalities,  multiplicities, 
exist  in  truth  only  for  the  thought-aspect 
of  consciousness,  while  thought,  properly 
speaking,  can  unfold  into  concrete  realiza- 
tion only  in  and  through  language — when 
this  is  remembered,  it  can  scarcely  be 
questioned  that  the  actual  relation  be- 
tween thought  and  language   is  one   and 


112  HegeVs  Educational  Ideas, 

the  same  with  the  relation  which  may 
otherwise  be  described  as  that  between 
inner  substance  and  outer  form,  and  again 
as  that  between  vital  function  and  its  or- 
ganic expression.  And  this  to  such  de- 
gree that  there  is  really  no  extravagance 
in  Max  Midler's  formula:  "  No_  Reason- 
without  Language — no  Language.. without 
Reason  " — a  truth  which  he  regards  as  of 
sufficiently  vital  significance  to  justify  his 
placing  it  as  the  motto  on  the  title  page 
of  his  Science  of  Thought — the  work  in 
which  he  sums  up  the  results  of  the  studies 
of  his  whole  life  in  his  chosen  field  of 
Linguistics. 

Nor  does  this  in  any  way  conflict  with 
Steinthal's  positive  statement  that  "  the 
animal  thinks  without  speaking."*  In- 
deed, Steinthal  makes  this  remark  directly 
after  quoting  with  approval  the  conviction 
expressed  by  Herbart  to  the  effect  that 
silent  thinking  is  for  the  most  part  only  a 
suppressed  speaking  ;  and  this   to  the  ex- 


*  Einleitung  in   die.  Psychologie   und  Sprach%vissen- 

schaft,  2d  Ed.,  p.  48. 


Instruction — Its  Means — A.  Language.      113 

tent  of  involving  the  whole  nervous  pro- 
cess controlling  the  organs  of  speech, 
though  not  with  such  force  as  to  bring 
the  muscles  into  actual  movement.* 

Steinthal,  in  fact,  is  only  insisting  that 
articulate  thinking  is  not  the  whole  of 
thinking — that  thought  pervades  the  whole 
field  of  consciousness,  and  that  though  in 
its  rudimentary  degree  it  is  inarticulate, 
it  is  still  the  mode  of  mind  through  which 
the  universal  aspects  of  things — types, 
qualities  as  such,  tendencies  (including 
consciousness  of  before  and  after  i.e., 
time)  etc., — are  apprehended. 

Indeed  it  is  only  in  so  far  as  thought  is 
conceived  to  be  already  necessarily  in- 
volved in  inarticulate,  but  germinal  form, 
even  in  the  rudimental  mind,  that  the  ac- 
tual development  of  explicit,  articulate 
thinking  as  unfolded  in  actual  speech  can 
be  accounted  for  at  all  upon  any  really 
scientific  basis.  And  this  is  but  to  say  in 
particular  form,  that  if  we  are  to  have   a 

*  It  has  even  been  said  ,  however,  that  mere  silent 
reading  can  produce  hoarseness. 
8 


114  HegeVs  Educational  Ideas. 

science  of  mind,  and  of  Education  as  the 
process  of  unfolding  mind,  it  must  be  upon 
the  express  presupposition  of  the  absolute 
unity  and  wholeness  of  mind  in  its  primal 
nature.  That  is,  mind  as  Type  must  be 
conceived  as  unfolding  into  realized  form 
in  individual  minds,  each  of  which,  from  and 
in  the  first  moment  of  its  existence  as  an 
individual  Mind,  is  already  in  germ  all 
that  the  type  implies,  and  hence  all  that 
the  individual  mind  itself  ever  can  be- 
come. In  which  case  it  is  evident  that 
we  can  never  too  strongly  emphasize  in  its 
literal  significance,  the  proposition  that 
education  is  just  the  evolution  of  mind — 
the  process  of  unfolding  into  explicit  form 
the  characteristics  which  are  implicit  in  each 
mind  from  its  birth  as  mind.     Man  inarticu- 

(late,  as  Hegel  insists,  is  not  essentially  dis- 
tinguishable from  other  objects  of  nature. 
It  is  only  as  articulately  thinkingve&x\  that  he 
proves  himself  to  have  emerged  out  of  mere 
nature  into  a  sphere  distinctively  above 
animalhood  and  to  be  realized  as  man.* 
*  Cf.      Werke,  VI 1 2.,  24. 


Instruction — Its  Means— A.  Language.      115 

And  now  we  have  to  remind  ourselves 
that  it  is  precisely  in  language  that  the 
universal  characteristics  of  mind  find  their 
subtlest,  most  exact  and  most  adequate 
formulation.  It  is  precisely  for  this  rea- 
son that  language  constitutes  not  only  the 
earliest  subject-matter,  but  also  at  every 
stage,  the  predominating  medium  of  edu- 
cation. From  the  kindergarten  on  through 
every  stage  of  education,  language  is  not 
only  the  most  direct,  it  is  the  one  abso- 
lutely indispensable  medium.  All  other 
appliances  find  their  highest  values  in  this  : 
that  the  knowledge  of  them  is  raised  to 
its  highest  term  through  description  of 
them  in  words,  through  command  of  them 
rendered  exact  by  explanation  of  the  re- 
lation of  part  to  part  in  words,  through 
appreciation  of  their  uses — such  appreci- 
ation becoming  really  matured  only 
through  tracing  out  by  means  of  words 
the  actual  purposes  which  such  appliances 
are  intended  to  fulfil. 

But  not  only  is  this  true  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  teacher,  who  must  consider 


Il6  HegeVs  Educational  Ideas. 

the  appliances  appropriate  to  the  work  of 
education.  It  is  no  less  true  in  the  actual 
development  of  the  mind  of  the  individual 
pupil.  And  because  rational  education 
consists  in  the  unfolding  of  the  individual 
mind  in  accordance  with  the  universal 
type  of  mind,  it  may  well  be  presumed 
that  in  the  teaching  of  language,  the  pro- 
cess is  essentially  one  of  leading  the  in- 
dividual pupil  to  recognize  with  ever-in- 
creasing clearness  the  universal  character 
of  language,  and  of  thought  as  embodied 
in  language.  And  this  is  only  so  much 
the  more  evident  when  we  remember  that 
it  is  in  and  through  language  that  the 
typical  or  universal  characteristics  of  mind 
find  their  subtlest,  most  exact,  most  ade- 
quate formulation. 

In  this  respect  the  special  phases  which 
are  of  direct  practical  interest  to  teachers 
are  :  (i)  Voice,  (2)  Reading,  (3)  Writing, 
and  (4)  Grammar. 

(1)  Of  Voice  it  may  be  said  that  the  tone 
merely  as  tone  expresses  the  least  differ- 
entiated phase  of  consciousness.     Through 


Instruction — Its  Means — A.  Language.     117 

tone  as  such,  only  feeling  becomes  explic- 
it. Whatever  thought  is  involved  remains 
merely  implicit.  Properly  speaking,  the 
human  voice  gives  utterance  to  what  is 
innermost  in  the  individual  consciousness. 
According  to  Hegel's  peculiar  formula, 
What  the  individual  is,  he  infuses  into  his 
voice  {zvas  er  ist  das  legt  er  in  seine 
St  iinme)* 

But  also — and  to  this  we  feel  sure  Heg- 
el would  offer  no  objection — the  comple- 
mentary aspect  of  this  view  is,  that  what- 
ever the  tone  of  voice  to  which  the  indi- 
vidual habituates  himself,  to  that  com- 
plexion will  his  inmost  being  come  at  last. 
For  this  habituation  is  itself  essentially 
nothing  else  than  an  inner  spiritual  pro- 
cess. Feeling  and  tone  are  but  inner  and 
outer  aspects  of  the  one  concrete  fact  of 
the  individual's  own  spontaneous  exis- 
tence. And  there  is  truth  even  in  the 
paradox  of  the  extreme  evolutionists,  that 
we  are  pleased  because  we  smile  and  sing, 
and  angry  because  we  frown  and  mutter. 

*    Werke,  VI I2.,  131. 


1 1 8  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

Laughter  and  cursing  alike  may  pass  be- 
yond control  and  grow  hysterical.  And 
it  is  not  to  be  forgotten  that  it  is  precisely 
through  this  outer  form  that  the  inner 
substance  of  mind  is  really  to  be  ap- 
proached and  influenced. 

Even  here,  then,  there  is  a  world  of  prac- 
tical suggestion  for  the  teacher,  and  that 
charmed  word  of  the  Greeks  :  Moderation, 
ought  to  be  the  motto  in  every  school- 
room. Tone  is  the  subtlest  gesture  of  the 
soul.  By  example,  as  well  as  by  precept, 
therefore,  a  normal  tone  of  voice  ought  to 
be  cultivated,  all  affectations  avoided,  and 
voice-culture  so  conducted  as  to  insure 
increased  refinement  of  mind  through 
growth  in  purity  and  strength  along  with 
gentleness  of  tone. 

But  long  before  the  child  is  sent  to 
school  he  has  passed  beyond  the  limits  of 
that  inner  existence  which  utters  itself  in 
mere  inarticulate  cries.  His  thought  has 
become  explicit  to  a  degree  that  must  as- 
tonish one  who  has  come  for  the  first  time 
to  think  of   it    deliberately.     Indeed,  the 


Instruction — Its  Means — A.  Language.     119 

extent  to  which  the  ordinary  child,  even 
of  three  years,  has  already  mastered  the 
thought  and  language  of  everyday  life 
must  go  far  to  confirm  in  every  thought- 
ful mind  the  belief  in  the  original  creative 
activity  of  mind  on  the  one  hand,  and  in 
the  subtlety  and  extent  to  which  the  indi- 
vidual mind  is  already  endowed  at  birth 
through  the  evolutional  process  of  the  race. 

And  so  much  the  more  significant  does 
this  transition  from  the  inarticulate  to  the 
articulate  in  vocalization  appear  when  we 
reflect  that  as  a  spiritual  process  the  trans- 
ition is  from  the  stage  of  mere  general 
consciousness  to  that  of  definite  ^//"-con- 
sciousness —  to  what  Kant  called  the 
"  transcendental  unity  of  self-conscious- 
ness," and  to  what  Hegel  calls  the  "  inde- 
pendently existing  (fur  sich  seyende)  unity 
of  self-consciousness." 

Language  is,  in  fact,  just  the  explicit 
form  (Dascyti)  of  the  self,  pure  and  simple, 
and  in  which  that  matured  form  of  self- 
related  unity,  known  as  self  -  conscious- 
ness, enters   into  positive  existence  ;  and 


120  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

this  in  such  wise  that  its  existence  is  at 
the  same  time  manifest  to  another  self.* 
For  example,  in  saying  "  I  "  I  realize  for 
myself  my  own  existence — bring  my  con- 
sciousness to  the  focus  of  explicit  self- 
consciousness.  But  in  saying  "  I '  I  also 
address  myself  to  another  unit,  which  I 
recognize  as  self-conscious  likewise,  and 
capable  in  turn  of  recognizing  me  in  the 
same  capacity.  So  that  the  expression  "  I ' 
is  intended  by  me,  indeed,  to  indicate  my 
own  individual  self,  while,  in  fact,  it  proves 
applicable  to  all  other  selves,  is  recognized 
by  others  as  having  that  value,  and  hence 
proves  to  be,  not  a  mere  individual,  but 
rather  a  universal  sign  ;  that  is,  a  sign  ap- 
plicable alike,  and  without  exception,  to 
all  minds. 

But  also,  it  is  a  sign  which  derives  its 
universal  nature  from  the  fact  that  it  is 
used  by  a  self-conscious  being,  as  a  sign 
of  a  self-conscious  being,  and  is  addressed 
to  a  self-conscious  being,  and  is  under- 
stood by  each  because  every  such  self- 
*  Cf.   fVerke,  II..  370. 


Instruction — Its  Means — A.  Language.      121 

conscious  being  possesses  a  nature  univer- 
sal and  common  to  all  alike.  Language, 
in  short,  is  universal,  because  it  is  the  im- 
mediate expression  of  the  inward  universal 
nature  of  Mind. 

In  learning  language,  therefore,  the 
child  is  learning  the  universal  form  in  and 
through  which  Mind  expresses  its  own 
universal  nature.  And  it  is  because  of 
this  subtle  significance  of  lanp-uap-e,  asex- 
pressing  the  ^^f-rnncnn^  "nivem^'ty 
Mind  in  the  form  of  specific  self-definition 
or  thought,  that  Hegel  calls  it  "the  ethe- 
rial  element,  the  sensuously  supersensu- 
ous,  through  which  the  expanding  knowl- 
edge of  the  mind  of  the  child  is  elevated 
in  ever  increasing  degree  above  merely 
sensuous  and  particular  forms  to  universal 
types,  principles  and  relations,  to  thought 
properly  speaking."* 

We  may  note,  now,  that  from  this  point 
of  view  language  can  really  exist  as  lan- 
guage only  in  so  far  as  it  is  the  outer, 
organic  form  in  which  thought  is  actually 

*  Wcrke,  VI 12.,  97. 


122  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

expressed.  Otherwise  it  is  a  mere  flatus 
vocis,  no  more  than  "  sounding  brass  or  a 
tinkling  cymbal."  Hence,  we  may  well 
imagine  what  Hegel  would  have  thought 
of  designating  language  as  a  mere  formal 
study  in  contrast  with,  say,  physics  or  chem- 
istry, as  a  study  having  a  content  !  As  if 
language  could  be  "  form  '  at  all,  save  in 
so  far  as  it  is  the  form  of  thought  !  As  if 
thought  were  not  the  very  essence  or  "con- 
tent "  of  every  "  study." 

Above  all,  in  respect  of  elementary  in- 
struction in  language,  form  and  substance, 
are  one  and  inseparable.  For  there  the 
child  is  as  yet  wholly  unable  to  distinguish 
between  a  "  form '  and  a  "  content." 
Rather,  he  can  only  grasp  the  two  in 
their  concrete  unity.  He  can  no  more 
know  language  apart  from  thought  than 
he  can  know  thought  apart  from  language. 
For  him  the  description  of  things  is  at 
the  same  time  the  direct  embodiment  of 
thought. 

Now,  by  the  time  he  is  sent  to  school, 
the  child  has  not  only  taken  his  first  step, 


Instruction — Its  Means — A.  Language.      123 

but  has  advanced  far  beyond  his  first 
step  in  this  process  of  explicit,  articulate 
thinking.  So  that  the  teacher,  even  of  the 
most  elementary  grade,  may  and  does  as- 
sume, with  perfectly  good  reason,  that  this 
work  has  already  been  brought  far  on  the 
way.  Of  course  there  are  wide  differences  ; 
but  the  minimum  is  still  an  accomplished 
fact  of  relatively  great  extent,  and  of  ab- 
solutely vital  import.  The  child  has  al- 
ready attained  substantial  self-conscious- 
ness. He  already  feels  the  universal  sig- 
nificance of  things.  He  already  possesses 
a  vocabulary  serving  the  modes  of  self- 
comprehension,  and  of  communication  with 
others,  in  respect  of  all  ordinary  interests. 
Nevertheless,  he  has  developed  this  vo- 
cabulary spontaneously.  True,  his  spon- 
taneity in  this  process  has  developed  in  re- 
ponse  to  external  stimuli,  including  the 
spoken  language  of  those  with  whom  he 
has  been  associated.  Hence,  from  this 
side  it  may  also  be  said  that  he  has  at- 
tained to  the  stage  of  articulate  utterance 
through  imitation.     But  even  so,  the  imita- 


124  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 


tion  has  been  unreflecting,  and,  in  this  vital 
sense,  spontaneous. 

On  entering  school,  therefore,  the  child's 
vocabulary  consists  of  words  as  wholes. 
Nay,  to  him  each  sentence  is  a  whole,  the 
construction  of  which  is  not  even  a  mys- 
tery to  him  ;  for  as  yet  he  has  raised  no 
question  about  it,  and  is  not  aware  that 
any  question  could  be  raised.  As  Stein- 
thal  and  others  have  intimated,  the  child 
comes  to  speak,  much  as  he  comes  to  see 
and  to  hear — by  the  spontaneous  exercise 
of  a  power  native  to  him,  through  an  or- 
gan already  formed,  and  only  needing  the 
spontaneous  inner  activity  of  the  mind  in 
answer  to  appropriate  outer  stimuli  to 
bring  it  into  effective  use.  Or,  as  Stein- 
thal  elsewhere  suggests,  the  child  cannot, 
properly  speaking,  be  said  to  have  learned 
language,  seeing  that  no  one  has  actually^ 
taught  him.  Rather,  "  what  the  gardener 
does  with  the  seed,  from  which  he  expects 
to  obtain  plants,  just  that  we  do  with  our 
children,  in  order  to  bring  them  to  speak : 
we  bring  them   into  the   necessary  condi- 


Instruction — Its  Means — A.  Language.      125 


tions  of  mental  growth,  that  is,  into  human 

association."^.——.  "  -" 

Such  in  brief  are  the  conditions  of  the 
actual  development  of  the  fact  of  language 
on  the  part  of  the  individual  child.  From 
which  it  will  be  seen  that  the  first  great 
epoch  in  the  development  of  individual 
self-consciousness,  consisting  in  the  spon- 
taneous unfolding  of  a  vocabulary  to  meet 
the  ordinary  needs  of  human  association, 
still  involves  a  subtle  synthetic  process 
and  corresponding  product,  of  the  nature 
of  which  the  child  is  still  unconscious. 

Of  the  process,  indeed,  he  must  remain 
unconscious  until  he  has  attained  the  de- 
gree of  reflective  self-consciousness,  where 
he  can  enter  upon  the  investigation  of  ulti- 
mate questions,  including  the  nature  of 
the  mind  itself. 

Of  the  product,  he  begins  the  analysis  as 
soon  as  he  enters  upon  school-life,  prop- 
erly speaking.  And  in  order  to  do  this, 
he  must  be  brought  into  direct  relation 
with  language  in  a  new  form. 
*  Op.  cit.,  p.  S3. 


126  HegeVs  Educational  Ideas. 

(2)  Reading  constitutes  this  new  form, 
and  involves  the  first  stage  in  the  analyti- 
cal examination  of  language  as  the  outer, 
organic  form  of  thought.  As  we  have 
seen,  the  vocabulary  he  already  possesses 
is  the  product  of  the  spontaneous  synthetic 
activity  of  the  child's  own  mind.  The  first 
stage  of  his  reflective  activity  in  school  will 
consist  normally  of  the  formal  analysis  of 
the  elements  of  this  vocabulary  under  the 
guidance  of  the  teacher.  What  took  place 
before  by  instinct  is  now  to  find  its  com- 
plement in  regulated — i.  e.,  more  or  less 
prescribed — reflection.  The  first  step  is 
to  be  taken  in  the  systematic  reduction 
of  the  sensuous  consciousness  to  subordi- 
nation to  the  reflective  consciousness. 

On  the  other  hand,  this  conscious  analy- 
sis is  only  the  transition  between  the  un- 
conscious synthesis  by  which  it  was  pre- 
ceded, and  the  conscious  synthesis  by  which 
it  is  immediately  followed,  and  which  con- 
stitutes its  true  complement. 

In  its  primitive,  unanalyzed  form  lan- 
guage may  not  only  be  compared  with,   it 


Instruction — Its  Means — A.  Language.     127 

may  rather  be  regarded  as,  an  art-work.* 
With  the  analysis  of  the  forms  thus  spon- 
taneously produced,  defects  are  discov- 
ered and  corrected,  and  the  work  not 
merely  restored  to  its  primal  unity,  but 
also  raised  to  a  higher  term  of  perfection, 
both  in  use  and  in  beauty,  for  the  con- 
sciousness of  the  child. 

It  is  the  bringing  into  its  full  significance 
this  restored  form  of  language  after  its  an- 
alysis that  in  its  first  degree  constitutes  read- 
ing m  the  proper  sense  of  the  term.  And 
here,  evidently,  two  aspects  present  them- 
selves. The  one  is  the  inner  aspect.  This 
consists  in  the  careful  endeavor  on  the  part 
of  the  pupil  to  reproduce  in  his  own  mind 
the  exact  thought  symbolized  in  the  writ- 
ten signs.  The  other  is  the  outer  aspect, 
consisting  in  the  attempt  to  give  proper 
vocal  expression  to  the  thought  thus  in- 
wardly   reproduced.       Both    are    in  truth 

*  Curtius  {History  of  Greece,  Trans.  Ward,  I.  32), 
declares  that  the  first  historic  deed  of  the  Greeks  was 
the  development  of  their  language,  "  and  this  first 
deed  an  artistic  one." 


128  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

exceedingly  subtle  processes,  requiring  a 
high  degree  of  mental  cultivation  and  of 
vocal  skill  on  the  part  of  the  teacher. 
And  so  much  the  more  when  the  distorted 
forms  of  speech  so  often  developed  by 
children  through  defective  or  vicious  in- 
tellectual associations  are  taken  into  the 
account.  Should  the  teacher  also  prove 
defective  in  culture  and  refinement,  the 
case  must  indeed  be  hopeless. 

It  should  be  added  that  the  teaching  of 
reading  presents  two  aspects  correspond- 
ing to  those  just  indicated  as  involved  in 
the  process  of  reading.  The  first  consists 
in  showing  the  child  how  to  study  the  les- 
son, so  as  to  find  out  exactly  the  thought 
it  conveys,  and  along  with  this,  and  as  a 
means  to  it,  to  bring  him  clearly  to  recog- 
nize the  precise  form  of  the  given  words 
and  sentences.  The  second  consists  in 
leading  him  to  find  and  bring  into  exer- 
cise the  vocalization  through  which  alone 
the  thought  can  be  rendered  precisely  and 
fully  comprehensible  to  the  hearer.* 

*  The  reader  will    find   in   Prof.    Hiram   Corson's 


Instruct  ion — Its  Means — A.  Language.     129 

Of  so  great  importance  did  the  proper 
instruction  of  the  pupil  in  reading  appear    \ 
to  Hegel  that  he  expressed  the  wish  and 
the  hope  that  it  might  be  made  one  of  the 
V  chief    means    oj_jruJ^H:e~~m~~1:he    schools.    / 
And,  of  course,  this  could  be  only  through  / 
the    careful    exercise    of    reading,    in    the/ 
sense    of    proper   vocalization,    in    direct, 
ceaseless  combination  with  reflection,  both 
as  to  the  form  of  the  language  and  as  to 
the  thought  which  the  language  conveys.* 

(3)  But  though  reading  involves  so  much 
of  reflection  aud  analysis,  it  still  is  pre- 
dominantly "  receptive  "  in  character.  That 
is,  it  depends  upon  an  immediate,  actual- 
ly given  external  object — the  book  to 
be  read.  And  this,  of  course,  necessarily 
implies  the  complementary  constructive 
process  through  which  the  book  was  pro- 
duced. In  other  words,  reading  involves 
writing. 

little  book  on  "  The  Aims   of  Literary  Study,"  ad- 
mirable   suggestions   as    to   right   method  and    true 
values  of  voice-culture  in  readirur. 
*  Thaulow,  Hegel 's  Ansichten,  I.,  90. 

9 


130  HegeVs  Educational  Ideas. 

Writing  is  production.  Reading  is  in- 
terpretation and  reproduction.  For  this 
reason,  as  we  may  remark  by  the  way, 
reading  and  writing  ought,  at  the  outset, 
to  be  taught  simultaneously  and  as  com- 
plementary phases  of  the  same  exercise. 
Spoken  word,  written  word,  printed  word 
— these  are  so  many  forms  of  one  and  the 
same  concept  in  the  mind.  And  such  gen- 
uine examples  of  unity  in  variety  and 
variety  in  unity  ought  to  be  made  the 
most  of. 

Here,  too,  as  elsewhere,  neatness  and 
precision  of  form  are  but  the  outward 
means  through  which  are  developed  ex- 
actness and  finish  of  inward  power  ;  and 
it  is  not  so  much  the  visible,  passing, 
more  or  less  marketable  product  as  the 
invisible,  permanent,  priceless  mental 
habit  that  is  of  chief  moment  in  edu- 
cation. 

Such  brief  intimation  will  suffice  with 
respect  to  the  elementary  and  so-called 
formal  work  of  instruction  in  writing. 
From    the    first,    as   the     pupil    advances 


Instruction — Its  Means — A.  Language.      131 

in  power  to  produce  at  will  the  writ- 
ten form  of  language,  it  cannot  be 
doubted  that  he  should  be  led  to  exercise 
that  power  in  giving  written  as  well  as  oral 
expression  to  his  own  thought.  By  so 
doing  he  not  only  gives  to  his  own  thought 
visible  and  more  or  less  lasting  objective 
form,  but  he  also  becomes  accustomed  to 
examining  it  at  his  leisure  in  that  form, 
and  hence,  to  carefully  noting  and  correct- 
ing its  defects.  Properly  conducted,  such 
exercises  cannot  fail  to  react  upon  the 
thinking  of  the  pupil,  rendering  it  more 
exact,  concise,  and  forcible. 

(4)  Nevertheless  all  language-work,  as 
thus  far  indicated,  is  still  relatively  sponta- 
neous. Analysis  appears,  indeed,  but  only 
as  a  matter  of  judgment  in  the  form  of 
taste.  It  is  still  literally  the  art  of  lan- 
guage with  which  the  pupil  is  occupied  ; 
and  that  precisely  this  phase  of  language- 
training  may  be  brought  to  its  highest 
degree  of  perfection  it  is  indispensable 
that  it  should  be  supplemented  by  the 
science  of  language. 


13-  HegeVs  Educational  Ideas. 

Thus  Grammar,  as  the  science  of  lan- 
guage, constitutes  the  instrument  of  rea- 
soned criticism,  of  judgment  in  the  form 
of  reflection.  In  this  connection  Hegel  de- 
clares that  "  The  value  of  grammatical 
study  cannot  be  too  much  emphasized 
since  it  constitutes  the  beginning  of  logical 
culture  " — an  aspect  which,  in  our  day  as 
well  as  in  that  of  Hegel,  "  appears  to  have 
fallen  almost  wholly  into  oblivion.  In 
fact,  Grammar  has  for  its  content  the  cate- 
gories [or  universal  terms  of  thought]  which 
are  the  peculiar  products  and  determina- 
tions or  characteristic  forms  of  the  under- 
standing. In  it  [t.  e.,  in  Grammar],  there- 
fore, the  understanding  itself  begins  to  be 
learned  [or  technically  exact]. 

"  These  most  spiritual  essentialities  [viz. 
the  categories]  with  which  Grammar  first 
makes  us  acquainted  are  something  spe- 
cially comprehensible  to  youth,  and,  in- 
deed, there  is  nothing  of  a  spiritual  [or 
mental]  nature  more  easily  comprehensible 
than  just  these.  For  the  as  yet  imper- 
fectly developed  power  of  comprehension 


Instruction — Its  Means— A.  Language.     133 

peculiar  to  this  age  is  still  unable  to  grasp 
the  realm  [of  thought]  in  its  manifold- 
ness ;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  those 
very  abstractions  are  something  altogether 
simple  [and  hence,  easy  of  comprehen- 
sionj.    * 

Elsewhere,f  in  speaking  of  the  logical 
determinations  or  characteristic  forms  of 
thought,  Hegel  expresses  himself  more  di- 
rectly to  the  effect  that  "  such  determina- 
tions are  laid  down  [or  presented  in  definite, 
concrete  form]  especially  in  language. 
Hence  is  it  that  the  instruction  in  gram- 
mar which  is  imparted  to  children  has  this 
phase  of  utility  :  that  they  are  brought  to 
attend  unawares  to  the  distinctions  of 
thought." 

All  which  may  be  restated  somewhat  as 
follows  :  The  mind,  in  its  very  nature  as 
mind,  is  a  self-centered  unit  of  energy, 
which  unfolds  itself  into  consciously  real- 
ized form  through  its  relation  to  its  en- 
vironment. In  its  sensuous  modes  of  ac- 
tivity it  apprcJicnds  particular  things.  That 
*  Loc.cit.  \  Werke,  VI.,  50. 


134  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

is,  in  its  responses  to  external  stimuli  it 
develops  within  itself  sensuous  representa- 
tions of  things.  But  also  in  its  reflective 
modes  of  activity  it  comprehends  things. 
That  is,  in  the  very  fact  of  developing  sen- 
suous representations  of  things,  it  neces- 
sarily, and  with  more  or  less  definiteness, 
recognizes  these  representations  as  modes 
of  its  own  being,  and,  in  that  fact,  also 
necessarily  seizes  them  together  in  vital  re- 
lation as  modes  of  its  own  individual  and 
indivisible  consciousness.* 

But  this  process  of  the  comprehension 
of  things  under  the  form  of  the  interrela- 
tion of  the  mind's  own  modes  is  just  what 
constitutes  thinking  ;  and  thinking  assumes 
actual  outer  form  in  and  attains  positive 
reality  through  language  and  nothing  else 
than  language. 

Further,  by  as  far  as  the  mind  attains 
to  ^//"-consciousness  it  recognizes  the 
modes  of  its  own  activity — makes    these 

*  We  will  see  later  on  how  the  psychological  prin- 
ciple here  indicated  becomes  manifest  in  the  devel- 
opment of  number. 


Instruction — Its  Means — A.  Language.      135 

the  object  of  its  own  reflection.  And  this 
process  of  the  examination  of  thought  by 
thought  finds  its  first  positive  form  in  the 
direct  apprehension  of  the  simple  natural 
categories  under  which  all  thought-forms 
are  primarily  to  be  classified,  and  through 
the  application  of  which  all  thought-pro- 
cesses are  to  be  clarified,  corrected,  and 
matured. 

It  is  precisely  this  process  which  in  its 
elementary  form  constitutes  the  essence 
of  grammar,  and  the  application  of  which 
constitutes  grammatical  analysis.  Once 
clearly  understood,  it  appears  as  self-evi- 
dent that  this  is  one  of  the  most  valid  and 
valuable  of  all  educational  media,  and  that 
its  neglect  is  one  of  the  gravest  educa- 
tional errors  of    our  time. 

So  much  is  especially  applicable  to  ele- 
/  mentary  work.     For  more  advanced  pupils  ' 
Hegel  is  in  accord  with  thoughtful    edu- 
cators generally  as  to    the  superiority  of 
ancient  languages  over  modern,  and  espe- 
\    cially  over  one's  mother  tongue,  for  pur- 
\poses  of  intellectual  discipline.     In  the  clas- 


1 36  Hegel 's  Educational  Ideas. 

sic  languages,  not  only  is  it  that  the  forms 
are  unfamiliar,  and  hence  attract  special 
attention,  but  also  every  phase  of  thought 
has  its  peculiar  and  appropriate  gram- 
matical form.  And  because  it  is  through 
such  concrete  forms  that  the  immature 
mind  most  easily  seizes  the  universal  as- 
pects of  thought,  it  is  evident  that  Hegel 
does  not  exaggerate  when  he  declares  that 
the  thoroughgoing  study  of  grammatical 
forms  presents  itself  as  one  of  the  most 
universal  and  noblest  of  all  the  means  of 
cultivating  the  mind. 

To  which  we  may  add  that  this  must  be 
true,  above  all,  of  that  language  which 
served  to  embody  the  thought  of  the  first 
people  in  the  world  who  devoted  their 
highest  genius  to  art  production,  on  the 
one  hand,  and  to  scientific  research,  on  the 
other,  and  who  in  just  this  process  devel- 
oped their  language  to  a  degree  of  preci- 
sion and  subtlety  of  expression  nowhere 
else  equaled,  precisely  in  and  through  this 
freely  creative  activity  within  the  realm  of 
the  Ideal.     From  which  it  is  but  a  natural 


Instruction — Its  Means— A.  Langtmge.     137 


corollary  that  the  Greek  language  is  a  means 
of  mental  discipline  for  which  there  is  no 
adequate  substitute  ;  and  the  claim  that  its 
place  in  the  course  of  study  ought  to  be 
given  up  to  some  modern  language  is  based 
upon  a  total  misconception  of  the  educa- 
tional values  to  be  derived  from  the  study 
of  language. 

(b)  Language  of  Quantity*  Our  discus- 
sion of  the  educational  aspects  of  language 
would  be  radically  incomplete  were  we 
not  to  consider  the  language  of  abstract 
quantity.  What  has  already  been  said 
refers  entirely  to  language  in  its  most  uni- 

*  I  cannot  pretend  that  Hegel  has  anywhere  ex- 
plicitly included  number  under  language.  But,  of 
course,  practically,  Hegel,  along  with  everybody  else, 
does  so  include  it.  Even  if  it  be  admitted  that,  as 
President  Eliot  of  Harvard  has  declared  (Regents' 
Bulletin,  No.  32,  1895,  University  of  the  State  of 
New  York,  p.  955),  "  the  reasoning  of  mathematics 
is  peculiar  to  itself,"  yet  it  is  still  to  be  classed  as  a 
special  aspect,  and  must  therefore  be  regarded  as 
realized  and  to  be  realized  only  in  some  form  of 
language.  That  number  is  nothing  else  than  a  special 
aspect  of  language  in  general,  has  not,  as  it  seems  to 
me,  been  sufficiently  appreciated  hitherto. 


138  HegeVs  Educational  Ideas. 

versal  form.  The  forms  of  expression 
peculiar  to  the  realm  of  abstract  quantity 
may  be  said  to  be  a  dialect  of  this  univer- 
sal language.  Hence,  all  that  precedes 
and  all  that  could  be  said  concerning  lan- 
guage in  the  wider  sense  must  be  applic- 
able in  a  measure  to  the  language  of  quan- 
tity. Some  things  remain  to  be  said,  how- 
ever, concerning  the  peculiarities  of  this 
dialectic  form. 

And  first  we  may  note  that  Arithmetic, 
which  is  commonly  defined  as  the  science 
of  number,  might,  for  that  reason,  very 
well  be  described  as  the  elementary  gram- 
mar of  the  special  dialect  in  which  the 
numerical  aspect  of  thought  finds  appro- 
priate expression.  And  here  we  are  com- 
pelled by  the  limits  of  the  present  essay 
to  confine  ourselves  to  the  single  central 
characteristic  of  numerical  synthesis. 

Students  of  Kant  know  that  "7  +  5=12' 
is    one    of   his    examples  of   a  "synthetic 
judgment    a  priori ;"   that  is,  of    a    judg- 
ment in  which  (1)  the  predicate  contains 
something   not  directly  given  in  the  sub- 


Instruction — Its  Means — A.  Language.      139 

ject ;  and  (2)  the  truth  of  which,  as  soon 
as  discovered,  is  recognized  as  being  uni- 
versal in  its  application,  and  also  "  neces- 
sary "  in  the  sense  that  from  the  very 
nature  of  thought  the  judgment  cannot 
but  be  accepted  as  absolutely  valid  so  soon 
as  its  real  meaning  is  clearly  apprehended. 

In  referring  to  this  Hegel  declares  that 
in  his  doctrine  of  Synthetic  Judgments 
a  priori  Kant  has  emphasized  a  concept 
{Begriff)  which  belongs  to  whatever  is  great 
and  undying  in  his  philosophy — "  the  con- 
cept, namely,  of  a  distinct  aspect  or  char- 
acteristic which  at  the  same  time  is  insep- 
arable from  the  given  whole  ;  something 
identical  which  at  the  same  time  is  undi- 
vided difference."* 

But  he  adds,  directly  after,  that  though 
this  concept  is  present  even  in  perception, 
yet  the  proposition  "  7-1-5=12,"  does  not 
really  serve  as  an  illustration  of  that  con- 
cept. "  Much  rather  is  number  a  mere 
identity,  and  numbering  or  reckoning  is 
the  producing  an  identity  which  is  utterly 
*   Werke,  III.,  232. 


140  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

and  wholly  an  external,  superficial  synthe- 
sis ;  a  unity  of  ones  of  such  nature  that,  so 
far  from  being  posited,  or  definitely  rep- 
resented as  identical  with  one  another,  are 
really  set  forth  as  external  and  positively 
separated." 

Kant  himself,  in  fact,  notifies  the  reader 
that  the  given  example  has  a  certain  analy- 
tical look,  and  that  primarily  the  discovery 
that  1 2  is  the  sum  of  7  and  5  is  really  arrived 
at  by  bringing  to  our  aid,  say,  the  five  fin- 
gers which  are  one  by  one  added  to  the  7. 

The  real  problem  in  Kant's  example  of 
a  numerical  synthesis,  as  we  may  remark 
by  the  way,  is  in  truth  the  very  old  one  of 
the  possibility  of  performing  any  addition 
at  all,  and  hence  the  problem  of  the  pos- 
sibility of  number  in  general.  In  The 
Sophist,  and  especially  in  The  Parmenides, 
Plato  treats  seriously  and  at  length  of  the 
problem  of  "  the  one  and  the  many." 
Elsewhere,  in  a  lighter  mood,  he  allows 
Socrates  to  express  himself  as  always 
wondering  why  it  is  that  an  object  here 
and  another  there   should,  when  brought 


Instruction — Its  Means — A.  Language.      141 

together,  become  tzuo,  and  whether  it  is  the 
mere  juxtaposition  of  things  that  is  the 
cause  of  multiplicity  ! 

Of  course  it  is  impossible  within  the 
present  limits  to  enter  into  the  more  ab- 
stract speculative  aspect  of  the  subject. 
Besides,  for  the  practical  purposes  of  edu- 
cational work,  the  more  immediate  psy- 
chological aspect  of  the  question  is  of 
greater  value.  Of  this  I  shall  present  a 
brief  intimation  of  what  seems  to  me  the 
correct  view,  only  premising  that  Kant's 
doctrine  of  the  "  transcendental  unity  of 
self-consciousness,"  and  Hegel's  doctrine 
of  the  original  unity  and  self-activity  of 
mind  as  such,  constitute,  when  taken  to- 
gether, the  necessary  presupposition  of 
all  really  fruitful  psychological  research. 

To  this  presupposition  no  other  psycho- 
logical problem  refers  us  more  directly 
than  that  of  number.  The  very  idea  of 
self-consciousness  necessarily  implies  the 
unity  of  the  mind.  But  also  such  idea  is 
possible  only  through  a  reference  of  self 
to  self.     This  very  reference  of  self  to  self, 


142  HegeVs  Educational  Ideas. 

however,  is  at  the  same  time  equally  a  dis- 
tingu  is  J i  ing  of  self  from  self.  S  e  1  f  -kn  o  w  i  n  g 
is  possible  only  in  so  far  as  the  self  is  made 
the  object  of  knowing.  But  it  is  the  self  alone 
that  is  capable  of  knowing.  As  knowing, 
however,  the  self  is  subject.  Further,  in 
the  very  fact  of  applying  to  itself  the 
name  "  subject "  the  knowing  self  has 
transformed  itself  into  an  object  to  which 
at  the  same  time  it  gives  the  name  subject. 

Thus  the  subject  is  its  own  object,  and 
the  object  is  itself  the  subject  by  which  it  is 
known  as  object.  They  are  one  and  indivis- 
ible ;  yet  also  this  one  has  already  disting- 
uished itself  as  two.  And  as  there  is  no  limit 
to  the  possibility  of  such  self-distinguishing, 
the  mind  has  thus  already  entered  upon 
that  phase  of  consciousness  constituting  the 
thought  of  multiplicity  with  its  infinite  pos- 
sibility of  number.  The  whole  mind,  besides, 
is  involved  in  each  of  its  many  phases.  Con- 
versely each  phase  involves  the  whole  mind. 

From  this  point  of  view  it  is  evident 
that  one  and  one  do  not  make  two  or  become 
two  at  all.     Rather,  in  the  very  nature   of 


Instruction — Its  Means — A.  Language.      143 

the  case  they  are  from  the  beginning  nec- 
essarily in  such  relation  to  each  other  that 
they  just  are  two — a  two,  however,  which 
is  only  a  more  complex  one.  When  we 
consider  the  one  as  one  it  appears  to  us  as 
continuous,  intensive  quantity  ;  when  we 
consider  it  as  multiple  it  appears  to  us  as 
discrete,  extensive  quantity.  Every  "  one  ' 
may  be  considered  as  an  indefinitely  com- 
plex sum  of  "  fractional  parts  ; '  though 
again  each  of  these  parts  may  be  properly  re- 
garded as  a  "  one."  Similarly,  every  sum  as 
such  is  equally  a  "  one,"  though  composed 
of  many  "ones."  And  we  are  to  remem- 
ber also  that  ''reciprocal  quantities"  are 
any  two  quantities  whose  product  is  unity. 
But  thus,  evidently,  number  is  just  a  nec- 
essary aspect  of  thought,  and  can  be  said 
to  inhere  in  things  only  in  so  far  as  things 
are  themselves  regarded  as  externalized 
thought.  It  is  not  the  juxtaposition  of  things 
in  space,  but  their  organic  interrelation  in 
consciousness  that  constitutes  the  basis  of 
number.  When  I  know  things  they  are  by 
that  fact  proven  to  be  in  my  thought.     And 


144  Hegel's  Educatio7ial  Ideas. 

I  can  know  them  only  in  so  far  as  they  are 
in  my  thought.  Whence  it  is  evident  that 
even  the  outward  formal  synthesis  of  num- 
ber is  dependent  absolutely  upon  the  inner 
synthesis  of  mind.  Or,  to  return  to  Hegel's 
explicit  utterance  :  "  Number  is  the  pure 
thought  of  the  externalization  of  thought."* 

In  short  we  can  know  anything  of  one 
and  of  many  only  because  the  mind  it- 
self is  a  one  which  in  its  very  nature  is 
a  self-differentiating  one — a  one  which  is 
forever  specializing  itself  into  many. 
At  the  same  time  the  "many"  thus  pro- 
duced are  nothing  else  than  modes  of 
the  mind  itself — differences  unfolded  by, 
from  and  within  the  mind  ;  which  differ- 
ences, nevertheless,  are  absolutely  in- 
separable from  the  mind.  Nay,  each 
mode,*  as  we  have  already  noticed,  in- 
volves the  whole  mind— is  just  a  mode 
of  the  one  whole  mind. 

Numbering,  to  repeat,  then,  is  just  one 
phase  of  thinking  ;  and  number^  as  out- 
ward form,  is  nothing  else  than  just   the 

*  Op.  cit. ,  237. 


Instruction — Its  Means — A.  Language.      145 


special  aspect  of  language  expressive  of 
this  peculiar  phase  of  thinking.* 

But  also  this  phase  of  thinking,  as  we 
must  add,  is  limited  to  the  simple,  abstract 
characteristic  of  quantity.  It  is  a  mere 
question  of  more  or  less,  and  wholly  ignores 
all  qualitative  aspects.  In  itself,  therefore, 
number  is  altogether  one-sided  and  wholly 
inadequate  as  an  expression  of  thought  in 
general,  and  all  attempts  in  that  direction 
must  inevitably  fail.  Indeed  the  very 
"  exactness  "  of  number  is  due  precisely 
to  this  inadequacy.  It  admits  no  ques- 
tion as  to  its  results  only  because  it  omits 
from  its  processes  all  "  disturbing  ele- 
ments " — i.  e.}  all  the  elements  which  give 
reality  to  things. 

We  have  next  to  ^note  on  the  one  hand 
that  this  very  simplicity  or  abstractness  of 
number  along  with  its  generality  explains 

*  On  referring  to  Sigwart  {Logic,  Trans.  Helen 
Dendy,  II.,  33)  I  find  this  statement  :  "  Thus  num- 
ber shows  itself  to  be  the  simple  consequence  of  the 
fundamental  functions  of  thought  itself,"  and  ''has 
its  root  in  self-consciousness,"  (p.  34).  The  whole 
section  (266)  will  well  repay  careful  study. 
IO 


146  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

why  it  is  so  easy  of  apprehension,  and 
why  it  is  so  much  a  matter  of  course 
to  begin  the  definite  work  of  instruction 
in  number  at  the  very  outset  even  of  ele- 
mentary education.  It  is  precisely  the 
phase  of  thinking  that  is  most  abstract 
and  which  yet  finds  its  application  in  im- 
mediately given  sensuous  forms.  Indeed, 
just  as  the  child  comes  to  school  already 
considerably  advanced  in  language  in  its 
more  general  character,  so  he  brings  with 
him  a  rudimentary  numerical  vocabulary 
together  with  actually  germinating  habits 
of  calculation  developed  through  the  spon- 
taneous processes  of  his  own  mind  awak- 
ened to  activity  through  his  daily  ex- 
perience. 

On  the  other  hand  it  is  important  also 
to  emphasize  a  point  already  indicated, 
and  which  Hegel*  shows  to  have  been  fa- 
miliar even  to  the  thinkers  of  antiquity — 
the  point,  vis.,  that  the  very  limitations  of 
numerical  expression  renders  it  hopelessly 
inadequate  to  the  expression  of  the  richer, 

*  Op.  cit.,  238. 


Instruction — Its  Means — A.  Language.      147 

more  concrete  phases  of  thought.  The 
vocabulary  of  number,  we  repeat,  is  but 
one  aspect  of  the  whole  vocabulary  of 
thought,  and  it  is  no  less  absurd  to  assume 
that  the  former  is  superior  to  the  latter  on 
the  ground  of  its  greater  "  exactness " 
than  it  would  be  to  insist  that  the  less 
includes  and  is  superior  to  the  greater 
because  it  is  more  easily  apprehended."* 
The  very  "  exactness"  of  number  is  the 
unmistakable  mark  of  its  hopeless  fin- 
itude.  For  every  actual  number  is  exact 
only  in  expressing  a  positive  limit ;  and 
any  actual  number  can  of  course  be  mul- 
tiplied by  any  other  number  or  by  itself  on 
ad  infinitum.  No  number  can  by  any  pos- 
sibility be  infinite  ;  and  just  this  thought, 
for  example, — a  thought  which  transcends 
number — is  not  a  whit  less  "  exact '  than 
any  that  can  be  expressed  in  actual  number. 

*  I  do  not  say  "  comprehended,"  because  to  really 
comprehend  the  less  one  must  know  it  in  its  relations 
— i.  e.,  must  know  the  greater  also — to  know  the  one 
you  must  know  the  many  ;  to  know  the  many  you 
must  know  the  one. 


148  HegeVs  Educational  Ideas. 

We  have  next  to  remark  that  because  of 
the  extreme  simplicity  of  its  processes,  in 
which,  as  Hegel  says,  the  "same  thing  is 
always  repeated,"  in  which,  as  Sigwart 
puts  it,  "  all  consists  finally  in  reducing 
manifold  combinations  of  numbers  to 
simple  counting" — because  of  this  we  are 
bound  to  admit  that,  while  within  its 
sphere  the  study  of  number  is  not  only 
valid  but  also  indispensable,  yet  in  point 
of  educational  value  its  sphere  is  very  lim- 
ited and  its  value  within  this  sphere  is  by 
no  means  to  be  confounded  with  its  "  prac- 
tical "  or  commercial  value. 

It  cannot  be  doubted,  in  fact,  that  Hegel 
is  entirely  justified  in  saying*  that  "  Arith- 
metic considers  numbers  and  their  corre- 
sponding figures  ;  or  rather,  does  not  con- 
sider them  but  only  operates  with  them. 
For  numbers  constitute  no  more  than  a 
neutral  characteristic,  something  alto- 
gether inert ;  they  have  to  be  made  effect- 
ive through  outward  means  and  thus 
brought  into  actual  relation."     In  fact  the 

*  Op.  cit.,  227. 


Instruction — Its  Means — A.  Language.      149 

whole  of  arithmetic  consists  of  the  various 
modes  of  reckoning;  and  these  are  noth- 
ing else  than  the  simple,  special  ways  of 
bringing  numbers  into  relation  one  with 
another.  And  we  may  add  that  when  the 
"  examples  "  are  set  aside  and  the  actual 
description  and  explanation  of  the  pro- 
cesses are  given  by  themselves,  the  small- 
ness  of  the  compass  of  this  remainder 
practically  demonstrates  the  extreme  sim- 
plicity of  the  theme,  while  the  number  of 
the  examples  shows  how  literally  true  it  is 
that  in  this  study  there  is  for  the  most  part 
only  prolonged  repetition  of  one  and  the 
same  thing. 

We  are  bound  to  repeat,  therefore,  that 
it  is  the  commercial  rather  than  the  edu- 
cational value  of  arithmetic  that  gives  it 
so  prominent  a  place  in  the  course  of 
study.  This  once  clearly  recognized,  it  is 
evident  that  the  movement  toward  restrict- 
ing this  study  to  narrower  limits  in  the 
schools  has  full  pedagogical  justification. 

And  as  for  Algebra,  we  need  only  re- 
mark for  our  present  purpose  that  it  is,  as 


150  Hegel 's  Educational  Ideas. 

Newton  named  it,  only  a  Universal  Arith- 
metic, and  hence,  only  a  higher,  subtler 
form  of  the  grammar  of  the  language  of 
abstract  numerical  quantity. 

(c)  Form  and  Substance  in  Language. 
Before  taking  final  leave  of  the  subject  of 
Language,  we  must  notice  that,  as  here 
considered,  it  includes  the  whole  range  of 
what  has  generally  been  regarded  as  the 
substance  of  elementary  education.  In 
other  words,  we  have  passed  under  review 
the  familiar  "  three  R's  " — Reading,  Writ- 
ing, and  Arithmetic,  as  the  universal  as- 
pects of  language  considered  as  the 
organic  form  of  thought. 

We  have,  besides,  noticed  that  these  are 
to  be  considered  from  two  complementary 
points  of  view — the  one  being  that  of  inner 
substance,  the  other  being  that  of  outer 
form.  And  we  have  now  further  to  em- 
phasize the  fact  that  precisely  for  the  pur- 
poses of  elementary  education  these  two 
aspects  are  altogether  inseparable.  It 
ought  never  to  be  forgotten  that  until 
Grammar,  as  the  science  of   Language,  is 


Instruction — Its  Means — A.  Language.      151 

formally  entered  upon,  the  exercises  in 
language  are  predominantly  of  a  sponta- 
neous, creative  character,  and  the  products, 
however  crude  they  may  be,  are  still  es- 
sentially of  the  nature  of  art  products. 

All  education,  as  we  cannot  too  often 
repeat,  consists  in  the  self-definition,  or 
self-formulation,  of  the  mind  ;  and  the 
most  direct,  and  subtle,  and  exact  form 
which  mind  assumes  in  this  process  of  self- 
formulation,  is  just  Language.  This  is 
the  real  reason  for  the  fact  that  among  all 
peoples  in  all  ages  elementary  education 
has  ever  consisted  chiefly  in  language  ex- 
ercises— in  speaking,  in  reading,  in  writ- 
ing, in  numbering. 

True,  these  have  always  been  exercises 
in  form,  and  from  this  point  of  view  they 
might  very  properly  be  described  as  "  for- 
mal "  studies.  But,  also,  they  are  quite 
as  much  exercises  in  differentiating  the 
substance  of  thought  itself ;  and  hence 
may  just  as  properly  be  described  as  "sub- 
stantial "  studies.  What,  indeed,  can  be 
more  substantial    for  the  mind   than  just 


152  HegeVs  Educational  Ideas. 

the  mind  itself — the  mind,  manifesting  it- 
self in  its  own  subtlest  modes,  which  are 
just  the  modes  of  thought  realized  in  and 
through  language  ?  Add  to  this,  that  the 
child-mind  is  wholly  unable  to  separate,  or 
even  clearly  to  distinguish,  between  form 
and  substance,  and  it  will  be  evident  that, 
in  elementary  education  especially,  these 
studies  are  far  enough  from  being  merely 
formal  in  their  value. 

But  yet  another  point  ought  to  be  men- 
tioned. It  is  that,  in  all  the  exercises 
tending  toward  the  education  or  self-form- 
ulation of  the  individual  mind,  such  mind 
is  itself  the  substance  formulated,  the  form- 
ulating principle,  and  the  formative  en- 
ergy— the  ultimate  aim  being  the  fulfill- 
ment in  the  individual  mind  itself  of  the 
universal  type  to  which  it  belongs.  In 
other  words,  to  repeat  once  more,  the 
mind  is  nothing  else,  or  less,  than  a  sub- 
stantial, self-differentiating  unit  of  energy, 
which  bears  within  itself  all  the  funda- 
mental aspects  of  cause,  as  these  were 
traced  out  by  Aristotle.     For  the  mind  as 


Instruction — Its  Means — A.  Language.      153 

spontaneous  energy  is  nothing  else  than 
efficient  cause,  giving  form  to  its  own 
substance ;  and  this  to  the  final  end  of 
realizing  within  and  for  itself,  just  its  own 
true  nature. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  have  also  to  no- 
tice that,  causal  though  it  be  in  its  very 
nature,  the  individual  mind  still  needs  to 
be  awakened  to  its  own  native,  self-defin- 
ing activity,  and  depends  for  its  awaken- 
ing upon  its  relations  to  the  world  of  its 
"  environment."  So  that  while  in  the  pro- 
cess of  education  the  chief  place  is  rightly 
given  to  the  various  phases  of  language 
as  constituting  the  most  immediate  aspects 
of  the  mind's  own  self-differentiation,  yet 
that  process  must  be  altogether  incom- 
plete, and  hopelessly  one-sided,  were  it  not 
to  include  the  careful  study  of  the  various 
aspects  of  the  environment  through  which 
the  mind  is  awakened  to  its  own  native, 
self-formulating  activity. 

And  here,  too,  the  same  principle  of 
causation  is  manifest.  For  Matter  (mate- 
rial cause),  cannot  really  be  conceived  as 


154  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

something  apart  from  definition  (formal 
cause),  nor  as  something  apart  from  en- 
ergy (efficient  cause).  On  the  contrary, 
energy  can  really  be  conceived — i.  e.,  ra- 
tionally thought — only  as  being  in  its  ulti- 
mate nature  self-active  substance,  which, 
precisely  through  its  own  self-activity,  de- 
fines itself,  or  gives  itself  specific  form. 
But  such  substantial,  self-formative  en- 
ergy cannot  but  be  self-conscious  energy, 
or  Mind. 

Thus,  in  its  ultimate  nature,  the  world 
or  the  environment  by  which  the  individ- 
ual mind  is  awakened  to  its  own  self-de- 
fining activity,  is  itself  nothing  else  than 
the  outer  form  in  and  through  which  the 
eternal  Mind  is  forever  expressing  itself 
as  Mind.  And  this  is  the  reason  why  the 
individual  mind  finds  itself  so  much  at 
home  in  its  contact  with  its  environment. 
For  in  this  contact  it  has  always  had  at 
least  some  dim  premonition  of  the  truth 
that  somehow  Nature  is  nothing  else  than 
the  outer  form  in  which  the  eternal  Mind 
is    forever  revealing  itself   to  the  human 


Instruction — Its  Means — A.  Laiignage.     155 

mind,  and  that  thus,  in  its  interpretations 
of  Nature,  the  human  mind  is  only  at- 
tempting to  spell  out  that  revelation,  and 
in  so  doing  is  only  going  to  school  to  the 
eternal  Mind.  And  thus  the  whole  range 
of  what  in  current  fashion  are  called  "  sub- 
stantial "  studies,  proves  to  be  nothing  else 
than  the  wider  range  of  Language  Lessons 
through  which  the  individual  mind  is  led 
up  to  still  more  adequate  knowledge  of 
Mind  in  its  eternal,  substantial,  causal 
character.  Nor  should  we  forget  that  in 
this  its  highest  character  Mind  finds  by  far 
its  subtlest,  most  adequate  expression  in 
and  through  the  human  mind  itself,  partly 
as  unfolded  in  institutions  on  the  one  hand 
and  in  language  and  literature  on  the 
other,  but  most  of  all  as  realized  progres- 
sively in  individual  human  lives. 

Hence,  while  Nature,  and  Institutions, 
and  Literature  are  highly  important  as 
media  of  the  child's  development,  the  liv- 
ing teacher  is  of  still  greater  importance 
— so  much  so  that  there  is  no  exaggera- 
tion in  Emerson's  saying  to  the  effect  that 


156  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

"  it  matters  less  what  you  learn  than  of 
whom  you  learn." 

It  is  upon  this  presupposition  on  the 
part  of  the  teacher,  the  presupposition, 
viz.,  that  the  whole  world  of  nature  and 
of  humanity  constitutes  one  continuous, 
progressive,  divinely  constituted  subject- 
matter  or  "  course  of  study  " — that  all  true 
educational  work  must  proceed,  and  tow- 
ard the  development  of  this  convicton  in 
reasoned  form,  on  the  part  of  the  pupil, 
that  all  true  educational  work  must  tend. 

Thus  far  Hegel  is  fairly  explicit  as  to 
the  Matter,  the  Method,  and  the  End  of 
education  considered  on  the  intellectual 
side  or  the  side  of  "  Instruction."  What 
he  would  have  said  of  the  further  phases 
which  we  have  called  Form  and  Process 
in  the  same  sphere,  is  still  more  a  matter 
of  inference,  and  can  here  be  indicated 
only  in  the  briefest  way. 


Instruction — Its  Means — B.  Form.         157 

X. 

INSTRUCTION — ITS   MEANS — B.    FORM. 

FORM,  in  the  sense  of  the  general  and 
more  or  less  abstract  space-relations,  serv- 
ing as  means  to  education,  appears  in  the 
received  course  of  study  under  three  as- 
pects :  (a)  Geography — the  study  of  given 
concrete  real  forms ;  (b)  Geometry — the 
study  of  abstract  ideal  forms  ;  (c)  Drawing 
— the  study  of  concrete  ideal  forms. 

Geography  is,  first  of  all,  the  more  or 
less  detailed  study  of  the  actually  existing 
concrete  form  of  the  earth  as  the  habita- 
tion of  man.  It  is  thus  of  immediate  prac- 
tical significance.  1 

Of  this  we  have  the  direct  antithesis  in 
Geometry,  which  is  the  study  of  the  uni- 
versal abstract  relations  true  of  all  space 
in  as  far  as  space  is  simply  a  form  of  con- 
sciousness— relations,  i.  e.y  which  are  no- 
where realized  as  such,  save  in  conscious- 
ness ;  and   this,   primarily,   in  the  eternal 


158  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

consciousness;  secondarily  in  the  human 
consciousness.  In  its  immediate  charac- 
ter, therefore,  Geometry  possesses  no  more 
than  a  purely  "  theoretical  "  significance. 

These  two  antithetical  aspects  of  the 
study  of  form  may  be  said  to  find  their 
unity  in  Drawing,  which  takes  into  consid- 
eration, and  accepts  as  valid,  the  universal 
laws  of  form  revealed  in  Geometry,  and 
applies  these  laws  in  the  idealization  and 
representation  of  the  forms  concretely 
presented  in  Nature.  It  is  through  such 
application  of  the  (consciously  or  uncon- 
sciously recognized)  laws  of  form  in  the 
deliberate  idealization  and  representation 
of  actually  given  forms  that  what  are 
known  as  Ideals  of  Beauty  become  explicit 
in  consciousness. 

Geography  gives  us  actual  forms ;  Ge- 
ometry reveals  to  us  the  laws  of  form  ; 
Drawing  develops  ideal  forms. 

Even  in  such  brief  summary — and  partly 
because  of  its  brevity — the  educational 
value  of  each  of  these  aspects  of  Form  is 
already    fairly  apparent.     To    this,    how- 


Instruction — Its  Means — B.  Form.        159 

ever,  we  must  add  a  few  further  intima- 
tions : 

(a)  Geography,  it  is  true,  is  of  immediate 
practical  significance.  But  that  is  not  its 
educational  significance.  The  latter,  as 
we  must  never  forget,  is  to  be  sought,  in 
any  study,  in  the  value  which  that  study 
has  as  a  means  to  the  development  of  mind. 
The  so-called  "  practical  "  significance  can 
at  most  but  lend  an  extrinsic  interest, 
which  serves  to  intensify — though  also  it 
is  only  too  likely  to  confuse — whatever 
mental  exercise  is  involved  in  the  given 
study  and  which  tend  to  the  development 
of  the  mind  of  the  pupil. 

What,  then,  is  the  actual  educational 
significance  of  the  study  of  Geography  ? 
Our  answer  is,  that  here,  as  in  language, 
the  immediate  given  concrete  form  is  to 
be  studied  as  the  form  of  a  definite  sub- 
stantial thought.  Thus,  evidently,  this  study 
necessarily  involves  in  its  actual  develop- 
ment the  recognition  of  certain  universal 
aspects  of  space-relation  (Mathematical 
Geography),  implying  and  therefore  lead- 


160  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

ing  over  to  Geometry,  which  may  be  called 
the  Universal  Grammar  of  Form ;  and 
also  implying  and  leading  over  (through 
maps  and  pictorial  representations  of  nat- 
ural types,  inorganic  and  organic),  to 
Drawing,  which  is  the  elementary  aspect 
of  the  Art  Form. 

Not  only  so,  but  the  study  of  geography 
necessarily  involves  the  recognition  of  cer- 
tain universal  aspects  of  Process,  inorganic 
(Physics  and  Chemistry),  organic  (Botany 
and  Zoology),  and  spiritual  (Human  His- 
tory) ;  though,  as  we  ought  carefully  to 
note,  while  geography  involves  these  ref- 
erences, it  does  not  and  cannot  include 
these  sciences,  but  only  presupposes  them. 

But  what  is  the  central  thought  involved 
in  the  facts  with  which  Geography  deals, 
and  hence  to  be  evolved  in  the  mind  of 
the  pupil  through  his  study  of  Geography  ? 
This  thought  is  nothing  else  than  what  is 
often  indicated  by  means  of  the  term 
"  orientation,"  and  by  this,  again,  is  meant 
nothing  else  than  the  process  of  conscious 
self-adjustment  to  the  actual  present  outer 


Instruction — Its  Means — B.  Fo?'m.         161 

world  as  thus  far  the  concrete   expression 
of  Reason. 

In  Geography,  strictly  speaking,  indeed, 
this  process  of  orientation  does  not  extend 
beyond  its  external  aspect.  But  even  this 
is  by  no  means  insignificant.  Within  this 
limit  the  pupil  is  brought  to  note  the  re- 
lative position  and  extent  of  land  and 
water,  the  outlines  of  land-masses,  the  po- 
sition and  elevation  of  mountain  systems, 
the  extent  of  plains,  the  conditions  and 
extent  of  rain-fall  on  the  one  hand  and 
of  drainage  on  the  other — the  last  two 
necessarily  implying  the  relations  sever- 
ally of  given  areas  of  land  and  water  to 
the  sun,  together  with  the  atmospheric 
currents  due  in  part  to  this  relation. 

All  this  observation  of  relation  of  part 
to  part  of  the  earth's  surface,  together 
with  the  relation  of  the  whole  with  its 
parts  to  the  sun,  constitutes  the  outer 
form  of  an  inner  process,  consisting  of  the 
development  and  orderly  arrangement  of 
a  vast  array  of  imagery  in  the  mind  of  the 
pupil.  And  we  may  remark  that  while 
ii 


1 62  HegeVs  Educational  Ideas. 

the  development  of  the  imagery  is  the 
work  of  the  mind  as  imagination,  which  is 
the  highest  aspect  of  the  sensuous  con- 
sciousness, the  orderly  arrangement  of 
the  imagery  is  the  work  of  the  mind  as 
understanding,  which  is  one  of  the  more 
elementary  phases  of  the  reflective  con- 
sciousness. 

It  is  through  the  study  of  Geography, 
then,  that  the  child  definitely  enters  upon 
the  process  of  his  own  intellectual  self-ad- 
justment to  the  thought  of  the  world  in  as 
far  as  that  thought  is  expressed  in  outer 
physical  form;  though  even  here,  let  us 
repeat,  through  every  fact  he  is  brought 
face  to  face  with  relations  which  can  be 
explained  only  through  a  study  of  the 
world  as  Process. 

But  this  is  only  the  beginning.  For,  as 
already  noticed,  the  study  of  Geography, 
strictly  speaking,  is  only  a  preparatory 
step  to  the  study  of  Man.  Man,  as  we 
cannot  too  often  remind  ourselves,  is,  in- 
deed, ultimately  the  child  of  Divinity  ;  but 
he  is  so  in  such  wise  as  to  appear  and  be, 


Instruction — Its  Means — B.  Form.        163 

immediately,  the  child  of  Nature.  Fur- 
ther, the  child,  as  the  growing  man,  can 
orient  himself  spiritually  only  through  the 
regulated  study  of  the  human  race  ;  for 
only  in  the  race  can  he  come  to  the  clear 
apprehension  of  his  own  larger  Self.  Only 
through  knowing  Humanity  can  he  come 
to  adequately  know  himself  as  a  human 
being. 

As  the  child  of  Nature,  however,  man 
can  be  comprehended  only  in  relation  to 
his  natural  environment ;  so  that  while  the 
study  of  man  in  the  more  elementary 
sense  of  the  term — i.  e.,  from  the  point  of 
view  of  anthropology — may  be  said  to 
emerge  out  of  physical  geography,  it  at- 
tains its  more  positive  educational  signi- 
ficance in  political  geography.  And  this  so 
much  the  more  as  the  actually  existing  races 
of  the  world  present  in  rough  logical  out- 
line the  whole  series  of  chronological  stages 
through  which  the  most  advanced  races 
must  have  passed  in  the  attainment  of  their 
present  superior  degree  of  self-realization. 

Thus,    Geography,    as    the    elementary 


164  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

study  of  the  concrete  forms  of  Nature,  is 
found  to  culminate  in  History,  as  the 
subtlest  and  most  concrete  Process  of 
the  world.  Hence  the  impossibility  of 
comprehending  the  history  of  any  given 
people  without  careful  and  continuous  ref- 
erence to  the  geographical  conditions  in 
the  midst  of  which  such  people  developed 
and  expended  their  energies. 

But,  as  we  have  already  noticed,  while 
geography  implies  all  the  other  sciences, 
and  may  even  be  said  to  be  the  premoni- 
tion of  them,  it  still  does  not  and  cannot 
include  them.  True,  as  descriptive  of  the 
concrete  outer  world  in  which  the  pupil 
lives,  geography  serves  as  the  means  to 
the  immediate  or  primary  synthesis  which 
he  forms  in  his  own  mind  of  the  world  as 
a  whole.  On  the  other  hand,  the  medi- 
ated, matured  synthesis  of  the  world,  he 
can  arrive  at  only  through  the  analytical 
processes  involved  in  the  study  of  the  va- 
rious sciences,  held  in  sharp  distinction 
one  from  another. 

These  various  aspects  of  the  outer  and 


Instruction — Its  Means — B.  Form.       165 

the  inner  world  must  therefore  be  taken 
up  separately,  and  considered  each  within 
its  own  specific  limits,  if  we  would  avoid 
endless  confusions  in  our  educational  work. 

{b)  Geometry,  as  the  study  of  the  uni- 
versal abstract  laws  of  space-relations,  has 
the  special  pedagogical  value  of  accustom- 
ing the  mind  to  insistance  upon  absolute 
precision  of  results  in  each  and  every  case, 
whether  in  one's  own  work  or  in  the  work 
of  others.  Such  habit  of  mind  is,  of  course, 
of  inestimable  value  in  all  studies. 

Meanwhile  it  is  not  to  be  overlooked 
that  the  exactness  demanded  is  exclusively 
quantitative,  and  that  to  the  qualitative 
aspects  of  concrete  forms  Geometry  is 
wholly  indifferent.  This  is  the  limitation 
which  constitutes,  at  once  its  defect  and  its 
perfection. — Its  defect,  because  unless  the 
complementary  aspect  of  quality  is  other- 
wise emphasized  in  the  education  of  the 
pupil,  the  habit  of  demanding  absolute 
quantitative  precision  must  grow  into  a 
rigid  formalism,  tending  to  the  final  arrest 
of  all    further   development. — Its    perfec- 


1 66  HcgeVs  Educational  Ideas. 

tion,  because  only  by  abstracting  from 
quality  and  attending  to  quantity  alone  is 
such  absolute  precision  possible  at  all. 

And  yet,  even  here  the  germ  of  qualita- 
tive difference  is  not  altogether  wanting, 
the  "  properties  "  of  the  triangle  being  dif- 
ferent from  those  of  the  circle,  those  of  a 
circle  being  different  from  those  of  a 
square,  etc.,  etc. 

It  may  be  added  that  the  very  aspect  of 
precision  presented  in  Geometry,  together 
with  the  simplicity  of  its  more  elementary 
degrees,  renders  this  special  phase  of  the 
study  of  Form  peculiarly  well  adapted  to 
the  requirements  of  elementary  education. 
On  the  one  hand,  the  simplicity  of  the 
figures  of  plane  Geometry  must  tend  to 
put  a  wholesome  check  upon  the  wild  ex- 
uberance of  childish  imagination  ;  while 
the  precision  of  such  forms  and  of  the  re- 
lations involved  in  them  must  tend  to  ren- 
der judgment  more  exact. 

At  the  same  time,  as  has  been  noticed 
in  what  precedes,  Geometry  is  already  im- 
plied in  that  aspect  of  Geography  known 


Instruction — Its  Means — B.  Form.        167 

as  "  mathemathical ;  "  though  for  the  child 
this  appears  only  in  germinal  form,  in  the 
simple  names  and  descriptions  of  the  cir- 
cle, sphere,  diameter,  etc.,  and  involves  no 
actual  instruction  upon  the  properties  of  any- 
geometrical  figure.  And  if "  triangulation  " 
appears  in  map-drawing,  this  again,  as  need 
hardly  be  mentioned,  involves  no  actual  in- 
struction in  Geometry,  properly  speaking. 
(c)  As  noticed  above,  Drawing  accepts 
as  valid  the  universal  laws  of  form  as  re- 
vealed in  Geometry,  or  the  Grammar  of 
Form,  and  so  applies  these  laws  in  the 
idealization  and  representation  of  the 
actual  forms  in  Nature  as  to  develop 
Ideals  of  Beauty.  We  have  now  to  add 
that  in  the  history  of  the  race  Drawing 
(including  modeling)  has  developed  a  world 
of  idealized  forms,  which  for  the  purposes  of 
education  are  forms  already  at  hand  to  be 
imitated  by  the  pupil — models  upon  which 
his  taste  may  be  developed  into  ever 
higher  degrees  of  realization,  with  the  as- 
surance that  it  will  thus  be  enriched  with 
those  elements  that  constitute  whatever  is 


1 68  HegeVs  Educational  Ideas. 

essential  in  the  best  products  of  the  race. 
Thus,  as  Geography  consists  in  the  study 
of  the  concrete  forms  produced  by  nature, 
and  serving  as  the  immediate  outward 
conditions  of  the  life  of  man,  so  Drawing 
consists  in  the  study  of  and  the  attempt  to 
reproduce  the  ideal  forms  produced  by 
man  himself,  and  expressing  thus  one  es- 
sential phase  of  the  inner  life  of  the  human 
spirit.  Such  study,  again,  cannot  but  re- 
sult in  the  development  and  orderly  ar- 
rangement of  a  vast  array  of  imagery  be- 
longing to  the  Ideal  World,  and  preparing 
the  pupil  for  productive  work  of  higher  or 
lower  degree  on  his  own  part. 

And  here,  too,  as  in  Geography,  the 
production  of  the  imagery  is  the  work  of 
the  imagination,  while  the  orderly  arrange- 
ment of  the  imagery  is  the  work  of  the 
understanding.  But  there  is  this  differ- 
ence :  that  the  imagery  in  the  realm  of 
Geography  is  limited  to  the  sphere  of  Na- 
ture, the  forms  in  which  are  more  or  less 
accidental,  so  far  as  the  element  of  beauty 
is  concerned  ;  while  in  the  field  of  art  the 


Instruction — Its  Means — B.  Form.        169 

forms  are  the  conscious  products  of  the 
human  spirit  stirred  to  utmost  eagerness 
of  effort  for  the  purpose  of  satisfying  its 
own  inherent,  irrepressible  demand  for 
perfection  in  Beauty. 

It  is  these  latter  products,  therefore, 
which  serve  best  of  all  as  the  models  upon 
which  to  form  the  taste  of  the  developing 
individual  mind.  But  also  it  is  important 
to  remember  that  the  really  worthy  ideals 
of  Beauty  have  always  had  a  religious  core. 
In  which  case  we  may  well  accept  as  sub- 
stantial truth  the  statement  that  "  Out  of 
the  perfection  of  Beauty  God  hath  or- 
dained the  world."*  And  because  on  the 
human  side  religion  is  essentially  ethical,  it 
may  very  well  be  said  that  really  good  taste  is 
nothing  else  than  Morality  become  beautiful. 

Hence  the  teaching  of  Drawing,  includ- 
ing, as  it  ought  to  include,  the  study  of  the 
vital  historical  elements  in  the  great  art- 
products  of  the  world,  involves   pedagogi- 

*  Such  thought  is  at  least  suggested  by  Psalms 
L. ,  2;  "  Out  of  Zion  the  perfection  of  Beauty,  God 
hath  shined  forth." 


170  HegeVs  Educational  Ideas. 

cal  values,  not  merely  of  a  formal,  intellec- 
tual character,  but  also  of  a  character 
which  is  essentially  ethical. 

Rightly  estimated  and  conducted,  there- 
fore, this  study,  which  deals  in  the  ideal  ele- 
ments having  their  roots  in  the  ethical  and 
the  religious  world,  cannot  but  point  for- 
ward to  the  study  of  these  more  concrete 
spheres  of  human  development  as  an  actual 
Process. 


Instruction — C.    The  Study  of  Process.     171 

XL 

INSTRUCTION — ITS    MEANS — C.      THE 
STUDY   OF   PROCESS. 

We  have  next  to  notice  the  educational 
significance  of  the  study  of  Process  as  ex- 
pressive of  the  essential  relations  of  the 
Energy  unfolding  itself  in  the  actual 
world.  This  presents  itself  under  the  gen- 
eral forms:  (a)  Inorganic  Processes;  (b) 
Organic  Processes,  and  (c)  the  Process  of 
Human  History.  And  here  our  limits 
render  still  more  hopeless  any  attempt  to 
do  more  than  barely  intimate  the  educa- 
tional significance  of  the  themes  named. 

(a)  It  must  be  frankly  admitted  that 
Hegel  was  less  happy  in  dealing  with  the 
world  of  Nature  than  in  dealing  with  the 
world  of  man.  So  that  while  it  may  be 
said  without  exaggeration  that  his  Logic 
is  the  most  compact  aud  rigidly  consistent 
statement  ever  given  of  the  essential  prin- 
ciples of  Evolution,  yet  his  attempt  to  ap- 
ply those  principles  in  the  realm  of  Nature 
proved  a  conspicuous  failure. 


172 


Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 


S> 


At  the  same  time  his  work  in  this  field 
is  not  without  valuable  suggestions  ;  and 
if  in  details  his  Philosophy  of  Nature  must 
be  rejected  as  arbitrary,  yet  the  general 
conception  of  nature  as  the  precondition 
of  human  history,  and  as  an  orderly  devel- 
opment leading  up  to  and  culminating  in 
human  life,  is  the  fundamental  thread  of 
the  whole,  and  must,  therefore,  be  taken 
as  indicating  his  real  view  of  the  proper 
significance  of  the  natural  sciences  in  a 
course  of  study. 

Of  the  soundness  of  such  pedagogi- 
cal clew  no  one  to-day  is  likely  to  entertain 
a  doubt.  And,  in  fact,  Hegel's  general 
philosophical  theory,  rightly  understood 
and  applied,  may  be  said  to  furnish  the 
one  clew  to  a  thoroughly  consistent  and 
completely  satisfactory  interpretation  of 
the  results  to  which  modern  science  has 
attained.*     Nor  can  there  be  a  reasonable 


*The  present  writer  has  attempted  an  interpreta- 
tion of  these  results  from  this  point  of  view  in  a  vol- 
ume entitled  :  The  World- Energy  and  its  Self -Con- 
servation, published  by  S.  C.  Griggs  &  Co. ,  Chicago. 


Instruction — C.    T/ie  Study  of  Process.      173 

question  that  such  interpretation  is  in- 
dispensable, above  all,  to  the  teacher  of 
science,  of  whatever  department  or  grade. 
For  upon  this  largely  must  depend  whether 
the  pupil  shall  be  satisfied  with  a  crude 
materialistic  view  of  the  world,  or  whether 
he  shall  be  led  to  comprehend  "  matter  " 
as  nothing  else  than  a  mode  of  the  univer- 
sal Energy  which  in  its  highest  term  is  the 
absolute  creative  Spirit  or  divine  Mind.   -' 

The  latter,  as  Hegel  would  unquestion- 
ably urge,  is  the  one  legitimate  conclusion 
to  which  the  study  of  inorganic  processes 
should  lead. 

(b)  Similarly,  the  teacher  of  science 
within  the  realm  of  the  organic,  ought  to 
be  able  to  bring  the  pupil  to  recognize  in 
the  whole  process,  of  Nature,  the  endlessly 
manifold  evidences  of  one  all-comprehen- 
sive Method  leading  up  from  the  inorgan- 
ic, through  the  organic,  to  Man.  And 
further  he  ought  to  be  able  to  bring  the 
pupil  to  see  in  this  Method  the  proof  that 
Mind  is  the  source  and  substance  of  the 
world,  and  that,   as  the  primal   Life,  the 


174  HegcVs  Educational  Ideas. 

eternal  Mind  in  its  self-unfolding,  cease- 
lessly gives  birth  to  every  form  of  life. 

To  which  it  must  be  added  that  the  di- 
rect pedagogical  value  of  the  natural  sci- 
ence studies  consists  in  the  first  place  in 
the  development  of  what  is  commonly 
known  as  the  power  of  observation.  This 
power,  more  closely  examined,  is  found  to 
have  for  its  immediate  factors,  Perception 
on  the  one  hand  and  Judgment  (as  the 
critical  aspect  of  the  understanding)  on 
the  other.  And  it  is  to  be  carefully  noted 
that  observation  for  the  purposes  of  Sci- 
ence is  different  from  observation  for  the 
purposes  of  Art.  In  both  it  is  demanded 
that  the  observation  shall  be  as  exact  as 
possible — i.  e.,  that  the  percepts*  formed 
shall  be  accurate  in  the  highest  attainable 
degree. 

But  in  observation  for  scientific  ends, 
the  actual  process  of  perception  is  brought 
into  definite  and  strict  subordination  to 
the  deliberate  exercise  of  judgment  con- 

*  In  its  outer  or  objective  aspect   a  percept   is   a 
"  mental  image." 


Instruct io7i — C.    The  Study  of  Process.     175 

cerning  the  essential  inner  relations  deter- 
mining the  given  outer  form  ;  while  in 
observations  for  the  purposes  of  art, 
though  the  power  of  perception  is  also 
exercised  under  the  direct  control  of  judg- 
ment, it  is  nevertheless  judgment  in  that 
spontaneous  aspect  known  as  Taste.  And 
in  this  peculiar  character  its  exercise  has 
for  direct  end  to  create  a  form  of  the  same 
type  as  that  of  the  given  observed  form, 
but  with  the  difference  that  it  shall  be 
raised  to  the  degree  of  ideal  perfection  as 
form. 

Nor  should  it  be  forgotten  that  in  sci- 
ence the  ultimate  aim  is  to  satisfy  the  de- 
mand of  the  mind  for  perfection  in  utility, 
while  in  art  the  aim  is  to  satisfy  the  de- 
mand of  the  mind  for  perfection  in  Beauty. 

Such  psychological  distinctions  cannot 
be  too  vividly  present  in  the  mind  of  the 
teacher,  since  they  must  have  a  control- 
ling influence  in  his  pedagogical  methods 
and  must  thus  radically  influence  the  de- 
velopment of  the  mind  of  the  pupil. 

But  again  in  the  second  place,  natural 


176  HegeVs  Educational  Ideas. 

science  studies  have  this  pedagogical  val- 
ue :  that  in  dealing  directly  with  modes  of 
energy  as  manifested  through  inorganic 
forms,  the  pupil  is  brought  to  positively 
exercise  and  to  definitely  measure  his  own 
powers,  and  thus  to  further  his  own  self- 
development  as  Will.  And  this  is  true  in 
a  still  subtler  way  in  dealing  with  organic 
forms,  such  as  putting  seeds  in  the  earth 
and  watching  the  growth  of  plants,  and 
noting  the  effect  of  his  own  work  upon 
their  development. 

Here,  indeed,  is  a  specially  fruitful  field 
for  practical  self-definition  on  the  part  of 
the  individual  pupil,  through  his  own  reg- 
ulated and  hence  increasingly  conscious 
self-adjustment  to  the  actual  modes  of  the 
creative  Mind  as  manifest  in  Nature.  It 
is  in  this  stern  school  of  Nature,  as  it  is 
well  worth  while  to  notice,  that  the  agri- 
culturist develops  that  keen  shrewdness 
and  subtle  "  common  sense '  which  so 
often  has  the  appearance  of  prophetic  in- 
stinct. 

(c)  But    without    further    remark  upon 


Instruction — C.    TJie  Study  of  Process.      177 

this  special  theme,  tempting  as  it  is,  we 
must  turn  to  the  third  phase  of  Process, 
viz.,  to  that  specially  complex  and  subtle 
mode  of  energy  manifest  in  human  his- 
tory. Here  Hegel  is  at  his  best.  Not 
only  does  he  conceive  Nature  to  be  the 
simple  divine  process  culminating  in  man  ; 
to  him  the  history  of  the  human  world  is 
itself  also,  as  we  have  seen,  nothing  else 
than  "  progress  in  the  consciousness  of  Free- 
dom." That  is,  the  central,  vital  element 
in  the  history  of  mankind  is  essentially  and 
solely  of  an  educational  character. 

At  the  same  time,  it  is  of  the  highest 
importance  to  notice,  that  in  the  definition 
of  history  just  quoted,  everything  centres 
in  the  idea  of  Freedom.  So  that  one 
might  infer  from  this  alone  that  for  Hegel 
the  educational  value  of  the  study  of  his- 
tory is  essentially  ethical  in  its  character, 
while  in  comparison  with  this  its  value  as 
an  intellectual  discipline  is  only  second- 
ary. 

But  here  again  human  history  is  by  no 
means  to   be  considered  merely  as  a  rec- 
12 


178  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

ord.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  to  be  consid- 
ered, above  all,  as  an  actual  Process.  ...  The 
study  of  history  is  not  the  study  of  a 
book ;  it  is  the  study  of  a  process  by 
means  of  a  book.  The  book  is  merely  a 
compound  lens  through  which  the  events 
of  the  world  are  brought  into  focus  for 
the  individual  pupil  so  that  he  may  view 
/them  in  their  true  perspective. 

In  such  wise,  the  indvidual,  even  una- 
wares, develops  an  ideal  or  universal 
standard  of  judgment  by  which  to  esti- 
mate the  events  of  his  own  time  as  well  as 
his  own  conduct  and  that  of  others. 

Deeper  than  this,  however,  is  the  edu- 
cational significance  of  the  various  institu- 
tions in  and  through  which  the  universal 
spirit  of  humanity  has  unfolded  itself.  It 
is  only  through  these  institutions,  in  fact, 
that  genuine  Freedom  can  be  attained  at 
all  on  the  part  of  the  individual.  For 
Freedom  is  a  universal  quality  inhering  in 
man  as  man.  That  is,  it  pertains  to  the 
universal  or  divine  nature  of  man  as  a 
spiritual  or  personal  being.     It  is  Freedom 


Instruction—  C.    The  Study  of  Process.      179 

in  this  universal,  positive,  concrete  sense, 
which  Hegel  describes  as  Freedom  of  the 
one  in  the  other,  and  which,  as  he  says, 
unites  men  in  a  manner  which  is  essen- 
tially internal  or  spiritual ;  whereas,  mere 
distress,  or  momentary  need,  only  brings 
men  together  in  a  fashion  that  is  wholly 
external  and  accidental,  the  groups  dis- 
solving as  soon  as  the  danger  is  ended,  or 
the  need  satisfied.* 

It  is  just  this  ethical  aspect  of  institu- 
tional life  that  above  everything  else  needs 
to  be  brought  vividly  home  to  the  con- 
sciousness and  conscience  of  the  youth  of 
our  time.  And  where  else  will  one  find 
such  searching  analysis  of  the  various 
forms  of  associated  human  life,  or  such 
adequate  application  of  their  central,  posi- 
tive elements  as  in  Hegel's  PJiilosopJiie 
des  Rechts\  to  say  nothing  of  his  Phil- 
osophy of  History  ? 

We  can   here  give  no    more    than    the 

*  Cf    Werke,   VI 12.,  276. 

f  Abridged  Trans,  by  J.   McBride   Sterrett,   under 
the  title  :    The  Ethics  of  Hegel. 


180  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

barest  intimations,  the  central  idea  being 
that  all  institutions  educate  through  the 
subtle  means  of  custom,  which  is  nothing 
else  than  the  Reason  of  the  race  become 
organic,  and  thus  far  actual,  without  hav- 
ing yet  emerged  from  its  instinctive  or 
unreflecting  form. 

(i)  In  the  Family  the  child  learns  lan- 
guage and  begins  the  formation  of  his 
habits  upon  the  model  of  custom  as  rep- 
resented in  the  manners  and  requirements 
of  the  given  household.  These  are  deter- 
mined in  detail  by  the  class  and  essen- 
tially by  the  race  to  which  the  family 
group  pertains. 

(2)  In  the  State  these  customs  begin  to 
assume  a  reflective  form  in  Laws;  which, 
however,  are  still  given  out  by  authority 
and  without  further  reason  than  that  of 
custom,  of  which  they  are  the  more  ex- 
plicit formulation.  So  that  the  individual 
who  adjusts  himself  to  custom  is  by  that 
fact  already  a  "  law-abiding  citizen." 

At  the  same  time,  the  state  restrains 
the  individual  who  assumes   to   disregard 


Instruction — C.    The  Study  of  Process.      1 8 1 

its  laws ;  and  this  secures  to  the  docile 
(teachable)  individual,  the  negative  free, 
dom  which  consists  in  absence  of  external 
hindrance  in  his  self-adjustment  to  custom 
as  the  actual,  present,  and  presumably 
rational,  world-order  ;  such  order  never 
ceasing  to  bring  to  bear  upon  him  its 
pressure  or  stimulus,  yielding  to  which  he 
attains  to  consistent  and  at  least  approxi- 
mately  rational,  self-definition. 

(3)  In  addition  to  these  institutions,  the 
Church  is  also  ceaselessly  as  well  as  more 
explicitly,  and  upon  still  higher  grounds, 
urging  upon  the  individual  the  necessity 
of  willingly  adjusting  himself  to  the  actual, 
explicit  form,  which  the  Reason  of  the 
race  has  assumed. 

(4)  But  the  SchooL-is  the  institution 
which  has  for  its  essential  and  specific 
function,  to  bring  the  individual  to  explic- 
it consciousness  of  the  Lawsof_the_jyxudd, 
both  physical  and  spiritual,  so  that  he  may 
conform  to  these  no  longer  as  a  mere 
matter  of  habit,  but  also  as  a  matter  of 
reflection ;  being    thus    able    to  give    not 


1 82  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 


merely  a  reason  but  a  good  reason  for   the 
faith  that  is  in  him. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  school  receives 
the  child  at  an  age  when  custom  and  au- 
thority are  the  only  standards  he  can  ap- 
preciate ;  so  that  here  the  problem  of  the 
transition  of  the  individual  from  the  mere- 
ly instinctive  and  habitual,  to  the  reflec- 
tive stage  of  his  own  adjustment  to  the 
rational  order  of  the  world  as  expressed 
in  nature  on  the  one  hand  and  in  human 
institutions  on  the  other,  attains  its  most 
explicit  and  complex  degree. 

But  just  for  this  reason,  the  school  pre- 
sents itself  as  the  highest  means  to  instruc- 
tion ;  for  it  has  deliberately  reduced  the 
whole  process  of  education  to  a  system. 
To  this  phase  of  the  subject,  therefore,  we 
have  next  to  turn. 


Instruction — Its  Method.  183 


XII. 

INSTRUCTION — ITS    METHOD. 

Upon  this  theme  we  need  add  but  little 
to  what  has  already  been  said  in  connec- 
tion with  the  Process  of  Instruction.  And 
the  first  thing  we  have  to  say  is  that  no- 
where else  is  the  wholeness  of  Personality 
of  such  vital  moment  as  in  the  teacher. 
Substantial  natural  gift,  exact  and  ade- 
quate culture,  positive  force  of  refined 
character — these  are  the  concrete  aspects 
severally  of  "  material,  formal  and  efficient 
cause  "  which  are  the  indispensable  pre- 
requisites of  the  really  good  teacher. 

And  it  is  the  exact  and  adequate 
culture,  constituting,  as  we  have  intimated, 
the  phase  of  "  formal  cause,"  in  which  con- 
sists the  essence  of  genuine  vital  Method 
in  teaching.  Hence  true  and  truly  effec- 
tive methods  of  teaching  are  not  to  be 
prescribed  and  applied   from  without,  but 


184  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

to  be  developed  as  vital,  spontaneous 
modes  from  within. 

To  this  it  should  be  added  on  the  other 
hand  that  true  methods  are  by  no  means 
"  original  "  in  the  sense  of  being  merely 
expressive  of  the  notions  peculiar  to  the 
individual  teacher.  On  the  contrary  to  be 
true,  a  method,  like  anything  else,  must  be 
rational.  It  is  not  the  individuality  of  the 
teacher  that  is  to  be  insisted  upon,  but  his 
personality.  His  methods,  if  they  are  to 
be  valid,  must  be  based,  not  in  his  individ- 
ual whims,  but  in  universal  Reason. 
Hence  the  supreme  necessity  of  sound  and 
well-rounded  education  on  the  part  of  the 
teacher. 

Meanwhile  supervision  can  accomplish 
well-nigh  the  impossible  through  sugges- 
tion in  respect  of  method.  And  the  most 
vital  aspect  of  this  consists  in  the  discov- 
ery, on  the  part  of  the  supervisor,  of  latent 
gifts  on  the  part  of  the  individual  teacher 
and  the  bringing  the  teacher  to  a  conscious- 
ness of  such  gifts.  The  power  of  the 
teacher   is  thus   increased   not   merely  by 


Instruction — Its  Method.  185 

explicit  knowledge  of  the  value  of  the 
method  already  unconsciously  made  use 
of,  but  also  by  the  increased  confidence, 
vigor  and  definiteness  of  work  which  such 
knowledge  brings. 

In  short  the  highest  function  of  the  su- 
pervisor is,  not  to  "  originate"  methods 
and  prescribe  them  for  others  to  follow 
unquestioningly.  It  is  rather  to  discover 
the  central  element  of  true  method  already 
spontaneously  unfolding  in  the  mind  of 
each  individual  teacher  under  his  super- 
vision and  to  encourage  and  guide  the 
teacher  in  the  maturing  of  such  inherent 
gift  into  its  richest  values. 

The  complement  of  this  is  to  be  found 
in  the  use  of  the  imitative  instinct  through 
the  observation  of  the  work  of  specially 
successful  teachers  by  those  less  experi- 
enced and  still  in  the  plastic  stage. 

Next  to  an  autocratic,  despotic  negative 
criticism,  which  generally  is  made  use  of 
to  conceal  a  barren  intellect,  nothing  could 
be  more  deadly  to  educational  interests 
than  ready-made  and  elaborately  worked 


1 86  HegeVs  Educational  Ideas. 

out  "  methods '  prescribed  for  the  sake 
and  to  the  extent  of  actual  uniformity. 
For  this  could  only  result  in  arrest  of  per- 
sonal development  on  the  part  of  the 
teachers  affected,  and  this  again  could 
mean  nothing  else  than  the  suspension  of 
all  vitality  and  the  reduction  of  the  whole 
educational  process  to  the  dead  level  of 
mere  monotonous  mechanism — the  utter 
cancellation  of  the  consciousness  of  Free- 
dom through  the  annulment  of  Freedom 
itself  in  and  for  the  individual. 

And  now  we  must  remind  ourselves 
once  more  that  Freedom  is  to  be  realized 
only  through  the  ethical  process  of  volun- 
tary action,  the  direct  consideration  of 
which  constitutes  the  next  subdivision  of 
our  theme. 


Discipline.  187 


XIII. 

DISCIPLINE. 

RESPECTING  Discipline  much  has  inevit- 
ably been  anticipated.  We  have  already 
noticed  Hegel's  dictum  that  just  as  the 
will  begins  in  obedience,  so  also  does 
thought ;  that  in  fact  obedien.ce_J.S- -the 
beginning  of  wisdom. 

Of  course  by  such  obedience  Hegel 
means  conscious  conformity  to  Reason  as 
such  ;  not  mere  blind  submission,  with 
which,  indeed,  he  strongly  contrasts  obe- 
dience properly  speaking.  And  yet  the 
child  must  at  first  simply  submit  to  exter- 
nal guidance — happy  if  the  actual  author- 
ity to  which  he  submits  prove  rational 
in  character  ! 

It  is  not  to  be  forgotten,  either,  that 
Hegel  is  in  full  accord  with  what  in  one  or 
another  form  is  the  world-old  doctrine 
that,  as  the  child  of  nature,  man  is  evil ; 
that    is,    that    his    immediate   inclinations 


1 88  Hegel 's  Educational  Ideas. 


pertain  to  his  animal  nature,  and  that  only 
through  training  and  discipline  can  he  be 
brought  into  the  state  of  positive  moral 
life.  In  this,  indeed,  he  simply  reproduces 
Kant's  affirmation  that  "  Discipline  or 
training  transforms  animality  into  human- 
ity* ;  "  an  aphorism  which  Kant  empha- 
sized by  the  further  statement  that  "  Dis- 
cipline preserves  man  from  falling  away 
from  his  manhood  through  his  animal  ten- 
dencies." 

From  this  point  of  view  it  is  but  a  mat- 
ter of  course  that  Hegel  should  have  little 
patience  with  the  sentimental  sympathy 
for  mere  childhood  as  such  and  which 
would  at  all  cost  please  the  child — elimin- 
ating law  by  substituting  the  child's  caprice 
in  place  of  law,  and  thus  encouraging  a 
mere  self-seeking  interest  on  the  part  of 
the  child,  which  interest  Hegel  pronounces 
"  the  root  of  all  evil."  On  the  contrary 
the  child  "  must  learn  to  obey  precisely 
because  his  will  is  not  yet  rational"  or 
matured  as  will. 

*    Werke,  X. ,  383. 


Discipline.  1 89 


The  purpose  of  the  teacher,  then,  should 
not  be  merely  to  find  out  what  the  child  hap- 
pens to  be  most  easily  interested  in  and  be 
governed  accordingly  ;  but  to  find  out  how 
the  child  can  be  brought  to  take  interest  in 
whatever  pertains  to  his  own  normal  ad- 
vancement. Thus  the  child,  instead  of  be- 
ing humored  and  excused  in  respect  of  his 
irregularities,  must  be  brought  to  prize 
order  and  punctuality.  And  this  is  to  be 
done  quietly  and  by  a  strict  requirement 
which  assumes  the  instinctive  approval  of 
the  child's  higher  nature,  and  above  all 
with  not  too  much  or  too  obtrusive  com- 
manding and  moralizing.  For  "  men  who 
are  early  plunged  into  the  dead  sea  of  moral 
platitudes  come  out,  indeed,  like  Achilles, 
invulnerable,  but'  also  with  the  addition 
that  all  manly  vigor  is  drowned  therein."* 

Along  with  this  Hegel  emphasizes  the 
importance  of  silence  as  a  form  of  self-re- 
straint and  hence  as  an  aspect  of  discip- 
line.     It   is  an   antidote  to  the  disease  of 

*  Rosenkranz  ;  Hegets    Leben,    p.    467.      (Quoted 
from  one  of  Hegel's  addresses). 


190  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

volubility  and  mere  egotistic  argumenta- 
tion. At  the  same  time  this  ought  not  to 
be  applied  too  rigidly  to  very  young  chil- 
dren. For,  as  Richter  says  :  "  The  heroic 
virtue  of  silence  requires  for  its  practice 
the  power  of  ripening  reason.  Reason 
teaches  us  to  be  silent ;  the  heart  teaches 
us  to  speak."* 

Closely  connected  with  what  has  just 
been  said  is  the  fact  that  attention  is  quite 
as  much  a  matter  of  will  as  of  intellect. 
"  I  am  really  attentive  only  then  when  I 
will  so  to  be."  Though  it  by  no  means 
follows  from  this  that  attention  is  an  easy 
thing.  On  the  contrary  it  requires  special 
effort  to  fix  the  attention  upon  some  one, 
to  the  exclusion  of  all  other,  representa- 
tions which  otherwise  are  equally  present 
in  consciousness. 

Perfect  attention,  in  fact,  is  one  of  the 
phases  of  complete  self-mastery  ;  and  it  is, 
for  example,  because  of  the  value  of  mili- 
tary exercises  in  developing  ready  and 
full    command    over    one's    own     powers, 

*  Levana  (Bohn  Lib.),  p.   336. 


Discipline.  1 9 1 

quite  as  much  as  from  their  significance  in 
respect  of  patriotism,  that  Hegel  would 
have  all  boys  trained  in  such  exercises. 
We  are,  he  says,  "  too  much  prone  to  con- 
sider every  art  and  every  science  as  some- 
thing specific  ;  "  i.  e.,  as  something  out 
of  relation  to  other  aspects  of  life.  On 
the  contrary  all  such  exercises  have  their 
organic  significance  in  the  total  round  of 
media  for  the  full  development  of  the  in- 
dividual, and  this  with  respect  both  to  his 
physical  and  to  his  spiritual  nature. 

Thus  obedience  and  attention  are  ne- 
cessary subjective  modes  which  express 
themselves  outwardly  through  definite, 
vigorous,  sustained  and  purposeful  action  ; 
and  the  two  aspects,  outer  and  inner,  are 
the  complementary  aspects  of  the  devel- 
opment of  actual'  Freedom,  or  self-deter- 
mination, on  the  part  of  the  individual. 

Along  with  this.  He^el  points  out  two 
aspects  of  discipline — outward  training 
{Zucht),  and  culture  (Bildung),  or  inward 
formative  process.  As  an  aspect  of  edu- 
cation, the  former  is  to  be  taken  in  the 


192  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

sense  of  subduing  the  will  of  the  child  in 
so  far  as  this  appears  in  the  form  of  mere 
wilfulness.  And  this  is  to  be  accomplished 
through  the  steady  pressure  of  a  wise, 
consistent,  albeit  kindly,  authority.  To 
endeavor  always  to  persuade  the  child  that 
the  thing  required  of  him  is  something 
that  will  prove  pleasing  to  him,  is  to  per- 
vert his  mind  and  confirm  him  in  the  be- 
lief that  he  ought  to  do  nothing  except 
what  will  give  him  pleasure  in  the  doing.* 
On  the  contrary,  as  we  have  already 
noticed,  Hegel  explicitly  calls  attention 
to  the  fact  that  the  parent,  and  next  to 
the  parent  the  teacher,  constitutes  for  the 
child  the  present  living  embodiment  of  all 
that  is  universal  and  essential ;  and  for 
this  reason  the  child  cannot  emerge  out  of 
childhood  save  by  the  more  or  less  forbid- 
ding path  of  obedience ;  that  is,  by  being 
brought  to  subordinate  his  own  will,  as 
in  itself  crude  and  capricious,  to  the  will 
of  parent  or  teacher,  as  relatively  matured 
and  rational. 

*Cf.   VVcrkc,  VIII.,  23 r. 


Discipline.  193 


We  might  even  say,  then,  that  child- 
hood is  the  inferno  of  infinite  lack  and 
longing,  out  of  which  the  individual  can 
escape  into  the  paradise  of  enriched  and 
blessed  existence  only  through  the  purga- 
torial pains  and  strains  of  Discipline,  which 
for  the  child  consist  first  of  all  in  training. 

But  while  this  phase  of  simple,  unques- 
tioning obedience  to  authority  is  appro- 
priate to  the  rudimentary  consciousness 
of  childhood,  the  complementary  phase, 
consisting  of  Bildung,  or  inner  formative 
process,  through  which  the  individual  ar> 
proximates  maturity  as  a  self-conscious, 
self-active  being,  is  no  less  indispensable 
to  the  growing  personality  of  the  youth. t 
In  this  connection  Hegel  has  repeatedly 
called  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  orien- 
tal mind  never  attains  to  the  full  sense  of 
personality,  and  the  dignity  pertaining 
thereto,  while  the  occidental  mind  is  spe- 
cially characterized  by  self-consciousness, 
to  which  the  individual  very  early  attains 
in  explicit  form,  and  in  ever-increasingly 
positive  degree. 
13 


/ 


V 


194  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas, 

Hence,  while  in  Asia  discipline  may 
very  well  consist  chiefly  in  mere  training, 
it  is  evident  that  in  Europe  and  America 
this  must  early  and  rapidly  give  way  to 
the  far  subtler  form  of  discipline,  consist- 
ing in  the  process  of  culture  through  which 
the  sense  of  personal  worth  may  be — not 
so  much  stimulated  indeed,  for  here  this 
develops  spontaneously — but  regulated  and 
directed  into  rational  channels. 

Besides,  with  the  general  progress  of 
culture  in  these  countries  a  great  change 
has  taken  place  in  the  general  estimate  of 
what  precisely  it  is  in  which  training,  and 
especially  school  training,  ought  really  to 
consist.  "  In  proportion  as  education 
comes  to  be  judged  of  from  the  right 
point  of  view — that  is,  in  proportion  as  it 
comes  to  be  understood,  that  in  essence 
education  is  rather  the  confirmation  than 
the  repression  of  the  awakened  sense  of 
selfhood ;  that  it  is  rather  the  positive, 
regulated  unfolding  of  the  spirit  of  inde- 
pendence— in  like  degree,  both  in  the 
family  and  in  the  school,  the  whole  mode 


Discipline.  1 95 


of  dealing  with  youth  has  undergone  pro- 
gressive change."* 

This  change  consists  essentially  in  em- 
phasizing less  and  less  the  importance  of 
keeping  up  the  feeling  of  subjection  and 
dependence,  even  in  respect  of  things 
which  are  in  themselves  indifferent.  So, 
also,  it  is  no  longer  assumed  that  there  is 
special  virtue  in  such  instruction  as  has 
no  other  aim  than  that  of  cultivating  the 
habit  of  obedience,  nor  that  results  which 
may  be  attained  through  the  feeling  of 
love,  and  through  direct  attention  to,  and 
serious  interest  in,  the  end  the  child  or 
youth  is  seeking,  would  be  in  the  least  en- 
hanced in  value  by  being  reached  through 
harsh  measures  and  forbidding  means. 

Meanwhile,  Hegel  does  not  forget,  nor' 
allow  his  readers  to  forget,  that  the  social 
aspect  is  quite  as  real,  and  quite"  as  va] 
as  is  the  individual  aspect  in  the  growth 
of  human  character.  It  is,  in  fact,  just 
this  social  aspect  that  first  begins  to  be 
emphasized  for  the  youth  precisely  in  the 
*  Thaulow  :  Hegel's  Ansichten,  I.,  100. 


196  HegeVs  Educational  Ideas. 

school.  It  is  there  that  he  begins  to  feel 
on  the  one  hand  the  force  of  universal  in- 
terests, and  on  the  other  the  necessity  of 
subordinating  his  own  merely  particular 
interests  to  the  general  welfare.  By  de- 
crees, also,  he  learns  that  this  seeming 
sacrifice  on  his  part,  for  what  at  first  ap- 
pears to  be  merely  the  good  of  others, 
really  proves  to  be  nothing  else  than  the 
putting  away  of  whatever  is  unworthy  of 
himself — his  whims  and  childish  ^fancies — 
and  that,  hence,  1T  is  but  one  aspect  of 
the  process  of  attaining  that  true  freedom 
which  is  the  central  characteristic  of  ma- 
tured and  maturing  Personality. 

Nor  is  this  all  ;  for  since  the  rule  of  sac- 
rifice for  the  general  good  is  universally 
applied,  it  turns  out  that  each  necessarily 
receives  the  benefit  of  the  sacrifice  of  all. 
Each  sacrifices  what  in  truth  is  only  harm- 
ful to  himself.  Each  finds  himself  free  to 
pursue  his  own  highest  purpose  of  self- 
development,  because  of  like  sacrifices  on 
the  part  of  all  the  others. 

In  such  fine  form   does   the  school  pre- 


Discipline.  197 


sent,  each  day,  each  hour,  that  lesson,  im- 
measurable in  its  significance,  that  every 
reasonable  sacrifice  the  individual  can  be 
called  upon  to  make  for  others  must  un- 
failingly result  in  his  own  good,  as  well  as 
in  the  good  of  others. 

Clearly,  then,  punishment,  either  at 
home  or  in  school,  whether  by  depriving 
of  what  is  desired,  or  inflicting  what  is 
dreaded,  has  no  real  ground  of  justifica- 
tion save  that  of  bringing  the  child  to  a 
sense  of  the  universal  Right,  in  conflict 
with  which  his  owrTcleed  is  zvfong,  in  the 
very  fact  that  through  such  deed  his  own 
personality  becomes  distorted,  or  wrung, 
out  of  its  due  form  of  moral  comeliness. 
Punishment  in  anger,  as  mere  vengeance, 
is  simply  monstrous. 

All  this,  again,  suggest's  Kant's  sum- 
mary of  the  fundamental  aspects  of  edu- 
cation, to  the  following  effect  :  "  (1)  Man 
must  be  disciplined.  (2)  He  must  be  cul- 
tivated. (3)  Care  must  be  taken  that  in 
his  development  the  individual  shall  attain 
to  prudence,  that  he   shall  be  led  to  take 


198  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

his  place  in  the  social  organism,  that  he 
shall  come  to  be  esteemed,  and  to  have  an 
influence  [that  is,  to  count  for  something 
in  the  world].  To  this  aspect  there  be- 
longs a  special  sort  of  culture  which  has 
come  to  be  called  civilizing.  (4)  Regard 
must  be  had  to  the  end  and  mode  of  ren- 
dering the  individual  moral."* 

To  this  it  is  important  to  add,  that  the 
individual  becomes  truly  moral,  in  the 
Kantian,  in  the  Hegelian,  in  any  really 
philosophic  sense,  only  through  clear  com- 
prehension of,  and  direct  personal  adjust- 
ment to  fundamental  principles.  The 
actual  development  of  virtue,  as  Hegel 
expressly  insists,f  is  not  to  be  secured 
through  some  particular  ethicality,  or  set 
of  formulas,  retailed  by  this  or  that  indi- 
vidual, and  warranted  to  apply  without 
further  trouble  to  all  and  sundry  situa- 
tions. Such  striving  after  the  moral  is 
spurious  and  profitless. 

On  the  other  hand,  Hegel   never  ceases 

*  Werke,  X. ,  390. 

f  Cf.   Werke,  I.,  399  and  fol. 


Discipline.  1 99 


to  insist  that  in  its  fullest  meaning  the  ac- 
tual school  of  morality  for   the   individual 
is  nothing  else  than  just  the  social  world 
in  its  organic  character  of  existing  humaji- 
institutions.    On  this  point  he  quotes  as  a 


word  of  the  wisest  in  antiquity,  and  as 
expressing  the  central  truth  of  the  matter  : 
"  '  Be  moral,'  means  to  live  in  accordance 
with  the  customs  of  one's  own  country ' 
— i.  e.y  of  course,  the  publicly  recognized 
customs  of  the  ivhole  country,  not  the  more 
or  less  disguised  customs  of  this  or  that 
perverted  neighborhood,  or  class,  within 
that  country. 

But  we  must  turn  abruptly  from  this  as- 
pect of  our  theme — so  deserving  of  ex- 
tended discussion — and  hasten  to  the  close. 


200  HegeVs  Educational  Ideas. 


XIV. 

REFINEMENT. 

UNDER  this  heading  we  have  first  to  re- 
mind the  reader  of  the  fact  already  no- 
ticed, that  in  his  Encyclopedia  of  the  Phil- 
osophic Sciences  Hegel  presents  an  outline 
of  his  whole  system,  intended  directly  for 
educational  purposes.  The  Logic,  as  we 
may  note  again,  indicates  the  fundamental 
principles  of  the  system  in  universal,  ab- 
stract form.  The  Philosophy  of  Nature 
represents  his  view  of  the  outer  evolutional 
process,  which  gives  reality  to  the  forms 
and  forces  and  types  of  the  outer  world  of 
space,  and  which  thus  leads  up  to  the  in- 
ner world  of  Mind.  In  the  Philosophy  of 
Mind  he  offers  a  sketch  of  the  actual 
stages  in  the  evolution  of  Mind,  as  at  once 
Individual  and  Social. 

This  latter  again  presents  three  funda- 
mental  aspects  : 

(a)  Subjective  Spirit    (or    Mind).     This 


Refinement.  201 


again  appears  in  three  essential  phases, 
(1)  Anthropology,  (2)  Phenomenology, 
(3)  Psychology.  And  we  may  here  re- 
mark that  it  is  to  this  simplest  sphere 
of  Mind  that  educational  discussions  are 
commonly  confined  ;  in  which  fact  may 
be  seen  the  real  reason  why  such  dis- 
cussions bear  so  one-sidedly  individual- 
istic an  appearance,  as  far  as  concerns  the 
explicit  form  of  the  theories  developed. 
Hence  the  practically  exclusive  attention 
given  to  mere  Instruction,  and  this  as  given 
in  the  School. 

(5)  The  second  part  of  the  Philosophy 
of  Mind  is  devoted  to  what,  in  Hegel's 
phrase,  is  Objective  Spirit  (or  Mind). 
Here  Hegel  deals  with  man  in  his  social 
relations.  (1)  in  Property.  (2)  Individ- 
ual Morality.  (3)  Social  Morality.  It  is 
here,  in  fact,  that  we  find  the  one  substan- 
tial basis  for  rightly  estimating  the  nature, 
the  means,  and  the  methods  of  Discipline 
in  its  full  significance  as  a  phaSe"  6t  edu-7 
cation  essential  in  itself  and  coordinate 
with  Instruction.     Coordinate,  for  if  char- 


202  He/ el's  Educational  Ideas. 

acter  without  intelligence  is  crude,  intelli- 
gence without  character  is  demonic. 

(c)  The  third  subdivision  of  the  Philoso- 
phy of  Mind  has  for  its  special  theme  : 
Absolute  Spirit  (or  Mind).  This  final  sub- 
division presents  again  in  ascending  series 
the  three  subtlest  aspects  of  spiritual  evo- 
lution, viz,,  (i)  Art,  (2)  Religion,  and  (3) 
Philosophy ;  the  latter  finding  its  highest 
concrete  interest  in  Theology. 

To  which  we  have  now   to   add  that  we 
have  in  this  sphere  the  basis  and  demand 
for  a  third  aspect   of  education,  to  which 
we  have  already  given   the  name  Jiejine^ 
vicnt^^ 

And  here  we  must  restrict  ourselves  to 
barely  indicating  the  general  character  of 
the  theme  in  its  three  essential  aspects. 

(1)  Art  is  the  highest  sphere  in  the 
realm  of  the  Beautiful.  It  is  so  because 
art-works  are  developed  as  the  direct  ex- 
pression of  the  inherent  demand  of  the 
human  mind  for  perfection  in  Beauty  as  ex- 
pressed in  outer  form.  Nature  is  the  search 
for    rhythm.     Man   is   discovered  rhythm. 


Refinement.  203 


Nature  is  Divinity  going  forth  from  him- 
seTT7~  Man  is  Divinity  returning  to  him- 
self. The  Beauty  of  Nature  is  inarticulate. 
The  Beauty  of  Art  is  articulate.  The 
Beauty  of  Nature  is  limited  to  the  work- 
ings of  simple  mechanical  laws.  TI12 
Beauty  of  Art  is  the  rhythm  of  the  divine 
Consciousness  concretely  unfolded  in  and 
through  the  human  consciousness,  as  itself 
a  divinely  constituted  nature,  and  hence 
the  highest  medium  through  which  the 
eternal  creative  Mind  gives  expression  to 
itself.  Art  is  the  finished  product  of  the 
most  perfectly  matured  taste ;  and  we 
have  already  noticed  that  true  Tas 
nothing  else  than  Morality  become  beau 
tiful. 

But  thus  Art,  as  the  direct  product  of 
mind  as  mind,  is  but  the  expression  of  a 
universal  demand  of  mind.  It  is  but  one 
aspect  of  the  demand  of  the  mind  for 
Perfection.  And  Perfection  is  nothing  else 
than  this  :  Conformity  of  the  Real  zuith  the 
Ideal.  Not  the  individual's  chance,  capri- 
cious "ideal,"  or  mere  momentary  fancy; 


204  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

but  the  universal,  rational  Ideal  as  in  itself 
the  abiding  Type  in  any  given  sphere. 

Art  thus  constitutes  one  essential  aspect 
in  the  education  of  the  human  mind.  The 
developing  individual  mind  has  the  abso- 
lute right  to  be  brought  face  to  face  with 
each  and  every  specific  Type  of  the  Beau- 
tiful which  has  charmed  the  growing  divin- 
ity in  man  through  all  the  ages.  And  this 
introduction  can  be  accomplished  only 
through  the  media  of  the  finest  products 
of  human  genius  within  this  realm. 

But  also  this  aspect  of  the  education  of 
the  individual  requires  that  he  should  test 
his  own  powers  in  the  direction  of  produc- 
ing rhythmic  forms.  He  must  not  be  per- 
mitted to  assume  in  any  sphere  the  atti- 
tude of  mere  spectator.  He  must  be  accus- 
tomed also  to  regard  himself  as  partici- 
pator in  the  actual  process  of  the  world. 
Hence  is  he  given  endless  exercises  in 
every  department  of  his  school-life. 

It  is  this  deeper  educational  value  as 
exercises  of  the  pupils  inner  spiritual 
powers  that  constitutes  the  ultimate  justi- 


Refinement .  205 


fication  for  the  time  devoted  to  Drawing, 
to  Music,  and  to  the  study  of  Literature 
in  the  schools.  They  are,  first  of  all, 
media  of  Refinement,  of  the  cultivation  of 
Judgment  in  the  subtle  form  of  Taste 
which,  in  proportion  as  it  becomes  ma- 
tured, will  spontaneously  and  unerringly 
select  and  rejoice  in  whatever  is  truly  and 
nobly  beautiful,  whether  in  tone,  or  word, 
or  deed,  in  all  the  world — -and  this  is  but 
one  form  of  loving  the  truth  and  scorning 
a  lie.* 

(2)  But  thus  we  are  brought  to  notice 
that  true  art-products  are  but  the  imme- 
diate, formal  and  outward  creations  of  an 
inward  spiritual  principle,  of  which  again 
the  vital  essence  is  Religion.  It  is,  in  fact, 
one  of  the  cardinal  principles  of  Hegel 
that  all  art,  properly  speaking,  has  a  relig- 
ious content.    And  this  amounts  to  saying 


*  For  further  information  (in  English)  as  to  the 
Hegelian  view  of  Art  the  reader  is  referred  to  Hegel 's 
Philosophy  of  Art,  translated  by  the  present  writer, 
who  has  also  printed  a  volume  on  the  Philosophy  of 
Landscape  Painting. 


2o6  Hegel's  Ediccational  Ideas. 


that  every  attempt  to  separate  between 
art  and  religious  sentiment  is  nothing  else 
than  an  attempt  to  separate  between  the 
outer  Form  of  Beauty  and  its  inner  Sub- 
stance. 

Clearly,  then,  the  cry  of  "  art  for  art's 
sake,"  with  which  we  have  become  so  fa- 
miliar in  our  times,  is  merely  a  cry  of 
"  form  for  form's  sake."  It  is  this  cry  that 
led  the  divinely  beautiful  Helen  to  forget 
that  the  soul  of  Beauty  is  actual  ethical 
and  religious  life — forgetting  which,  as  one 
specially  significant  version  of  the  story 
tells  us,  she  became  herself  the  merest 
phantom.  And  this,  indeed,  is  the  story 
of  the  whole  Greek  world.  For  in  pro- 
portion as  their  religious  consciousness  be- 
came reduced  in  vitality,  their  art  lost 
poise,  and  became  phantasmal. 

Religion  is  the  essence  of  art  because  it 
is  the  essence  of  Life.  But  can  religion 
be  taught  ?  Upon  this  point  Hegel  de- 
clares that  those  who  deny  the  practica- 
bility of  making  religion  the  object  of  in- 
struction, really  fail'to  understand  what  it 


Refinement.  207 


is  with  which  such  instruction  ought  to 
begin.  One  has  only  to  recognize  that  re- 
ligion has  a  positive  inner  content  or  sub- 
stantial significance,  which  not  only  can, 
but  must  be  set  forth,  in  actual  outer  or 
"  objective  "  fashion — whether  in  art-forms 
or  in  the  more  definite  forms  of  language 
to  be  convinced  that  thus  far  religion  can 
be  taught. 

On  the  other  hand,  stirring  the  heart, 
excitation  of  religious  feeling — this  is  quite 
another  thing.  So  far  from  being  a  form 
of  instruction,  this  pertains  to  the  elo- 
quence and  pathos  of  preaching  and  can 
attain  to  nothing  more  than  awaking  the 
hearer  to  an  interest  in  a  given  theme. 
All  this  is  valid  and  of  the  highest  value 
in  itself,  but  it  is  not  teaching.  Besides, 
whatever  the  degree  in  which  feeling  may 
be  excited,  it  is  yet  vague,  and  hence 
needs  to  pass  through  the  differentiating 
process  of  definite  cultivation  and  clarifi- 
cation through  the  media  of  teaching  in 
the  proper  sense  of  the  term.  Sentiment 
must    be   raised   to  the    higher  power    of 


208  HegeVs  Educational  Ideas. 

clearly  defined  positive  doctrine.  And  so 
much  the  more,  since,  were  religion  to  ex- 
ist merely  as  feeling,  it  must  die  away  in- 
to a  vague,  dreamy,  inner  state  that  must 
become  more  and  more  incapable  of  out- 
ward manifestation  either  in  any  specific 
form  or  in  any  actual  deed.* 

Meanwhile,  here  as  elsewhere,  Hegel 
shows  his  alertness  and  self-poise  in  avoid- 
ing the  temptation  of  the  professional 
thinker  to  belittle  feeling  as  if  that  were  a 
less  worthy  phase  of  the  life  of  mind. 
And  especially  does  he  note  the  pedagog- 
ical limitations  involved  in  the  question  of 
the  possibility  of  including  Religion  in  a 
practical  scheme  of  elementary  instruc- 
tion. The  child,  he  reminds  us  specifical- 
ly^ attains  only  to  vorstellenden  Dcnkcn; 
that  is,  to  thinking  that  is  still  wholly  in- 
volved in  imagery.  In  fact,  so  far  as  his 
consciousness  can  be  said  to  be  explicit, 
the  world  exists  only  for  his  Vorstclliing, 
for  his  power   of   representing  the  world 

*  i  Cf.   Werke,  XI.,  130-160,  and  elsewhere, 
f    Werke,  VI 1 2.,  97. 


Refinement.  209 


about  him  in  forms  derived  from  and  ap- 
pealing directly  to,  the  Imagination. 

It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  while  Heg- 
el regards  religion  as  a  proper  object  of 
instruction,  and  this  to  the  full  extent  of 
the  whole  system  of  theology,  he  would 
restrict  such  instruction  for  children  rather 
to  the  ethical  aspects  that  can  be  repre- 
sented to  the  imagination  through  imagery 
and  to  such  simple  formulas  as  those  in 
which  the  catechism  consists.  /^£nd  we 
may  add  that  because  the  noblest  relig- 
ious ideas  and  sentiments  have  found 
their  worthiest  and  sublimest  sensuous  ex- 
pression in  the  various  books  of  the  He- 
brew and  Christian  Bible,  it  is  an  absolute, 
inalienable  right  of  every  child  to  be  made 
familiar  with  these  forms,  which  only  grow 
richer  in  content  for  the  individual  con- 
sciousness with  each  added  year  of  his  ex- 
perience in  actual  life. 

It  was  the  world  in  its  penny-wisdom 
that  knew  not  God  ;  and  so  gave  proof  of 
its  pound-foolishness.  If  Art  is  the  out- 
ward form  of  Refinement,  Religion  is  its 
14 


2io  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 


inner  soul  and  vital  substance.  And  edu- 
cation which  fails  to  take  this  fact  serious- 
ly into  the  account  must  itself  become 
phantasmal. 

(3)  Respecting  Philosophy,  we  can  add 
but  a  single  word.  Whether  we  regard  it 
as  the  "  unification  of  knowledge  "  (Spen- 
cer), or  as  the  "thinking  consideration  of 
kings"  (Hegel)  we  are  still  discovering  it 
to  be  the  supreme  effort  made  by  the  hu- 
man intelligence  to  grasp  together  all  ob- 
jects of  the  Real  World  as  constituting  at 
the  same  time  the  objects  of  the  Rational 
World.  And  this  means  that  Philosophy 
is  the  name  we  give  to  the  effort  of  the 
human  mind  to  behold  and  account  for 
all  things  in  their  actual,  true  relations, 
one  to  another. 

Evidently,  then,  all  teaching  presup- 
poses Philosophy,  as  all  learning  should 
lead  up  to  it.  For  teaching  consists 
essentially  in  the  pointing  out  of  relations, 
as  learning  consists  in  the  tracing  out  of 
relations.  And  this  includes  the  tracing 
out  of  relations  between  relations — that   is, 


Refinement.  1 1 1 


the  progressive  recognition  of  the  relative 
significance  of  relations  as  involved  in  the 
whole  scheme  of  the  world,  through  which 
alone  the  relative  (educational)  values  of 
things  can  be  ascertained. 

From  which  this  corollary  is  inevitable 
— that  a  course  in  sound  philosophy  ought 
to  constitute  an  essential  factor  in  the 
training  of  every  teacher,  and  especially  of 
every  teacher  who  has  to  do  with  the  in- 
struction of  advanced  pupils,  or  with  the 
supervision  of  work  in  any  grade. 

Such  course  ought  to  begin  in  rational 
Psychology  as  giving  an  account  of  the 
whole  mind,  including,  by  way  of  prelude, 
a  summary  view  of  anthropology,  together 
with  an  account  of  the  central  character- 
istics of  the  braip  and  nervous  system  as 
the  immediate  organ  of  mind,  and  espec- 
ially of  mind  within  the  range  of  the  sen- 
suous consciousness. 

The  next  stage  in  the  course  should 
consist  of  Logic  in  the  sense  of  a  careful 
study  of  the  Laws,  the  Forms  and  the 
Method  of  Thought. 


212  Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 

The  third  stage  would  present  the  prac- 
tical aspect — Ethics,  in  its  individual,  in 
its  social  and  in  its  historical  aspects. 

The  fourth  stage  ought  to  render  the 
student  familiar  with  the  general  outlines 
of  the  History  of  Philosophy ;  that  is,  a 
critical  history  of  the  successive  phases  in 
the  evolutional  process  through  which  the 
human  mind  has  passed  in  the  interpreta- 
tion of  the  world  as  a  whole. 

The  fifth  and  culminating  stage  ought  to 
consist  in  a  thorough-going  analysis  which 
should  also  be  a  careful  sympathetic  study 
of  one  great  work  constituting  the  central 
ganglion  of  one  of  the  great  constructive 
Systems  of  Philosophy,  and  which  would 
put  the  student  in  definite  possession  of 
an  adequate  and  consistent  organon  or 
method  for  all  his  future  work. 

And  if  this  is  true  of  all  teachers  in  gen- 
eral, only  so  much  the  more  must  it  be 
true  of  those  teachers  who  have  the  infin- 
itely responsible  task  of  teaching  actual  or 
prospective  teachers. 

To  which  we   may   add   that  (to  quote 


Refinement.  2 1 


j 


another  of  Hegel's  happy  definitions) 
Philosophy  seriously  pursued  is  just  "  a 
perpetual  service  of  God  ;  "  for  first  of  all 
it  raises  to  the  highest  degree  attainable 
for  the  individual  the  self-defining  process 
of  the  mind  and  thus  assures  the  highest 
measure  of  precision  in  the  self-realizing 
process  of  mind,  the  unfailing  outcome  of 
which  must  be  the  unfolding  of  that  rich 
rhythm  of  Refinement  that  constitutes  the 
central  charm  in  a  truly  worthy  Life. 

Yet  one  thing  is  lacking  in  the  enumera- 
tion of  the  requirements  which  Hegel 
would  make  of  the  Teacher.  It  is  that  he 
should  not  depend  upon  his  own  mere  per- 
sonal gifts  as  these  chance  to  develop  into 
more  or  less  onesided  method  ;  nor  yet 
upon  imitation  of  this  or  that  favorite 
teacher  ;  but  that  he  should  become  famil- 
iar with  the  whole  course  of  the  History 
of  Education  as  such.  It  is  thus  alone 
that  he  can  hope  to  escape  falling  into 
errors  of  greater  or  less  gravity.  Nor 
can  he  otherwise  avail   himself  of  the  dis- 


214 


Hegel's  Educational  Ideas. 


coveries  and  achievements  of  the  race  in 
the  process  of  guiding  and  stimulating  in- 
dividual human  minds  in  that  struggle 
towards  maturity  that  ends  only  in  God. 


ORN^ 


U  DAY  USE 

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